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In the last decades, young adolescents, when entering secondary school, increasingly 
have been placed in the role of active learners with responsibilities for their own 
learning process. In the Netherlands, this resulted in a secondary-education system in 
which students have to face more and more responsibilities for their own learning and 
study success. In order to be successful, students have to be able to plan their learning 
activities and execute them in a systematic and orderly way, to monitor and to evaluate 
their own learning and to refl ect on it. All afore-mentioned skills are components of 
metacognitive skillfulness.
 This thesis aims to gain insight into the development of metacognitive skillfulness 
in young adolescents. The development of metacognitive skills will be investigated 
in relation to intellectual ability and learning performance. Furthermore, it will be 
investigated whether metacognitive skills are general or domain specifi c. Metacognitive-
skill development of young adolescents, aged 12 to 15 years, will be investigated in both 
longitudinal and cross-sectional designs.
1.1 Metacognition as a concept
In recent publications metacognition, that is, cognition about cognition, has been 
characterized as a concept that lacks coherence (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & 
Affl erbach, 2006) and as a concept with ‘fuzzy borders’ (Zohar & Ben-David, 2009). 
Besides the problem that the concept of metacognition is not very well-defi ned, the 
term metacognition often is used interchangeably with self-regulation (SR) and self-
regulated learning (SRL), or considered as intertwined with self-regulation (Dinsmore, 
Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008; Fox & Riconscente, 2008). SR and SRL are concepts that 
are rooted in the social-cognitive research tradition and infl uenced by neobehaviorism, 
while metacognition has its roots in cognitive developmental research. SR emphasizes 
the interaction of the person with the environment as well as the motivation of the 
person (Bandura, 1977). The application of SR to school learning led to the SRL-theory. 
According to SRL-theory, the interaction between cognition, metacognition, and 
motivation is very important for learning performance (Zimmerman, 1986). In cognitive 
developmental studies, however, researchers traditionally are less concerned with the 
role of motivation in learning. The research in this thesis is conducted from a cognitive 
developmental perspective and will focus on metacognition in particular.
 One of the reasons for the lack of consensus concerning the term metacognition is 
that it is used to refer to both knowledge about cognition and to regulation of cognition. 
In most descriptions of metacognition two knowledge components can be distinguished: 
A declarative knowledge component and a procedural knowledge component for the 
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regulation of behavior (Brown, 1987; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Veenman et al., 2006). 
Flavell (1976, 1979), as ‘founding father’ of metacognition, subdivided metacognition 
into metacognitive knowledge and the active monitoring and regulation of cognitive 
processes: “Metacognition refers to one’s knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive 
processes and products or anything related to them, (…) Metacognition refers, among 
other things, to the active monitoring and consequent regulation and orchestration 
of these processes in relation to the cognitive objects on which they bear, usually in 
the serve of some concrete goal or objective.” (Flavell, 1976, p. 232). According to 
Flavell, metacognitive knowledge refers to the declarative knowledge one has about the 
interplay between person characteristics, task characteristics, and strategy characteristics. 
For example, a student thinks that s/he is a poor performer (person characteristic) in 
remembering historical facts and dates (task characteristics) and, therefore, has to write 
down the important facts and dates several times (strategy characteristics) before knowing 
them by heart. Procedural metacognitive knowledge is known from the literature by 
terms of ‘executive decisions’ (Kluwe, 1987), ‘metacognitive control’ (Ertmer & Newby, 
1996), ‘regulation and control’ (Brown, 1987; Schraw, 1998), and ‘metacognitve skills’ 
(Veenman, 1993). All these terms refer to a person’s skills for regulating and controlling 
his/her own cognitive activities. Metacognitive skills refer to the actual regulation of, 
and control over, one’s learning performance (Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Veenman, 
Elshout, & Meijer, 1997). In many cases, however, metacognitive skills remain covert 
mechanisms that take place inside the head (Veenman et al., 2006) and have to be 
inferred from students’ overt behavior or utterances, that is, from concrete cognitive 
activities. For example, when a student starts to reread a paragraph, this activity is 
probably the consequence of a monitoring or evaluation process. Different components 
of metacognitive skillfulness (also referred to as ‘subscales of metacognitive skillfulness’) 
may come into play either at the onset of task performance (orientation), during task 
performance (planning, monitoring, evaluation), or at the end of task performance 
(elaboration and refl ection). A more detailed description of metacognitive skills, in 
particular those in text studying and problem solving, is given in section 1.5.
 Some researchers not only separate declarative from procedural knowledge, but 
they also distinguish conditional knowledge (Brown, 1987; Schraw & Moshman, 1995), 
resulting in a distinction between a) declarative metacognitive knowledge (knowing that, 
knowing about); b) conditional metacognitive knowledge (knowing when and why); 
and c) procedural metacognitive knowledge, also referred to as metacognitive skills 
(knowing how). Conditional knowledge, however, pertains to declarative knowledge. 
Even if conditional knowledge is adequate, it does not guarantee the right application 
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of a certain strategy due to the fact that the learner does not necessarily possess the 
procedural knowledge of how to use this strategy (Veenman, 2011). In order to apply 
metacognitive skills in the right way at the right time, one needs the required repertoire of 
procedural knowledge, that is, knowing how to use these skills effectively. This repertoire 
can be considered as a program of self-instructions (Veenman, 2011), represented by a 
production system of condition-action rules (Anderson, 1996; Veenman, 2011; Winne, 
2010). The condition part of the rules triggers certain activities (i.e., the action part 
of the rules) of the learner. For example, IF (condition) you cannot solve the problem 
on which you are working, THEN (action) see if you can transform it into a familiar 
problem; or IF (condition) you encounter an unfamiliar word, THEN (action) see if 
you can deduce its meaning from the context, and if not, look it up in a dictionary. 
Considering metacognitive skills as condition-action rules implicates that students can 
be trained to use the condition and the action part as one set of rules belonging to 
a production system of metacognitive self-instructions within a certain context. Once 
students recognize the condition part of the rules, they will perform the action part of the 
rules that is triggered by the conditions. Some of these actions will be automated when 
students become more experienced learners, others need to be consciously applied 
and tuned to the task at hand (Veenman, 2011). Finally, Zohar and Ben-David (2009) 
refer to the ‘how, when & why’ knowledge as meta-strategic knowledge (MSK), which 
links MSK to Kuhn’s procedural meta-knowing (1999). According to Veenman (2011), 
MSK “obscures the boundary between metacognitive knowledge and skills. It precludes 
the notion that metacognitive strategies may fail either due to incorrect or incomplete 
conditional knowledge, or due to lack of knowledge about how to execute a strategy” 
(p. 199). Nevertheless, conditional knowledge can be considered as an important factor 
in the acquisition of metacognitive skills. Knowing when and why to use a certain 
strategy can be considered as a fi rst step toward the acquisition of metacognitive skills, 
that is, the cognitive stage of production rules before these rules get transformed into 
automated skills through proceduralization. Proceduralization is the dropping out of 
cues from declarative knowledge, resulting in a faster and more automated execution of 
the strategy (Anderson, 1996).
 As stated above, metacognitive declarative knowledge refers to factual knowledge 
one has about the cognitive system in general and one’s own cognition in particular. 
Like knowledge about other things, one’s knowledge about the cognitive system can 
have shortcomings. It can be insuffi cient, inaccurate, not reliably retrieved, etc. (Flavell, 
1992). Conditional knowledge is declarative knowledge about when and why certain 
metacognitive strategies should be applied. Although some researchers (Schraw & 
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Moshman, 1995; Simons, 1996) assumed that metacognitive knowledge is correct know-
ledge based on earlier experiences, it can be argued that metacognitive knowledge, 
just like any other type of declarative knowledge, is not always correct, available and/
or applied when necessary. As Campione (1987, p. 134) formulated: “Availability of 
knowledge, either declarative or procedural, does not in itself guarantee fl exible access 
to and use of those resources”. Alexander, Carr and Schwanenfl ugel (1995) found a 
discrepancy between children’s knowledge about monitoring and applying monitoring 
skills during task performance. Winne (1996) stated that knowledge has no effect on 
behavior until this knowledge is actually needed and actually used. So, it is quite 
possible that students have knowledge of a certain strategy at their disposal, but still 
not spontaneously use this strategy during task performance (Barnett, 2000; Focant, 
Grégoire, & Desoete, 2006; Pressley, Yokoi, Van Meter, Van Etten, & Freebern, 1997; 
Veenman, Kok, & Blöte, 2005). According to the fi ndings of the afore-cited studies, 
metacognitive (conditional) knowledge does not automatically lead to an adequate 
use of metacognitive strategies. Consequently, metacognitive knowledge often poorly 
predicts learning outcomes, whereas metacognitive skills appear to have a much stronger 
predictive value (Veenman, 2005). Based on a review of studies, Wang, Haertel, and 
Walberg (1990) concluded that metacognition is the most important predictor of learning 
performance. In an overview of studies, Veenman (2008) estimated that metacognitive 
skillfulness accounted for 40% of variance in learning performance. Therefore, this 
thesis will focus on metacognitive skills in relation to learning performance.
1.2 Metacognition from a developmental perspective
Roughly spoken, research into the development of metacognition has focused on two 
issues: 1) Where does metacognition come from? And 2) when does it fi rst emerge 
and how does it develop from there? Although the question ‘where does metacognition 
come from?’ is an issue of great interest, this issue goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Therefore, it will be discussed only very briefl y. Some evidence has been found that 
“theory of mind” (ToM) can be considered as a precursor of metacognitive knowledge 
(Lockl & Schneider, 2006), while metacognitive knowledge can be considered as a 
necessary precursor of one’s metacognitive skills (Annevirta & Vauras, 2006). In both 
studies, metacognitive competencies of very young children (preschoolers) were 
assessed. Results of both studies indicate that individual differences in the development 
of these competencies are already existent at an early age.
 In this thesis the focus will be on the discussion about the second issue, the 
developmental trajectory of metacognition, in particular of metacognitive skills. 
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According to Piaget (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), children younger than seven years are 
not able to keep a record of their own problem-solving attempts due to shortcomings 
in storing a record of their own cognitive activities. Piaget claimed that the egocentrism 
of young children prevents them from introspection or treating their own thinking as an 
object (Flavell, 1992). He assumed that egocentric perspective would change at the age 
of 11 – 12 years “when the child moves into thinking characterized by formal operations 
or hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Now the child becomes capable of metacognition 
in the sense of awareness of and refl ective knowledge regarding her own thoughts and 
thought processes” (Piaget, 1964/1968, p. 64).
 The earliest work on metacognitive development, however, dealt almost 
exclusively with metamemory, that is, awareness and monitoring of memory strategies. 
Evidence was found that children younger than 11 – 12 years have knowledge or at 
least awareness of their own memory and memory-strategy use. Flavell, Friedrichs, 
and Hoyt (1970) investigated the ability to predict one’s own immediate memory span 
in preschool through fourth grade students. Results showed strong developmental 
differences. Accuracy in predicting the memory span increased signifi cantly with 
age. In a longitudinal study between 2 and 20 years, Schneider and Pressley (1997) 
found evidence that memory-strategy development begins before elementary school 
and continues into adulthood. Furthermore, older children predict their own (memory) 
performance better than preschoolers, who often overestimate their own performance 
(Flavell & Wellman, 1977). Despite the fact that preschoolers display some metacognitive 
knowledge, (e.g., they understand that increasing the number of items makes a memory 
test harder; Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975), it is not before middle childhood 
that they understand that a memory strategy like categorization of objects will help 
them remember the objects better (Moynahan, 1978). Furthermore, young children 
tend not to apply strategies spontaneously in contexts where they would be useful. 
Improvements in this respect occur during the middle childhood years, but even by the 
end of childhood (strategy use or memory) performance is far from infallible (Brown et 
al., 1983; Schneider, 1985). Not only in the fi eld of metamemory evidence was found 
against Piaget who related the onset of metacognition to the formal-operational stage 
of development (11 – 12 years). Researchers in other domains (e.g., problem solving 
and text comprehension) also found evidence of metacognitive activities in younger 
children, even preschoolers. Kluwe (1987) investigated how children of different ages 
could cope with changing problem-solving conditions. Results showed that 4-year-olds 
knew when an originally selected approach to the problem was no longer adequate. 
These young children appeared to be able to effectively regulate their own search for a 
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solution. Whitebread et al. (2009) observed 3- to 5-year olds while interacting in playful 
problem-solving situations, e.g., distributing dolls over a limited number of chairs. The 
children revealed elementary forms of planning, monitoring, and refl ection. Markman 
(1979) investigated elementary school children’s awareness of their own comprehension 
failure by presenting them inconsistent information. Results showed that third through 
sixth graders do not spontaneously carry out the monitoring processes that they are 
capable of. Only modest improvements could be observed through the school years. If 
the students were alerted that something in the passage might not make sense, Markman 
found that the performance of sixth graders exceeded that of third graders. Veenman 
et al. (2006) argue that it is most likely that metacognitive skills develop alongside 
metacognitive knowledge during preschool and early-school years at a very basic 
level and that these skills become more sophisticated and academically oriented when 
needed in formal educational settings. In a cross-sectional study, Veenman et al. (2004) 
investigated the metacognitive skillfulness of fourth-, sixth-, and eighth-graders, and 
university students (aged 9 – 22 years). When performing four inductive-learning tasks in 
different domains, students’ metacognitive skillfulness was assessed with logfi le analysis 
and thinking-aloud protocols. A linear increase of metacognitive skillfulness with age 
was found. In the same vein, Veenman and Spaans (2005) assessed the metacognitive 
skillfulness of fi rst-year and third-year secondary school students performing a problem-
solving task in math and an inductive-learning task in biology. Veenman and Spaans 
(2005) found that high-intelligent students exhibited more metacognitive activities 
relative to low-intelligent ones, while third-year students showed more metacognitive 
activities than fi rst-year students did.
 From the afore-cited it becomes clear that metacognition develops gradually, 
that is, it does not appear from one moment to the other like a rabbit from a magician’s 
hat. As Kuhn (2000, p. 178) formulated: “metacognition emerges early in life, … and 
follows an extended developmental course during which it becomes more explicit, 
more powerful, and hence more effective, as it comes to operate increasingly under 
the individual’s conscious control.” In order to understand better how metacognitive 
development can be facilitated, it is important to know more about the developmental 
trajectory of metacognition. As could be learned from the afore-cited studies, the 
development of metacognition is quite a long trajectory. It appears that even very young 
children exhibit metacognitive competencies to a certain extent (Brown, 1997), while 
the metacognition of adults still reveals serious weaknesses (Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, 
& Anderson, 1995). As stated earlier, Brown et al. (1983) and Schneider (1985) found 
that children not always apply strategies spontaneously in contexts where they would 
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be useful. Kuhn (1999) said that not a great deal is known about the development of 
metastrategic (memory) skills in school contexts. Therefore, the focus in this thesis is on 
spontaneous use of metacognitive skills, without any training or intervention, during the 
performance of ecologically valid school tasks.
 One of the weaknesses of research on metacognitive development so far is the 
frequent use of cross-sectional designs. Despite the risk of participants dropping out 
from a longitudinal study before data collection has ended, there are serious arguments 
in favor of a longitudinal design relative to a cross-sectional design. In a longitudinal 
design continuous changes in frequency and quality of metacognitive skillfulness can be 
detected and followed with more precision than in a cross-sectional design. Moreover, in 
a cross-sectional design there is the problem of error variance due to comparing different 
age groups. Given the large individual variability in brain structure among individuals, 
especially during development, Casey, Tottenham, Liston, and Durston (2005) advocate 
a more frequent use of longitudinal designs in evaluating cortical changes with age. 
Considering the pros and cons of the two designs, for this thesis a longitudinal design 
is preferred to the more frequently used “cross-sectional, frozen, one shot looks at age 
changes” (Brown, 1987, p. 107) design.
1.3 Metacognitive skills and intellectual ability
Veenman (1993; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; 
Veenman & Verheij, 2003) described three, mutually exclusive models concerning 
the relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness as predictors of 
learning performance. The intelligence model regards metacognitive skillfulness as an 
integral part of intellectual ability. In this model metacognitive skillfulness does not 
contribute to learning performance on top of intellectual ability. According to this 
model, metacognitive skills cannot have a predictive value for learning performance 
independent of intellectual ability. Sternberg (1990), for instance, advocates such an 
inclusive position of ‘metacomponents’ in his triarchic theory of intelligence. Support 
for the intelligence model was found by Elshout and Veenman (1992) in a study with 
university students working in a computer-simulated environment. Other researchers 
found signifi cant differences concerning the application of metacognitive strategies 
between gifted and non-gifted students (Cheng, 1993; Hannah & Shore, 1995; Shore 
& Dover, 1987; Span & Overtoom-Corsmit 1986; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1990). 
The second, contrasting model is the independency model, in which intellectual 
ability and metacognitive skillfulness are regarded as entirely independent predictors 
of learning performance. Support for the independency model was found by Allon, 
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Gutkin, and Bruning (1994). They found a correlation of .15 between metacognition 
scores and WISC-R scores of adolescents performing several cognitive tasks. In a study 
with children performing Piagetian tasks, Swanson (1990) reported that intelligence 
and metacognition were unrelated. In another study, however, Swanson, Christie, and 
Rubadeau (1993) found that metacognition appeared to be only partly independent of 
intelligence. In the third model, the mixed model, intellectual ability and metacognitive 
skillfulness are correlated, but metacognitive skillfulness has its own, unique contribution 
to the prediction of learning performance, on top of intellectual ability. Support for 
the mixed model was found in several studies, either with computer simulations in 
the domains of physics, statistics, and behavioral psychology, with text-studying tasks 
in the domains of law, geography, or with problem-solving tasks in the domains of 
math, biology and physics (Elshout &Veenman, 1992; Veenman, 1993; Veenman 
& Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman & Elshout, 1991, 1999; Veenman, Elshout, & Busato, 
1994; Veenman, Elshout & Meijer, 1997; Veenman, Prins, & Elshout, 2002; Veenman 
& Spaans, 2005; Veenman & Verheij, 2003; Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004). 
Results of a study in which primary-school students performed arithmetic problems (Van 
der Heijden, 1989) corroborated the mixed model as well. The same applied for the 
results of Maqsud (1997) with secondary-school students performing math and reading 
tasks. Berger and Reid (1989) concluded from their study with students ranging from 
mentally retarded to normal achieving individuals that “IQ mediates metacognition, but 
does not explain it”. Stankov (2000) argued that metacognition is partly independent 
of fl uid intelligence. Minnaert and Janssen (1999), on the other hand, rejected the 
intelligence model, but could not decide between the independency model and the 
mixed model when predicting fi rst-year university students’ learning performance, while 
using a questionnaire to measure regulatory study activities.
 Although over the last decades support has been found for each of the three 
models, the results of studies with complete data sets, that is, data sets containing 
measures of metacognition, intelligence, and learning performance, seem to be 
in favor of the mixed model. Most of the studies, however, are diffi cult to compare 
due to dissimilarities in methods for assessing metacognitive skillfulness (thinking 
aloud, observation, questionnaires), in participants (age, educational background, 
intelligence), and in tasks and domains. Another limitation for comparing the studies 
concerns the fact that the focus of some studies is restricted to the relation between 
intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness, thereby excluding the relation of 
both predictors with learning performance. Moreover, many of the afore-cited studies 
concern university students, that is, students who are used to apply their metacognitive 
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skills in an academic context for quite a period of time. Because of these limitations, 
it still remains uncertain whether the mixed model can be generalized to younger 
students with less developed metacognitive skills. From a developmental perspective 
not only the question to what extent intellectual ability and metacognitive ability are 
related as predictors of learning performance is interesting, but also the question how 
both predictors develop in relation to each other. Alexander et al. (1995) formulated 
three developmental hypotheses with regard to the relation between intellectual ability 
and the development of metacognition, excluding the relation of both predictors with 
learning performance. The ceiling hypothesis assumes that effects of intelligence on 
the development of metacognition diminish over time. Initially, gifted children might 
develop their metacognitive skills faster than non-gifted children, but later the non-
gifted children ‘catch up’. In line with the ceiling hypothesis, Schneider and Pressley 
(1997) argue that during cognitive development the effects of some limitations of the 
information processing system in young children, for example their memory capacity, 
are being reduced. This would result in more resources becoming available with age 
for applying metacognitive skills. Conversely, the acceleration hypothesis assumes that 
the impact of intelligence on the development of metacognition increases with age. 
If this were the case, intellectual development would reinforce the development of 
metacognitive skills. When regulatory activities demand more complex and/or more 
abstract activities with age (e.g. refl ecting), a higher intellectual level is required to do 
so. At the same time one could argue that more complex cognitive tasks require more 
and better metacognitive skills. Finally, the monotonic development hypothesis assumes 
that both intelligence and metacognition show a monotonic growth over age, while 
intellectual ability does not affect the development of metacognitive skills. Linking the 
models proposed by Alexander et al. (1995) to the three models described by Veenman 
(1993), it can be argued that both the acceleration hypothesis and the ceiling hypothesis 
relate to the intelligence model as the infl uence of intellectual ability on metacognition 
either increases or diminishes with age. In the ceiling hypothesis the intelligence model 
will fi t less with age, whereas in the acceleration hypothesis the intelligence model 
will fi t more with age. The monotonic hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts a parallel 
growth of both intellectual and metacognitive abilities. Such a parallel, monotonic 
development requires that the development of metacognition does not interact with 
the intellectual development, as would be the case in a non-monotonic development. 
The monotonic development hypothesis would suggest a link with the mixed model, 
where metacognitive skills do not develop merely as a component of intellectual ability, 
but have their own unique contribution to learning performance on top of intellectual 
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ability. Finally, the independency model fi ts none of Alexander’s hypotheses, since it 
predicts that there is no relation between intelligence and metacognition at all. In their 
literature overview, Alexander et al. (1995) found support for the monotonic development 
of metacognitive knowledge. Gifted children showed a general superiority in their 
declarative metacognitive knowledge. Giftedness effects were persistent throughout 
childhood with gifted early elementary school children showing a similar superiority in 
this knowledge relative to their non-gifted peers as junior high school students did. With 
regard to metacognitive skills, however, the results were inconclusive. Alexander et al. 
(1995) did not address intellectual and metacognitive ability as predictors of learning 
performance. In several studies, Veenman (2006), Veenman and Spaans (2005), and 
Veenman et al. (2004) addressed this issue using inductive discovery-learning tasks or 
problem-solving tasks in a cross-sectional design. Overall results fi tted the mixed model. 
Metacognitive skills develop alongside, but not entirely as part of intellectual ability. 
Moreover, support was found for a monotonic maturation effect of both intellectual 
ability and metacognitive skillfulness in a parallel mode across age groups.
 In this thesis not only participants’ intellectual and metacognitive abilities will 
be assessed each year for three consecutive years, but also their learning performance. 
In this way, the relation between intellectual ability and metacognition as predictors 
of learning performance will be addressed and at the same time the relation between 
the fi rst two variables will be studied from a developmental perspective. After entering 
secondary school young adolescents will perform two series of different tasks in two 
widely varying domains for three consecutive years.
1.4 Generality vs. domain-specifi city of metacognitive skills
A frequently discussed issue is whether metacognitive skills are domain specifi c or 
general by nature. Prior studies concerning this issue of metacognitive skills being general 
or domain specifi c have yielded contradictory results. By using four metacognitive tasks 
(ease of learning judgments, feeling of knowing judgments, judgments of learning, 
and text-comprehension monitoring), Kelemen, Frost, and Weaver (2000) investigated 
whether university students’ metacognitive monitoring ability is a general, domain-
independent ability. They concluded that metacognitive memory accuracy was not 
stable across tasks and sessions, which they interpreted as evidence against a general 
metacognitive ability. Also Glaser, Schauble, Raghavan, and Zeitz (1992) found 
evidence against the generality of metacognitive skills. They investigated the generality 
vs. domain-specifi city of metacognition in discovery-learning tasks. University freshmen 
performed three discovery-learning tasks in different domains (physics and economics). 
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Results showed that metacognitive activities of university students varied across 
different discovery-learning tasks, which can be interpreted as evidence in favor of 
domain specifi city. Nevertheless, Glaser et al. (1992) did not rule out the role of general 
strategies of a larger grain size, since learners improved when performing one learning 
task after the other. In a study of Veenman et al. (1997), metacognitive skills of students 
performing discovery-learning tasks in three different domains (calorimetry, statistics, 
and a fi ctitious one) appeared to be general rather than domain specifi c. In another 
study (Veenman et al., 2004), the metacognitive skillfulness of fourth-, sixth-, and eighth-
graders, and university students appeared to be a general, person-related characteristic 
for all age groups, ranging from 9 to 22 yrs. All participants performed four computerized 
inductive-learning tasks, that is, two tasks in the domain of biology and two tasks in 
the domain of geography. In Veenman and Verheij (2003), technical university students 
performed two tasks, a mathematical model-construction task that was part of their 
curriculum and a discovery-learning task in a fi ctitious domain. Their results supported 
the generality of metacognitve skills across tasks and domains. Veenman and Beishuizen 
(2004) found support for the general nature of metacognitive skills of undergraduate 
students studying two texts in different domains (geography vs. forensic psychology). 
Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, and Roedel (1995) investigated the nature of metacognitive 
skills, in particular monitoring skills, during test taking. In a fi rst experiment, Schraw and 
colleagues (1995) found support for the domain-specifi c hypothesis. In this experiment, 
they used eight tests that differed with respect to several dimensions, like content, length, 
diffi culty, and test format. In a next experiment, tests were used that differed only on 
one dimension, that is, only content domain was varied. Once tests were matched on 
dimensions other than content knowledge, fi ndings were consistent with the domain-
general hypothesis. Schraw et al. (1995) suggested a compromise between domain-
specifi c and domain-general hypotheses. They argued that “domain-general monitoring 
skills emerge late in development, are preceded by modularized monitoring skills, and 
emerge only after considerable effort has been devoted…to integrating monitoring skills 
across domains” (p. 441). In the same vein, Veenman and Spaans (2005) assumed that 
metacognitive skills initially develop on separate islands of tasks and domains and that 
after the age of 12 years these metacognitive skills become more and more general. 
In their study, 12- and 15-year olds performed two tasks in two different domains 
(solving math word problems and an inductive-learning task for biology). Metacognitive 
skills of the 12-year-olds appeared to be rather domain specifi c, whereas those of the 
15-year-olds turned out to be general. It can be argued that in the afore-cited studies 
differences in tasks and domains were not large enough in order to answer the question 
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whether metacognitive skills are general or domain specifi c by nature, and whether 
age is involved. By maximizing the difference in both tasks and domains at the same 
time, the opportunity for fi nding a domain-specifi c factor will be optimized, relative to 
prior studies in which domains and/or tasks differed to a lesser extent. Therefore, in the 
research for this thesis, history vs. mathematics are contrasted as domains because they 
additionally allow for a substantial difference in tasks, that is, text studying vs. problem 
solving. Moreover, both tasks are ecologically valid as all students are to a certain extent 
familiar with and trained in these domains since elementary school. In a longitudinal 
design in which the same participants are followed for several years, it also is possible 
to draw conclusions about the nature of metacognitive skills along the developmental 
trajectory. The question is whether metacognitive skills will develop from being domain 
specifi c into general skills, as argued by Schraw et al. (1995) and Veenman & Spaans 
(2005).
1.5 Metacognitive skills in text studying and problem solving
Many studies on metacognitive skills pertain to one particular domain or task. 
Presumably, the most frequently used tasks are problem-solving tasks and text-studying 
or text-comprehension tasks. As shown in section 1.4, there is still no consensus among 
researchers whether metacognitive skills are general of domain specifi c. As argued by 
Veenman et al. (2006, p. 7), “one of the reasons for these equivocal results may be found 
in the grain of analysis used by researchers. At fi rst glance, metacognitive activities may 
differ from one task to the other, say text studying vs. problem solving”. In a hierarchical 
model three levels of specifi city of metacognitive activities were distinguished for any 
task (Meijer, Veenman & Van Hout-Wolters, 2006). Based on a very detailed list (Pressley 
& Affl erbach, 1995) of some 150 concrete metacognitive reading activities, Meijer et 
al. (2006) made a list of some 65 metacognitive activities for problem-solving tasks in 
physics. Activities in the detailed list of Pressley and Affl erbach as well as in the one of 
Meijer et al. can be considered as metacognitive activities at the lowest level. Looking at 
metacognitive activities in different tasks, they could be perceived as different from task 
to task. At the surface level, they differ indeed, but they stem from the same metacognitive 
behavior at the intermediate level. For example, prior to the actual reading of a history 
text, a student may scan the subtitles of all paragraphs in order to get an idea about 
what the text is about, while prior to a math problem, s/he will make a sketch of the 
problem in order to build a mental representation of the problem. In both cases, the 
student applies a metacognitive skill that guides the initial execution of the task, that is, 
the preparatory activity of orienting on the task prior to execution. Other examples of 
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orienting activities for text-studying tasks are scanning the text, goal setting for reading, 
and thinking about what to expect in an upcoming test (Pressley & Affl erbach, 1995; 
Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004). Examples of orienting activities for problem-solving 
tasks are reading the problem statement, establishing what information is given and 
what is asked for, and predicting a plausible outcome (Meijer et al., 2006). Like the 
orienting activities, concrete planning activities for text-studying tasks also differ from 
planning activities for problem-solving tasks at the lowest level. For example, deciding 
what to read fi rst and how to navigate through the text pertains to text-studying tasks, 
while designing a step-by-step action plan in order to solve the problem is distinctive 
of problem-solving tasks. In short, concrete, task-specifi c self-regulatory activities at the 
lowest level have a common denominator at the intermediate level. In this thesis, four 
components of general metacognitive skillfulness are distinguished at the intermediate 
level: Orientation, that is, preparatory metacognitive activities prior to task performance; 
Planning, that is, having an orderly sequence of planned actions instead of working by 
trial- and-error; Evaluation, that is, monitoring and checking in order to keep track of 
good task performance; Elaboration and Refl ection, that is, refl ecting on what has been 
learned, and relating this to one’s own prior knowledge. These four components have 
been based on the Effective working method by Veenman (1993), which is an organized 
set of self-regulatory activities for passing through the phases (prior, during, and after) 
of task performance. Each of these activities not only seems to contribute to good task 
performance, but they also appear to be highly interdependent (Veenman & Spaans, 
2005). When orienting thoroughly on a task, a student probably will build a deeper 
representation of the problem or the task requirements. Consequently, the student will be 
able to build a detailed plan instead of working by trial-and-error, which further enables 
him/her to monitor and control the learning process. Finally, this set of activities provides 
an opportunity for learning through refl ection (Veenman et al., 1997). As formulated 
in section 1.4, the difference in both tasks and domains in this thesis is maximized 
relative to other studies, in order to answer the question whether metacognitive skills 
are general or domain specifi c by nature. By maximizing the difference in both tasks and 
domains at the same time, the opportunity for fi nding a domain-specifi c factor will be 
optimized. Because the scores at the intermediate level are composed of scores at the 
lowest level, scores at the intermediate level allow for fi nding both general and domain-
specifi c tendencies. In the case of metacognitive skills being general by nature, there has 
to be a stability in intra-individual differences across different tasks in different domains. 
For example, if a student is metacognitively active in text studying, s/he will show this 
active metacognitive behavior in problem solving too. If metacognitive skills would be 
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domain specifi c by nature, however, no stability in intra-individual differences across 
tasks would be found. Thus, a student that is metacognitively active in text studying, not 
necessarily will show the same metacognitve behavior in problem solving.
1.6  Assessing metacognitive skills
In the past decades, different methods for assessing metacognitive skills have been 
developed. These methods differ regarding the way and the moment the assessment 
takes place. With respect to the way of assessing metacognitive skills, a main 
distinction is made between off-line and on-line methods (Veenman et al., 2006). Off-
line methods are assessment methods that are used before or after task performance. 
Questionnaires (e.g., MSLQ, Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; MAI, Schraw & Dennison, 
1994) and interviews (Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1990) are examples of off-line 
methods. Both questionnaires and interviews can be administered before (prospective) 
or after (retrospective) task performance (Veenman, 2005). On-line methods, on the 
other hand, are concurrent methods. In these methods the assessment of metacognitive 
skills takes place during task performance. Systematic observations (Veenman et al., 
2005; Whitebread et al., 2009), think-aloud protocol analysis (Azevedo, Greene, & 
Moos, 2007; Pressley & Affl erbach, 1995; Veenman, 1993; Veenman & Spaans, 2005), 
and computer logfi le registrations (Hadwin, Nesbit, Jamieson-Noel, Code, & Winne, 
2007; Veenman et al., 2004) are examples of on-line methods. The essential difference 
between off-line and on-line methods is that off-line methods measures merely rely on 
self-reports from the learner, whereas on-line measures concern the coding of learner 
behavior on externally defi ned criteria (Veenman, 2011). Studies with multi-method 
designs have shown that off-line measures hardly correspond to on-line measures. In a 
review study, Veenman (2005) found hardly any correspondence between off-line self-
reports and various on-line assessment methods. In the same vein, Hadwin et al. (2007, 
p. 119) reported that “self-reports were poorly calibrated with actual traceable studying 
events” during text studying in G-Study, a computerized reading environment. Cromley 
and Azevedo (2006) also compared off-line and on-line methods. Three parallel strategy-
use measures were administered to a sample of 30 ninth-grade students: a prospective 
self-report measure (Metacognitive Awareness of Reading Strategies Inventory, MARSI), 
a concurrent multiple-choice measure which required students to apply the strategies 
to specifi c passages, and students were asked to think aloud during text studying. Two 
measures of reading comprehension, a standardized measure and free recall scores, 
were collected as well. Results showed that the concurrent multiple-choice and think-
aloud data were both signifi cantly correlated with the comprehension scores and with 
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each other, whereas the prospective self-report data had non-signifi cant correlations 
with all of the other measures. Cromley and Azevedo (2006) recommended using 
concurrent measures to study strategy use in reading comprehension. On-line methods 
appear to be more predictive of learning performance relative to off-line methods 
(Bannert & Mengelkamp, 2008; Sperling, Howard, Miller, & Murphy, 2002; Veenman, 
2005). In his review study, Veenman (2005) found that correlations with learning 
performance range from slightly negative to .36 for off-line measures, and from .45 to 
.90 for on-line measures. The external validity of on-line measures appears to be better 
than that of off-line measures. Furthermore, low convergent validity among off-line 
self-report measures, and high convergent validity among different on-line measures 
are reported (Veenman, 2005). The relatively high convergent and external validity of 
online-measures for metacognition led to the use of online-measures in this thesis. In 
case of thinking aloud, students verbalize their actual, ongoing thoughts during task 
performance. This requires not only a certain level of (language) development of the 
students, but also a certain level of task diffi culty. If the task is very easy, cognitive 
processes will be automated and ongoing thoughts will not be verbalized. If the task is 
too complex, students probably will fall silent. Therefore, if students are quite young or 
the task is not suitable, the obtained protocols will be rather shallow, that is, incomplete 
and not very well elaborated. Considering the fact that participants in this thesis are 
old enough to verbalize their own thoughts, that the tasks are suitable for their age, 
and that both quantitative and qualitative scores are required, the think-aloud method 
was appropriate for research in this thesis. Having students thinking aloud during task 
performance makes it possible to measure metacognitive behavior in the most direct way. 
Studies by Bannert and Mengelkamp (2008), Ericsson and Simon (1993), and Veenman, 
Elshout, and Groen (1993) show that using the think-aloud method neither affects the 
learning process, nor learning performance. Bannert and Mengelkamp interpret this 
as indirect evidence that thinking aloud does not interfere with metacognition, and 
therefore, they recommend this type of verbalization as an online-assessment method 
(2008, p. 54). Veenman (1993) compared students’ logfi le measures with think-aloud 
protocols. Results showed that thinking aloud does not interfere with metacognitive 
processes, although it may slow down those processes a bit.
1.7  Objectives and expectations of this thesis
The fi rst objective of this thesis is to establish whether metacognitive skills will increase 
in frequency/quantity (QN) and quality (QL) during early adolescence. Based on prior 
studies (Veenman et al., 2004; Veenman & Spaans, 2005), a linear growth in both the 
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quantity and quality of metacognitve skillfulness is expected. The second objective relates 
to the development of the relation between metacognitive skills and intellectual ability 
as predictors of learning performance. It is expected that metacognitive skills develop 
alongside, but not fully dependent on intellectual ability, in line with the mixed model 
(Veenman, 1993) and the monotonic development hypothesis (Alexander et al., 1995). 
As a third, and last objective, the generality vs. domain-specifi city of metacognitive 
skills is investigated over age. In line with results of Veenman and Spaans (2005), it is 
expected that metacognitive skills tend to generalize along the developmental trajectory.
1.8 Outline of this thesis
In this fi rst chapter (Chapter 1), a theoretical background of the empirical studies 
conducted as part of this thesis has been given. The four chapters (Chapters 2-5) 
that report about the empirical studies examined metacognitive skillfulness in young 
adolescents aged 12 – 15 years. In Chapters 2 – 4, results for each year of a three-year-
longitudinal study are reported. Chapter 5 describes the results of a cross-sectional study. 
The fi rst year of the longitudinal study (Chapter 2), however, is limited to the fi rst two 
research questions as formulated in section 1.7. Since there were no data of other years 
available in the fi rst year of the longitudinal study, in Chapter 2, the two main issues 
were to establish whether metacognitive skills have their own, unique contribution to 
learning performance on top of intellectual ability, and whether metacognitive skills 
are general or domain-specifi c. Chapter 3 and 4 share all three research question (see 
section 1.7). Since the cross-sectional study (Chapter 5) was restricted to the domain 
of mathematics, the third research question concerning the generality vs. domain-
specifi city of metacognitive skills had to be left out. In Chapter 6 some methodological 
issues are discussed that could not be fully addressed in the articles due to limited 
space. Finally, in Chapter 7, the fi ndings described in the Chapters 2 – 5 are summarized 
and discussed. Chapters 2 – 5 have been published in, or submitted to peer-reviewed 
journals. 
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Chapter 2 
Relation between intellectual ability and 
metacognitive skillfulness as predictors of 
learning performance of young students 




The fi rst objective of this study was to establish the relation between intellectual ability 
and metacognitive skillfulness as predictors of learning performance in young students 
(aged 12 years). Furthermore, the generality vs. domain specifi city of metacognitive 
skillfulness was investigated. Thirty-two fi rst-year secondary-school students participated 
in this study. While thinking aloud, they performed two different tasks representing 
two different domains: A text-studying task for history and a problem-solving task for 
mathematics. Participants’ intellectual ability, metacognitive skillfulness, and learning 
performance were assessed. Results show that metacognitive skillfulness contributed to 
learning performance (partly) independent of intellectual ability. Results also show that 
metacognitive skills predominantly appear to be general. Domain-specifi c metacognitive 
skills, however, played a substantial, but minor role as well. 
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2.1 Introduction
“Things are always diffi cult at fi rst” is heard frequently in education. Nevertheless, some 
students are more successful in acquiring expertise in a domain than others. Elshout 
(1983) and Schoenfeld (1983) simultaneously introduced the concept of the ‘expert-
novice’. These students are able to gain expertise rather rapidly compared to others. 
Does this rapid progression occur because of their intellectual ability, their metacognitive 
skills, or because of a combination of both?
 This study addresses the issue of how intellectual ability and metacognitive 
skills contribute to the prediction of learning performance. Furthermore, the generality 
vs. domain specifi city of metacognitive skillfulness is investigated. By using two very 
different tasks (text studying and problem solving) in widely varying domains (history 
vs. mathematics) the results of Veenman and Spaans (2005) are further elaborated upon. 
They found that young secondary-school students have rather strong domain-specifi c 
metacognitive skills.
 Compared to earlier studies on the generality vs. domain specifi city of 
metacognitive skills (Prins, 2002; Veenman, 1993; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; 
Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman & Verheij, 2003), however, participants in the 
present study are young students (12 years), and the differences in tasks and domains 
are maximized.
2.1.1 Intellectual ability
Although researchers diverge in their conceptions of intelligence (see e.g., Brody, 1992; 
Carroll, 1993; Resnick & Glaser, 1976; Sternberg, 1990), they often relate intelligence 
to learning. We adopted the rather pragmatic point of view on intelligence from Elshout 
(1983): Intelligence may be perceived as the magnitude and quality of the human 
cognitive toolbox, which contains basic cognitive operations. The content of this 
toolbox is determined by the biological substratum (e.g., hereditary factors or brain 
damage), but also by the opportunities for acquiring useful cognitive strategies at school 
or at home (Veenman & Spaans, 2005). In the same vein, Humphreys, (1968, 1989) and 
Snow (1989; Snow & Lohman, 1984) regard intelligence as the acquired repertoire of 
intellectual or cognitive skills that is available to a person at a particular point of time. 
2.1.2 Metacognitive skillfulness
Since Flavell (1979) introduced the concept ‘metacognition’, many studies have 
addressed the issue of the infl uence of metacognition on learning performance (for an 
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overview, see Wang, Haertel, and Walberg, 1990). Metacognitive knowledge refers to 
the declarative knowledge one has about the interplay between personal characteristics, 
task characteristics, and available strategies in a learning situation (Flavell, 1979), while 
metacognitive skills concern the procedural knowledge that is required for the actual 
regulation of, and control over one’s learning activities (Brown & DeLoache, 1978). Task 
analysis, planning, monitoring, checking and recapitulation are manifestations of such 
skills. An interesting question is whether metacognitive skills are part of the intellectual 
toolbox or repertoire; or as Slife, Weiss, and Bell (1985) formulated …”whether 
metacognition can be reduced to cognition”. 
2.1.3 Relation between intellectual ability, metacognitive skillfulness, and 
learning performance
Veenman (1993; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; 
Veenman & Verheij, 2003;) described three, mutually exclusive models concerning 
the relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness as predictors of 
learning performance. The intelligence model regards metacognitive skillfulness as an 
integral part of intellectual ability. In this model metacognitive skillfulness does not 
contribute to learning performance on top of intellectual ability. According to this 
model, metacognitive skills cannot have a predictive value for learning performance 
independent of intellectual ability. The second, contrasting model is the independency 
model, in which intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness are regarded as 
entirely independent predictors of learning performance. Finally, in the mixed model 
intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness are correlated, but they also have their 
own, unique contribution to the prediction of learning performance. 
 Over the last decades, support has been found for each of these models (for 
an overview, see Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman, Wilhelm & Beishuizen, 2004). 
Many studies, however, are diffi cult to compare, due to dissimilarities in assessing 
metacognitive skillfulness (thinking aloud, observation, questionnaires), in participants 
(age, level of intellectual ability), and in tasks and domains. Moreover, the focus of 
some studies is restricted to the relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive 
skillfulness, thereby excluding the relation of both predictors with learning performance. 
The evidence found seems to be highly in favor of the mixed model, but many of these 
studies concerned the metacognitive skillfulness of older secondary-school or university 
students. It remains to be ascertained more thoroughly whether the mixed model can 
be generalized to younger students with less developed metacognitive skills, performing 
different tasks in different domains (see Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004). 
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Therefore, the fi rst objective of the present study is to establish the relation between 
intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness as predictors of learning performance 
in young students. We hypothesize that the mixed model can be generalized to fi rst-year 
secondary-school students, regardless of tasks or domains.
2.1.4 Generality vs. domain specifi city of metacognitive skillfulness
A second objective of this study is to establish whether metacognitive skillfulness is 
general (i.e., domain independent), or domain specifi c. Earlier studies concerning this 
issue have yielded contradictory results. On the one hand, researchers have found 
evidence for general, domain-independent metacognitive skills (Schraw, Dunkle, 
Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995; Schraw & Nietfeld, 1998; Veenman & Beishuizen 2004; 
Veenman & Verheij 2003; Veenman et al., 1997, 2004). Despite this considerable 
number of studies with comparable results, it should be kept in mind that participants, 
tasks, and domains varied substantially.  On the other hand, other reseachers (De Jong, 
1992; Glaser, Schauble, Raghavan, & Zeitz, 1992; Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000) 
found evidence against a general metacognitive ability. 
 Veenman et al. (2004) found support for the generality of metacognitive skills 
among young students (9- to 22-year olds) performing discovery-learning tasks in 
different domains. Recently, this support for young students’ general metacognitive skills 
could not be corroborated by a study of Veenman and Spaans (2005). In this study 12- 
and 15-year olds performed two tasks in different domains (solving math word problems 
and an inductive-learning task for biology). Metacognitive skills of the younger students 
appeared to be rather domain-specifi c, whereas those of the older ones turned to be 
general by nature.
 Based on earlier studies, the onset of metacognitive skill development for 
academic tasks is not to be expected before the age of 8 – 10 years (Alexander, Carr, & 
Schwanenfl ugel, 1995; Berk, 2006; Kuhn, 1999; Siegler, 1998; Veenman, et al., 2004). 
The academic metacognitive skills of 12-year olds are still premature and developing, 
which may explain why these skills may diverge on notably different tasks.
 Participants in the present study are rather young and inexperienced in applying 
academic metacognitive skills. Therefore, we expect their metacognitive skills to be in 
a transitory phase of development. We hypothesize that children, slightly over the age 
of 12 years, will use general as well as domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. In order 
to allow domain-specifi c metacognitive activities, the differences in tasks and domains 





Thirty-two fi rst-year secondary-school students (12 boys, 20 girls; average age 12 years 
and 8 months) participated in this study. They were recruited from 85 students of three 
different tracks (pre-university education, higher general education and pre-vocational 
education)1 of an urban school in the Netherlands. 
 A history pretest was administered to all 85 students. This test consisted of 16 
multiple-choice questions about American history (Cronbach’s alpha = .71). Students 
were instructed not to guess the right answer. The pretest was administered for reasons 
of selection and played no further role in data analysis. One boy was excluded from 
further participation due to prior knowledge of the topic, that is, he correctly answered 
more than 75% of the 16 MC questions. Next, 40 participants were selected out of 
the remaining 84 students on their intellectual ability (see section 2.2.2). Eight low 
intelligent students, however, were excluded from the study due to learning or conduct 
disorders (e.g., dyslexia or ADHD). The mean score on the history pretest for the 
remaining 32 participants was 4.0 (sd = 2.4), i.e., 25% of the maximum score. For 
mathematics no pretest was administered. Here students need a certain amount of 
lower-level mathematics knowledge in order to solve more complex problems. 
 Consent was requested from and given by the participants’ parents. After 
completing the tasks, participants received a small fi nancial reward for their participation.
2.2.2 Intellectual ability
The intellectual ability of 84 students was assessed by a series of ability tests. Three 
subtests from the Groninger Intelligence test for Secondary Education (GIVO, 
standardized Dutch intelligence test; Van Dijk & Tellegen, 1994) were selected: 
Number Series, Verbal Analogies and Unfolding Figures. With these subtests a number 
of the primary intelligence factors (Carroll, 1993) is assessed: Inductive and deductive 
reasoning abilities, both verbal and quantitative, and visuospatial ability. 
 The GIVO, however, lacks a test for assessing memory abilities, another primary 
factor in Carroll’s (1993) model highly relevant to text studying. Therefore, a fourth 
test (Names & Professions; see Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004) was added. An overall 
Intellectual Ability score was obtained by transforming the scores on all tests into 
z-scores and then calculating the mean z-score (Cronbach’s alpha = .76).
1 In Dutch: VWO, HAVO and VMBO-T respectively
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To guarantee suffi cient variance in intellectual ability the median of the Intellectual 
Ability scores was calculated and participants were denominated as high (1st quartile), 
average (2nd and 3rd quartile) or low (4th quartile) in intelligence. Finally, 13 high, 13 
average and 6 low intelligent students were selected as participants. In the 4th quartile 
there were relatively many students with learning or conduct problems. That is the reason 
why only six students could be selected as participants in the low range of intelligence.
2.2.3 Tasks
Students performed two different tasks representing two different domains. One task was 
a text-studying task in the domain of history and the other one was a problem-solving 
task in the domain of mathematics. 
2.2.3.1 History task
In an individual session of 50 minutes, participants were asked to study a history text 
in the same way as they usually do when preparing for a test. They had to read aloud 
and think aloud while reading the text and answering the questions or assignments 
embedded in the text. Participants were allowed to study the text for 30 minutes and in 
the remaining 20 minutes the post-test was administered (see section 2.2.5). 
 The history text was composed of parts from two of the most frequently used 
Dutch schoolbooks for history: “MeMo” (Van Boxtel & Schrover, 1998) and “Sprekend 
verleden” (Buskop, Dalhuisen, & Geest, 1998). To avoid prior knowledge of the subject 
on the one hand, and to appeal to the zone of tolerable diffi culty on the other hand, 
the text was based on a subject of the second-year curriculum, instead of the fi rst-year 
curriculum. 
 The text about slavery and the civil war in the United States of America contained 
76 concepts and 1479 words. In the text, three questions or assignments were embedded. 
These questions were not meant for testing the students’ knowledge, but to elicit (more) 
metacognitive activities (e.g., ‘There are several reasons why the north and the south 
were at war with each other. Describe in your own words at least two of these reasons’). 
From a pilot-study we learned that if a text does not contain such questions, many 
participants just tend to read linearly.
2.2.3.2 Mathematics task
In another individual session of 50 minutes, participants had to solve fi ve mathematical 
word problems in 20 minutes. Several categories of problems were presented (e.g., 
distance, fraction, surface area, percentage problems). For instance, a fraction problem 
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was ‘My brother received two bags of marbles. Each bag contains 48 marbles in four 
different colors: 1/6 is yellow; 3/8 is blue; 1/3 is green and the rest is red. Of which 
color does my brother have most marbles?’ Together with the assignments, participants 
received a sheet containing the answers and a brief stepwise explanation of how to 
solve the problems. Participants were free to consult this sheet whenever and as much 
as they liked. The fi rst 20 minutes were considered as a learning-by-doing phase. Next, 
the participants handed in all materials and received another series of fi ve parallel 
problems, which had to be solved without any help in the remaining 30 minutes. This 
second part is considered as a post-test assessment of learning performance (see section 
2.2.5). All problems had to be solved while thinking aloud. 
2.2.4 Metacognitive skillfulness
The transcribed thinking-aloud protocols for both tasks were analyzed on spontaneous 
use of metacognitive skills according to the procedure of Veenman (1993; Veenman & 
Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman, Kerseboom, & Imthorn, 2000). Metacognitive skillfulness 
was divided into four subscales: Orientation (O), Planning and Systematic orderliness 
(P), Evaluation (Ev), and Elaboration (El). Some metacognitive activities are general 
across both tasks and domains, whereas other metacognitive activities seem to be more 
domain-specifi c (see Table 2.1). 
 To obtain a reliable score for metacognitive skillfulness, scoring criteria were 
formulated for both tasks. For each subscale it was described which criteria should 
be met in order to receive a certain rate for the quality2 of metacognitive skillfulness. 
This resulted in a method, which allowed assessing general as well as domain-specifi c 
metacognitive activities. The scoring method consisted of two steps for each protocol. 
First, each utterance was coded in the margin as belonging to one of the four subscales 
(O, P, Ev or El). Secondly, each subscale received a qualitative score according to the 
formulated criteria. This score was a total score per subscale per protocol. A fi ve-point 
scale (ranging from 0 to 4)3 was used for each subscale. It was the quality, not merely 
the quantity of metacognitive activities that determined the scores. For example, a 
participant received a higher score for ‘deeper’ Elaboration (e.g., drawing a conclusion 
2 The data in the tables relate to the quality of metacognitive skillfulness. The same analysis was performed 
with the quantitative scores of metacognitive skillfulness. Quantitative scores were obtained by counting the 
frequency of metacognitive activities of each subscale (e.g., if a student evaluated fi ve times, his quantitative 
Evaluation score was fi ve).The results are comparable with the results of the qualitative data. They follow the 
same pattern, but are somewhat less pronounced. 
3 Results of a CatPCA (formerly PRINCALS) show that it is permitted to treat the scores for metacognitive skills 
as interval variables.
Relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness as predictors of learning performance 
33
in one’s own words) than for a superfi cial one (e.g., summarizing a paragraph almost 
literally).
Table 2.1 Examples of domain-specifi c and general metacognitive activities
History-specifi c Math-specifi c General
Orientation
a.  Activating prior knowledge
b.  Goal setting
c. Predicting the content of 
the text
Estimating the answer
d. Reading titles of para-
graphs prior to reading 
the entire text
Making a sketch of the 
problem in order to 
represent the problem
Planning & systematic orderliness
a.  Subgoaling
b. Time management
c. Designing a reading plan 
and deciding upon which 
text parts to pay attention 
to
Designing a step-by-step 
action plan, instead of 
working by trial-and-error
d. Note taking (self-
instruction for doing so)
Writing down calculations 
step by step
Evaluation 
a.  Expressing non-
understanding
b.  Comment on own 
activities
c. Monitoring text compre-
hension during reading
Monitoring action plan
d. Self-correction after 
rereading (parts of) the text
Checking an answer by 
recalculating
Elaboration 
a. Recapitulating and 
drawing conclusions
b. Relating the answer to the 
question or problem




instruction for doing so); 
Making inferences during 
reading
Drawing conclusions while 




It is important to emphasize that the judges intentionally avoided the confounding of 
metacognition scores by the correctness or incorrectness of the content matter. So, an 
incorrect, but highly elaborated conclusion could equally generate a high score for 
‘Elaboration’ as long as it was in line with the participant’s own reasoning. 
 For each task Cronbach’s alpha was calculated over the four subscales: (History 
.72; Mathematics .83). Sum scores on the subscales were calculated, representing 
the quality of metacognitive skillfulness for each task. Furthermore, six protocols for 
each task were simultaneously rated by two judges. This resulted in an alpha interrater 
reliability of .97 for history and .89 for math.
2.2.5  Learning performance
After the learning phase of both tasks, the learning performance of participants was 
assessed by a post-test, as was explained to them in advance. For history the post-test 
consisted of fi ve multiple-choice questions and six essay questions. The MC questions 
assessed reproductive knowledge (facts and dates, e.g., ‘when did the Americans 
offi cially abolish slavery?’) and the essay questions were meant to assess overall text 
comprehension (e.g., ‘Explain in your own words why Lincoln changed his opinion 
about slavery several times’). Participants were not allowed to consult the text or their 
notes while answering the questions. 
 According to a rating system, points were given for the correctness of answers 
to each question. MC questions could render one point, while essay questions could 
render a maximum of four points. A total score was calculated and used as a measure of 
learning performance in history (Cronbach’s alpha = .58). 
 For math a post-test with fi ve math word problems was administered. For each of 
the fi ve math post-test problems an equal amount of points could be earned: two points 
if both the procedure and the answer was correct; one point if either one of them was 
correct; and zero points if neither of them was correct. A total score was calculated and 
used as a measure of learning performance in mathematics (Cronbach’s alpha = .71). 
2.2.6  Procedure
The intellectual-ability test and the history pretest were administered during a group 
session of 100 minutes. The individual sessions took place during school time. The 
experiment had a counterbalanced design with respect to task order, meaning that 16 
students started with history and 16 students with mathematics. Participants could make 
use of a pen, pencil, text highlighter, ruler, calculator, and blank sheets of paper for 
making notes. 
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All participants were instructed to think aloud while working on both tasks. The 
experimenter was not allowed to help the students in any way. To encourage the student 
to keep on thinking aloud the experimenter used standard prompts (e.g., ‘please, keep 
on thinking aloud’) whenever the student fell silent. All the utterances of the participants 
were audio-taped, transcribed, and analyzed in relation to metacognitive skillfulness. 
2.3 Results
All participants (N = 32) performed the tasks, so there are no missing values in the data.In 
Table 2.2 the means and standard deviations of the Learning measure and Metacognitive 
skillfulness for both tasks are depicted, as well as the maximum obtainable score.
Table 2.2 Means and standard deviations
Mean Std. deviation Maximum score
MetatotHis* 5.03 3.40 16.0
Learning measureHis 8.47 3.28 20.0
MetatotMath* 6.09 3.31 16.0
Learning measureMath 4.44 2.54 10.0
*Note: MetatotHis means the total score on the quality of metacognitive activities during history task; 
MetatotMath means the total score on the quality of metacognitive activities during math task.
2.3.1 Relation between intellectual ability, metacognitive skillfulness and 
learning performance
Correlations between intellectual ability, metacognitive skillfulness, and learning 
performance on both tasks were calculated (see Table 2.3). As far as the math task 
is concerned, Intellectual ability correlated signifi cantly with both Metacognitive 
skillfulness and the Learning measure. The same applies for the correlation between 
Metacognitive skillfulness and the Learning measure for math. The results on the history 
task differ partly from the results on the math task. A signifi cant correlation was found 
between Intellectual ability and the Learning measure, but the correlation between 
Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skillfulness was not signifi cant. Metacognitive 
skillfulness, however, correlated signifi cantly with the Learning measure for history. 
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Table 2.3 Correlations between Intellectual ability, Metacognitive skills and Learning 







Learning measureHis .40* .65**
MetatotMath .62** .35* .38*
Learning measureMath .75** .27 .49** .72**
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
To determine whether correlations for both tasks deviate signifi cantly from each other, 
Fisher-z ratios were calculated (Guilford, 1965). There is no difference in correlations 
between both tasks as long as Metacognitive skillfulness is involved (Fisher-z ratio = 
1.71, n.s., for the correlations between Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skillfulness, 
and 0.50, n.s., for the correlations between Metacognitive skillfulness and Learning 
measures). Intellectual ability, however, plays a more important role in predicting the 
learning performance for mathematics relative to history (Fisher-z ratio = 2.09, p < 0.05). 
 Next, semi-partial correlations (Nunnally, 1967) were calculated by partialing 
Metacognitive skillfulness from the correlation between Intellectual ability and the 
Learning measure (i.e., semi-partIntel) and partialing Intellectual ability from the 
correlation between Metacognitive skillfulness and the Learning measure (i.e., semi-
partMeta). These semi-partial correlations (see Table 2.4) are needed to calculate the 
unique, independent contribution of Metacognitive skillfulness and Intellectual ability 
to the Learning measures.
Table 2.4 Semi-partial correlations
Semi-partIntel Semi-partMeta
Learning measureHis .23 .53**
Learning measureMath .39** .33**
**p < 0.01
Using regression-analytic techniques (Pedhazur, 1982; Veenman, 1993; Veenman & 
Verheij, 2003; Veenman & Spaans, 2005) the unique and shared proportions of variance 
in the Learning measures were distributed to Metacognitive skillfulness and Intellectual 
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ability (see Table 2.5). The math data could be taken as an example. The squared 
multiple correlation of Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skillfulness for predicting 
Learning measure in math was calculated from the correlations presented in Table 2.3 
and 2.4 (R² = the squared correlation between Intellectual ability and Learning measure 
+ the squared semi-partial correlation between Metacognitive skillfulness and Learning 
measure with Intellectual ability partialled out = .75² + .33² = .671). The unique 
contribution of Intellectual ability to Learning measure was determined by calculating the 
squared semi-partial correlation between Intellectual ability and Learning measure with 
Metacognitive skillfulness partialled from Intellectual ability (r² = .152). Consequently, 
it was estimated that Intellectual ability uniquely accounted for 15.2% of the variance 
in Learning measure for math, Metacognitive skillfulness uniquely accounted for 10.9% 
of the variance, while both predictors had another 41.0% of variance in common. This 
procedure was applied to both tasks (see Table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Percentage of variance accounted for in Learning measures
Intel unique Meta unique Shared Total
History  5.2 28.0 10.8 44.0
Math 15.2 10.9 41.0 67.1
Note: Intel unique means the unique contribution of Intellectual ability to Learning measure; Meta 
unique means the unique contribution of Metacognitive skillfulness to Learning measure; Shared means 
the shared contribution of Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skillfulness to Learning measure. 
The history results in Table 2.5 show that, despite the variance shared with Intellectual 
ability, Metacognitive skillfulness substantially added to the prediction of Learning 
measure in history on top of Intellectual ability. In fact, the unique contribution of 
Metacognitive skillfulness outweighed the unique contribution of Intellectual ability to 
Learning measure in history. 
2.3.2  Metacognition across domains
A principal component analysis (PCA) with a two-factor solution was performed on the 
four subscales of metacognitive skillfulness for both tasks (see Table 2.6).
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Table 2.6 Unrotated component matrix for metacognitive skillfulness
Component 1 Component 2
Eigenvalue 3.35 1.71









The results of the unrotated PCA show that all measures of metacognitive skillfulness 
substantially load on the fi rst component. This component has an eigenvalue of 3.35 
and a variance proportion of .42. Although component loadings are not extremely high, 
ranging from .41 to .87, this fi rst component may be interpreted as representing general 
metacognitive skills across the two tasks/domains. On the other hand, we fi nd contrasted 
loadings in the second component, that is, positive loadings for history and negative 
ones for math. This points in the direction of a component representing domain-specifi c 
metacognitive skills. With an eigenvalue of 1.71 and a variance proportion of .21 this 
second component cannot be ignored.
2.4  Discussion
This study investigated the relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive 
skillfulness as predictors of learning performance in young learners. As was expected, 
results corroborate the mixed model. First, intellectual ability and metacognitive 
skillfulness are moderately correlated. Moreover, both intellectual ability and 
metacognitive skillfulness have their own, unique contribution to learning performances 
on both tasks. These results are similar to results for older age groups obtained in other 
studies (Veenman, 1993; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman & Verheij, 2003; 
Veenman et al., 2004). Therefore, the mixed model can be generalized to twelve-
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year-olds, although the small number of participants may be considered as a possible 
limitation of this study. 
 The second research question concerned the generality vs. domain specifi city of 
metacognitive skillfulness. The PCA on the metacognitive data shows a two-component 
solution: A fi rst component, which can be interpreted as general metacognitive skills, 
and a second component, which can be interpreted as domain-specifi c metacognitive 
skills. Results support our expectation that metacognitive skills of 12 year old students 
represent a general as well as a domain-specifi c component. This may indicate that these 
students are in a transitory phase of metacognitive-skill development. Veenman and 
Spaans (2005) assumed that metacognitive skills initially develop on separate islands of 
tasks and domains. Beyond the age of 12, these skills will gradually merge into a more 
general repertoire that is applicable and transferable across tasks and domains. Among 
12-year olds a phase of transition is characterized by applying recently acquired general 
metacognitive skills, along with a remainder of domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. 
 From a developmental perspective, it is interesting to know more about the 
development of metacognitive skillfulness. On the one hand, the development of 
metacognitive skills in relation to intellectual ability as predictors of learning performance. 
On the other hand, the development of the nature of metacognitive skills (general vs. 
domain-specifi c). A longitudinal study will offer the opportunity to investigate these 
aspects of metacognitive development. The present study is the fi rst part of a longitudinal 
project, where the same students will be followed for three consecutive years. 
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This study shows the results of a two-year longitudinal study where the same participants 
were followed for two consecutive years as they enter secondary school (aged 12 – 14 
years). The main issue was to investigate the development of both the quantity and the 
quality of metacognitive skills. Another issue was to establish whether the development of 
metacognitive skillfulness is intelligence-related or relatively intelligence-independent. 
Finally, the generality vs. domain specifi city of developing metacognitive skillfulness 
was investigated. Thirty-two secondary-school students participated in this study. While 
thinking aloud they performed two different tasks representing two different domains: 
A text-studying task for history and a problem-solving task for math. Participants’ 
intellectual ability, metacognitive skillfulness and learning performance were assessed. 
Results show a quantitative as well as a qualitative growth in metacognitive skillfulness. 
Furthermore, results of both years show that metacognitive skillfulness contributed to 
learning performance (partly) independent of intellectual ability. A parallel development 
of metacognitive and intellectual ability was found. Finally, metacognitive skills 
predominantly appear to be general. Domain-specifi c metacognitive skills, however, 
played a substantial, but minor role as well in both years. Instructional implications are 
being discussed.
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3.1 Introduction 
Since Flavell (1979) introduced the concept ‘metacognition’, many studies have 
addressed the issue of the infl uence of metacognition on learning performance. 
Based on a review of studies, Wang, Haertel, and Walberg (1990) concluded that 
metacognition is the most important predictor of learning performance. Our study 
focuses on the development of metacognitive skills: What components develop when? 
Is the development of metacognitive skills dependent on (or part of) the development 
of intellectual ability? Are developing metacognitive skills general or domain specifi c 
by nature. Answers to these questions could contribute to our understanding of the 
development of metacognitive skills and the educational consequences. 
3.1.1  Metacognitive skillfulness 
Metacognitive skills concern the procedural knowledge that is required for the actual 
regulation of, and control over one’s learning activities (Brown & DeLoache, 1978; 
Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997). Metacognitive skills can be inferred from overt 
behavior or utterances by the student, i.e., from concrete metacognitive activities. 
Examples of metacognitive activities are given in Table 3.1. 
 Several studies (Bowen, Shore, & Cartwright, 1992; Brown, 1980; Christoph, 
2006; Markman, 1977, 1979; Mevarech & Fridkin, 2006; Pressley & Affl erbach, 1995; 
Schoenfeld, 1992; Shore & Lazar, 1996) have focused on the use of metacognitive skills 
while performing different tasks (e.g., reading comprehension or problem solving). This 
study, however, includes both problem-solving and text-studying tasks focusing on both 
the quantity (frequency of applying metacognitive skills) and the quality of these skills 
(the depth, e.g., drawing a conclusion in one’s own words is considered as a deeper 
elaboration than summarizing almost literally). In line with Veenman, Wilhelm, and 
Beishuizen (2004), we expect metacognitive skills to increase in frequency as well as in 
quality over the years (hypothesis 1). 
 A related research issue is whether the development of metacognitive skills 
is intelligence-related or relatively intelligence-independent. Several researchers 
(Alexander, Carr, & Schwanenfl ugel, 1995; Borkowski & Peck 1986; Schneider & Pressley, 
1997; Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman, et al., 2004) investigated metacognitive 
skills in relation to intellectual ability. 
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3.1.2  Relation between intellectual ability, metacognitive skills, and learning 
performance from a developmental perspective
Veenman (Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman et al., 1997) described three models 
concerning the relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness as 
predictors of learning performance. Over the last decades, support has been found for 
each of these models (for an overview, see Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 
2004). The evidence found so far seems to be highly in favor of the mixed model. In this 
model intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness are correlated, but metacognitive 
skillfulness has its own, unique contribution to the prediction of learning performance, 
on top of intellectual ability. Because many studies concerned the metacognitive 
skillfulness of older students, it remains to be ascertained more thoroughly whether 
the mixed model can be generalized to younger students with initially developing 
metacognitive skills. Furthermore, the role of intellectual ability in the development of 
metacognitive skills will be addressed in this study. Alexander et al. (1995) formulated 
three developmental hypotheses with regard to the relation between intelligence and 
the development of metacognition. The monotonic development hypothesis assumes 
that both intelligence and metacognition show a monotonic growth over age. Finding 
such a parallel development would support the monotonic development hypothesis. We 
hypothesize that metacognitive skillfulness develops alongside, but not fully dependent 
on intellectual ability, regardless of tasks and domains. Therefore, we expect to fi nd a 
parallel development of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability as predictors 
of learning performance in line with the mixed model and the monotonic development 
hypothesis (hypothesis 2). 
3.1.3  Metacognitive skillfulness across domains
Another objective of this study was to establish whether metacognitive skillfulness is 
general, or domain specifi c. From a developmental and an instructional perspective, it 
is relevant to know how metacognitive skills develop: Whether they develop from being 
general into becoming domain specifi c or the other way around? Earlier studies yielded 
contradictory results (Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995; Schraw & Nietfeld, 
1998; Veenman & Beishuizen 2004; Veenman & Verheij 2003; Veenman et al., 1997, 
2004; De Jong, 1992; Glaser, Schauble, Raghavan, & Zeitz, 1992). 
 Based on earlier studies, the onset of metacognitive skill development for 
academic tasks is not to be expected before the age of 8-10 years (Alexander et al., 
1995; Berk, 2006; Kuhn, 1999; Siegler, 1998). The academic metacognitive skills of 
12-year olds are still premature and developing, which may explain why these skills 
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may diverge on notably different tasks (Veenman & Spaans, 2005). Participants in the 
present study are rather young and inexperienced in applying academic metacognitive 
skills. Therefore, we expect their metacognitive skills to be in a transitory phase of 
development. We hypothesize that the participants will initially use general as well as 
domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. We also hypothesize that the initially acquired 
domain-specifi c metacognitive skills tend to generalize during further development. 
Therefore, we expect older students to resort less to domain-specifi c metacognitive skills 
than younger students (hypothesis 3). 
3.2  Method
3.2.1  Participants
In the fi rst year of this longitudinal study, 32 fi rst-year secondary school students (12 
boys, 20 girls; average age 12 years and 8 months) participated. They were selected 
on their intellectual ability from 85 students of a school in the Netherlands (section 
3.2.3). This school is known because of its large diversity of children, thus representing 
a broad educational level of the students, a broad range of social economic status of 
parents, and various ethnic backgrounds. We have chosen not to work with more than 
one school in order to avoid confounding variables, such as differences in teachers, 
pedagogical/didactic philosophy, schoolbooks, etc. Students with learning or conduct 
disorders (e.g., dyslexia or ADHD) were excluded from the study. In the second year we 
lost four students due to changing residence. The remaining 28 students (10 boys, 18 
girls; average age 13 years and 8 months) participated in the second year.
3.2.2  Metacognitive skillfulness
Thinking-aloud protocols were analyzed according to the procedure of Veenman (Prins, 
Veenman, & Elshout, 2006; Van der Stel & Veenman, 2008; Veenman & Beishuizen, 
2004;). Metacognitive skillfulness was divided into four subscales: Orientation (O), 
Planning and Systematic orderliness (P), Evaluation (Ev), and Elaboration (El). In Table 
3.1 general metacognitive activities across both tasks and domains and more specifi c 
metacognitive activities for text studying and problem solving are described (Meijer, 
Veenman, & Van Hout-Wolters, 2006; Pressley, 2000; Pressley & Affl erbach, 1995).
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Table 3.1 Examples of domain-specifi c and general metacognitive activities
History-specifi c Math-specifi c General
Orientation
a.  Activating prior 
knowledge
b.  Goal setting
c. Predicting the content of 
the text
Estimating the answer
d. Reading titles of 
paragraphs prior to 
reading the entire text
Making a sketch of the 
problem in order to 
represent the problem
Planning & Systematic orderliness
a.  Subgoaling
b. Time management
c. Designing a reading plan 
and deciding upon which 
text parts to pay attention 
to
Designing a step-by-step 
action plan, instead of 
working by trial-and-error
d. Note taking (self-
instruction for doing so)
Writing down calculations 
step by step
Evaluation  
a.  Expressing non-
understanding
b.  Comment on own 
activities




d. Self-correction after 
rereading (parts of) the 
text
Checking an answer 
by recalculating
Elaboration  
a. Recapitulating and 
drawing conclusions
b. Relating the answer to the 
question or problem





instruction for doing so); 
Making inferences during 
reading
Drawing conclusions 
while referring to the 
problem statement
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The scoring method consisted of two steps. First, an utterance was coded in the margin 
if belonging to one of the subscales (O, P, Ev or El). This resulted in a quantitative 
score obtained by counting the frequency of metacognitive activities on each subscale. 
Secondly, a score for the quality of metacognitive skillfulness was judged from the 
protocols. To obtain a reliable score for the quality of metacognitive skillfulness, scoring 
criteria were formulated. A fi ve-point scale (ranging from 0 to 4)4 was used to score the 
quality of each subscale. 
 In both years, 6 protocols of each task were rated by two judges separately. Since 
the inter-rater reliability5 was high, the remaining protocols were analyzed and rated by 
one judge.
3.2.3  Intellectual ability
In both years, intellectual ability was assessed. Three subtests from the Groninger 
Intelligence test for Secondary Education (GIVO, standardized Dutch intelligence 
test; Van Dijk & Tellegen, 1994) were selected: Number Series, Verbal Analogies and 
Unfolding Figures. A fourth test (Names & Professions, requiring the memorization of 
word pairs; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004) was added to assess memory abilities. In both 
years, the intellectual ability score was obtained by transforming the scores on each test 
into z-scores and then calculating the mean z-score for each participant.
3.2.4  Tasks
To ensure the novelty of tasks, each year participants were given new tasks with task 
demands adapted to their age. All tasks were piloted beforehand. In order to allow 
domain-specifi c metacognitive activities, the differences in tasks and domains were 
maximized.
3.2.4.1  History task
In an individual session of 50 minutes, participants were asked to study a history text 
in the same way as they usually do when preparing for a test. They were also asked to 
read and think aloud. Participants were allowed to study the text for 30 minutes. In the 
remaining 20 minutes the post-test was administered (section 3.2.5). In both years, three 
activating questions or assignments were embedded in the text. These were not meant 
for testing the students’ knowledge, but to elicit (more) metacognitive activities. From a 
4 Results of a CatPCA show that it is permitted to treat the scores for metacognitive skills as interval variables.
5 The mean inter-rater reliability score for math and history for both years was .90.
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pilot-study (Meijer, Veenman, & Van Hout-Wolters, 2006) we learned that if a text does 
not contain such activating questions, many participants just tend to read linearly. 
3.2.4.2  Mathematics task
In another thinking-aloud session of 50 minutes, participants practiced to solve 
mathematical word problems in 20 minutes. Together with the assignments, participants 
received a sheet containing the answers and a brief stepwise explanation of how to 
solve the problems. Participants were free to consult this sheet whenever and as much 
as they liked. The fi rst 20 minutes were considered as a learning-by-doing phase. Next, 
the participants handed in all materials and received another series of parallel problems, 
which had to be solved without any help in the remaining 30 minutes. This second part 
is considered as a post-test assessment of learning performance (section 3.2.5). 
3.2.5  Learning performance
Both post-tests for history consisted of fi ve multiple-choice questions (facts and dates) 
and six essay questions (text comprehension). A total score was calculated and used as 
a measure of learning performance in history (Cronbach’s alpha was .58, 1st year and 
.51, 2nd year). 
 For math, post-tests with fi ve (1st year) and six (2nd year) math word problems 
were administered (Cronbach’s alpha = .58, 1st year and .69, 2nd year). A total score 
was calculated and used as a measure of learning performance in math. In both years, 
the post-test items were parallel to the items in the learning tasks, that is, the surface 
structure of the post-test items differed from the one of the learning-task items, but the 
deep structure was the same.
3.3  Results
3.3.1  Development of metacognitive and intellectual abilities 
MANOVAs were performed on the intellectual ability and metacognition scores with 
age as a within factor. The multivariate within-subjects effect on the intellectual ability 
scores was [F(4,24) = 11.74, p < .001, ² = .66]. 14-year-olds had a higher intelligence 
score than 13-year-olds. Anova on the quality of metacognitive skillfulness also revealed 
a signifi cant age effect [F(8,20) = 6.77, p < .001, ² = .73]. The same tests were performed 
on the quantitative scores of metacognitive skillfulness. Again a signifi cant age effect 
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was found [F(8,20) = 5.28, p < .001, ² = .68]6. 14-year-olds exhibited more and better 
metacognitive activities than 13-year-olds. 
 Separate univariate tests on the metacognitive and intellectual ability data show 
which subscale scores increased signifi cantly between the fi rst and the second year 
(Table 3.2). No effect was found for gender and/or ethnic background.
Table 3.2 Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts (13 vs. 14 yrs.)
F Sig.
Verbal analogies 22.96 .000










Note: MetaqlMathP means the score on the quality of planning activities for math; MetaqlHistEv means 
the score on the quality of evaluation activities for history; MetaqnMathO means the score on the 
quantity of orientation activities for math; MetaqnMathP means the score on the quantity of planning 
activities for math; MetaqnMathEv means the score on the quantity of evaluation activities for math; 
MetaqnMathEl means the score on the quantity of elaboration activities for math; MetaqnMathTot means 
the total score on the quantity of metacognition for math; MetaqnHistEv means the score on the quantity 
of evaluation activities for history.
3.3.2  The monotonic development hypothesis
To determine whether developmental processes affect the relation between intellectual 
ability (IA) and metacognition (Meta) as predictors of learning performance (LP), the 
results of both years were compared (Table 3.3). 
6 Because the quantitative metacognitive scores were positively skewed, loglinear and square root transformations 
on the data were performed. This did not alter the results. 
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Table 3.3 Correlations and semi-partial correlations
IA Meta Semi-PartIA Semi-PartMeta
Quality
LP Math13 .79** .74** .39* .33*
Meta Math13 .65**
LP Math14 .57** .74** .22 .52**
Meta Math14 .51**
LP History13 .42* .66** .23 .53**
Meta Hist13 .27
LP History14 .25 .36 .17 .33*
Meta Hist14 .32
Quantity
LP Math13 .76** .37* .30*
Meta Math13 .69**
LP Math14 .42* .47** .28*
Meta Math14 .27
LP History13 .57** .31* .50**
Meta Hist13 .20
LP History14 .24 .24 .22
Meta Hist14 .21
Note: LP means Learning performance * p < .05, ** p < .01
As far as the math task concerned intellectual ability correlated signifi cantly with both 
the quality of metacognitive skillfulness and the learning measure in both years. The 
same applies for the correlation between the quality and the quantity of metacognitive 
skillfulness on the one hand, and the learning performance for math on the other. 
Intellectual ability and the quantity of metacognition in math correlated signifi cantly 
among 13-year-olds only. The results on the history task differ partly from the results 
on the math task. Only in the fi rst year a signifi cant correlation was found between 
intellectual ability and the learning performance. The same applies for the correlation 
between the quantity of metacognitive skillfulness and the learning performance. The 
correlation between the metacognitive quality and the learning performance was 
signifi cant in both years. 
 In order to test the mixed model the semi-partial correlations (Nunnally, 1967) 
were calculated (Table 3.3) by partialling Metacognitive skillfulness from the correlation 
between Intellectual ability and the Learning performance (i.e., semi-partIA) and 
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partialling Intellectual ability from the correlation between Metacognitive skillfulness 
and the Learning performance (i.e., semi-partMeta). Next, the unique, independent 
contribution of Metacognitive skillfulness and Intellectual ability to the Learning 
performance was calculated. Using regression-analytic techniques (Pedhazur, 1982; 
Veenman & Spaans, 2005) the unique and shared proportions of variance in the learning 
performance were distributed to metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability (Table 
3.4). 
Table 3.4 Percentage of variance accounted for in Learning performance
Intel unique Meta unique Shared Total
QL QN QL QN QL QN QL QN
History 13 5.2 9.7 28.0 24.6 10.8 7.9 44.0 42.2
History 14 2.9 5.5 11.3 5.0 5.3 1.0 19.5 11.3
Math 13 15.2 13.5 10.9 8.8 41.0 48.9 67.1 71.2
Math 14 5.1 22.2 27.3 7.9 27.2 10.1 59.6 40.2
Note: Intel unique means the unique contribution of Intellectual ability to Learning performance; 
Meta unique means the unique contribution of Metacognitive skillfulness to Learning performance; 
Shared means the shared contribution of Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skillfulness to Learning 
performance. Total means the total contribution of Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skillfulness to 
Learning performance. QL = qualitative metacognition scores; QN = quantitative metacognition scores.
Results in Table 3.4 show that, despite the variance shared with Intellectual ability, 
both qualitative and quantitative Metacognitive skillfulness, added to the prediction of 
Learning performance on top of Intellectual ability. 
3.3.3  Metacognitive skillfulness across domains 
The generality vs. domain specifi city of metacognitive skillfulness was investigated by 
performing a principal component analysis (PCA) on the metacognitive scores. For each 
year separately, a PCA with a two-factor solution was performed on the four subscales 
of metacognitive skillfulness (Table 3.5).
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Eigenvalue 3.53 1.78 3.28 1.40
Variance proportion .44 .22 .41 .17
MetaorientationHis .50 .49 .51 -.45
MetaplanningHis .72 .48 .49 -.46
MetaevaluationHis .48 .52 .77 -.42
MetaelaborationHis .72 .37 .89 -.14
MetaorientationMath .61 -.57 .40 .23
MetaplanningMath .78 -.31 .58 .61
MetaevaluationMath .55 -.67 .69 .13
MetaelaborationMath .86 -.16 .63 .59
The unrotated solutions of the PCAs show that all measures of the quality of metacognitive 
skillfulness substantially load on the fi rst component (Table 3.5). Although not all 
component loadings are extremely high, these fi rst components may be interpreted as 
representing general metacognitive skills across the two domains. On the other hand, 
we found contrasted loadings on both second components. This points in the direction 
of a component representing domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. The same analyses 
were performed on the quantitative scores. These results were in line with the results of 
the qualitative data. 
3.4 Discussion 
This study investigated the development of metacognitive skillfulness. Results show an 
overall growth of the quantity and quality of metacognitive skillfulness indeed. Looking 
closer into the subscales, we see an increase in the quality of planning in math. This 
means that 14-year-olds performed more and better planning activities. For history, the 
frequency of evaluating increased signifi cantly. 14-year-olds not only evaluated more, 
they also evaluated on a higher level. This means that 14-year-olds not only monitored 
their own text comprehension more frequently than 13-year-olds, but they also did so 
on a higher, more effective level. In conclusion, the fi rst hypothesis was confi rmed. 
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From an instructional point of view, it would be interesting to know more about the 
sequence in which metacognitive skills develop over an extended period of time 
(Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Affl erbach, 2006). 
 The second hypothesis concerned the relation between metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability as predictors of learning performance over age groups. Results 
were in line with the mixed model, similar to results of older students in earlier studies 
(Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman & Verheij, 2003; Veenman et al., 2004). The 
unique contribution of Metacognitive skillfulness outweighed the unique contribution 
of Intellectual ability to Learning performance in history in both years. The math results 
show a changing role of Intellectual ability over the years: In the fi rst year the unique 
contribution of Intellectual ability outweighed the unique contribution of Metacognitive 
skillfulness to Learning performance. In the second year, on the other hand, the results are 
developing in line with the history results. This difference in contribution of intellectual 
ability could be explained by a difference in the novelty of tasks, as experienced by 
participants. Compared to solving math word problems, the history task may have been 
less familiar to them, i.e., less in line with their usual schoolwork. In everyday school 
life students are not used to read lengthy history texts as used in this study. Moreover, 
they also were unfamiliar with the topic. Solving math problems was a more familiar 
task format to them. A high task novelty suppresses the impact of intellectual ability on 
learning performance (Elshout, 1987; Raaheim, 1988; Prins et al., 2006, Veenman & 
Elshout , 1999; Veenman, Prins, & Elshout, 2002). 
 We found a parallel development of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
ability as predictors of learning performance in line with the monotonic development 
hypothesis. Earlier, Alexander et al. (1995) found that the developmental pattern was 
not consistent over different constituents of metacognition. They obtained evidence 
in favor of a monotonic development of metacognitive knowledge, but their results 
were inconclusive regarding metacognitive skills. Our results point in the direction 
of a monotonic development in metacognitive skills as well: A continuous growth of 
metacognitive skills with age, alongside intellectual growth (Veenman et al., 2004), thus 
corroborating hypothesis 2.
 The third research question concerned the generality vs. domain specifi city of 
metacognitive skillfulness. In both years, the solutions of the PCAs are very similar : A 
fi rst component, which can be interpreted as general metacognitive skills, and a second 
component, which can be interpreted as domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. Results 
support our expectation that metacognitive skills of rather young and inexperienced 
students represent a general as well as a domain-specifi c component. Veenman and 
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Spaans (2005) assumed that metacognitive skills initially develop on separate islands of 
tasks and domains. Beyond the age of 12 years, these skills will merge into a more general 
repertoire that is applicable and transferable across tasks and domains. Among young 
students a phase of transition could be characterized by applying recently acquired 
general metacognitive skills, along with a remainder of domain-specifi c metacognitive 
skills. We expected that the initially acquired domain-specifi c metacognitive skills would 
tend to generalize during development. The present results, however, do not support this 
part of hypothesis 3 as yet. Next to drawing on a repertoire of general metacognitive 
skills students seem to continue applying domain-specifi c metacognitive skills as well. 
This may indicate that these students are still in a transitory phase of metacognitive-skill 
development. Being so, the general component would gain weight in the forthcoming 
years of development. On the other hand, it may indicate that metacognitive skills are 
only partly general by nature. 
 Despite fi nding signifi cant results, there might be some limitations of the study. 
The small sample may be considered as a limitation to the generalizability. The time-
consuming method of protocol analysis of individual sessions did not allow for larger 
samples. About 220 hours a year were spent on the individual sessions, transcribing 
protocols, analyzing protocols and tests. The fact that all participants came from the 
same school might be a limitation too. The same applies for the dissimilarity in tasks. In 
order to measure the learning performance after studying a new task, it was not possible 
to administer the same tasks over the years. By piloting the tasks and consulting teachers 
we tried to make the relative diffi culty level of the tasks for each year as comparable as 
possible. Furthermore, the period covering the development of metacognitve skills was 
rather short. 
 This study shows that metacognitive skills cannot be ignored as an important 
predictor of learning performance. These skills develop during an important phase in 
education. It would be interesting to replicate (parts of) this study over a longer period of 
time with more participants coming from various schools. Such an extended study could 
contribute to a better understanding of the development of particular metacognitive 
skills, and of how appropriate skills can be taught at the right time.
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This study shows the fi nal results of a longitudinal project where the same participants 
were followed for three consecutive years as they enter secondary school (aged 12 to 
15 years). The fi rst objective of this study was to investigate the development of both 
quantity and quality of metacognitive skills. The second objective was to establish 
whether the development of metacognitive skills is intelligence-related or relatively 
intelligence-independent. Finally, the generality vs. domain-specifi city of developing 
metacognitive skills was investigated. In the fi rst year 32 fi rst-year secondary-school 
students participated in this study. In the second and third year, respectively 28 and 25 
students participated. While thinking aloud, the participants performed two different 
tasks representing two different domains: A text-studying task for history and a problem-
solving task for mathematics. Each year participants were given new tasks, suitable for 
their age. Participants’ intellectual ability was assessed, as well as their metacognitive 
skills and learning performance for both domains separately. Results of the fi rst two years 
show a signifi cant growth of both the quantity and the quality of metacognitive skills. In 
the third year this growth did not continue. Furthermore, results show that metacognitve 
skills contributed to learning performance partly independent of intellectual ability. 
Results also show that metacognitive skills appear to be predominantly general by 
nature over the years. A smaller domain-specifi c component was found as well in the 
fi rst two years, while this component disintegrated in the third year. In conclusion, the 
age around 15 years appears to be a relevant point in time during the developmental 
trajectory of metacognitive skills. At this age the growth of metacognitive skills is put on 
hold, while the nature of these skills becomes fully general. 
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4.1  Introduction 
Since Flavell (1979) introduced the concept ‘metacognition’, many studies have addressed 
the issue of the infl uence of metacognition on learning performance. Based on a meta-
review of studies, Wang, Haertel, and Walberg (1990) concluded that metacognition is 
the most important predictor of learning performance. The present study focuses on the 
development of metacognitive skills in relation to intellectual ability. Another important 
issue concerns the generality vs. the domain specifi city of metacognitive skills. 
4.1.1  Metacognitive skills 
A generally accepted distinction is the one between metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive skills. Metacognitive knowledge refers to the declarative knowledge 
one has about the interplay between personal characteristics, task characteristics, 
and available strategies in a learning situation (Flavell, 1979). Having metacognitive 
knowledge at one’s disposal, however, appears to be no guarantee for using this 
knowledge whenever it is needed. Alexander, Carr and Schwanenfl ugel (1995) found a 
discrepancy between childrens’ knowledge about monitoring and applying monitoring 
skills during task performance. In the same vein, Winne (1996) stated that knowledge has 
no effect on behavior until it is actually being used. Students who are aware of effective 
strategies still do not always use them (Barnett, 2000; Pressley, Yokoi, Van Meter, Van 
Etten, & Freebern, 1997). Metacognitive skills concern the procedural knowledge that 
is required for the actual regulation of, and control over one’s learning activities (Brown 
& DeLoache, 1978; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; Veenman, 2011). Task analysis, 
goal setting, planning, monitoring, checking, and recapitulation are manifestations of 
such skills. Metacognitive skills can be inferred from overt behavior or utterances by the 
student, that is, from concrete metacognitive activities (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & 
Affl erbach, 2006). These activities can be divided in behavior that occurs at the onset 
of task performance (orientation), during task performance (planning, monitoring, 
evaluation) and after task performance (refl ection and elaboration). Examples of 
metacognitive activities are given in Table 4.1. Note that some of the behavior in Table 
4.1 may be considered as cognitive, but the purposeful application of such cognitive 
behavior at the appropriate moment results from metacognitive skillfulness. It refl ects 
the intention to attain control over the cognitive task. Several researchers (Bowen, 
Shore, & Cartwright, 1992; Brown, 1980; Christoph, 2006; Markman, 1977, 1979; 
Mevarech & Fridkin, 2006; Pressley & Affl erbach, 1995; Schoenfeld, 1992; Shore & 
Lazar, 1996) have investigated the use of metacognitive skills while performing different 
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tasks (e.g., reading comprehension or problem solving) often focusing on a separate 
component of metacognitive skills (e.g., planning or monitoring activities). The present 
study, however, includes a broad range of metacognitive skills referring to orientation, 
planning, monitoring, as well as elaboration skills in both problem-solving and text-
studying tasks. While assessing metacognitive skills over a developmental trajectory 
two different perspectives can be taken: The quantity and the quality of metacognitive 
skills. The quantity concerns the frequency of these skills being applied, whereas the 
quality concerns the depth or the extent to which they are applied. An example of 
the latter is that making a sketch of the problem in order to represent the problem is 
considered as a deeper orientation than just reading (a part of) the problem statement. 
Using metacognitive skills more frequently does not automatically imply that these 
metacognitive skills have a higher level of quality. Therefore, this study focuses on the 
development of both the quantity and the quality of metacognitive skillfulness. 
4.1.2  Metacognitive skills from a developmental perspective
The fi rst objective of this study was to investigate the development of metacognitive 
skills. Flavell (1992) related the concept of metacognition to Piaget’s developmental 
stage of formal-operational thinking (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). At this stage children 
are capable of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, which requires metacognitive control. 
Flavell indicated that Piaget would not expect metacognition to show up before the 
stage of formal-operational thinking has been reached. More recent studies, however, 
showed that, alongside with the “theory of mind” (ToM), that is, the understanding 
of one’s own and other people’s state of mind, (Wellman, 1990), young preschoolers 
already start to develop some metacognitive awareness (Blöte, Van Otterloo, Stevenson, 
& Veenman, 2004; Demitriou & Efklides, 1990; Kuhn, 1999). Larkin (2006) found a 
relation between ToM, metacognitive knowledge and strategy use in two 5- to 6-year-
olds. A further metacognitive development in later childhood concerns not only the 
metacognitive knowledge, but also the onset of the development of metacognitive skills. 
Although Whitebread et al. (2009) found some planning and monitoring activities in 
playful situations with youngsters as young as 5 years old, it is generally assumed that 
the development of metacognitive skills in educational contexts commences around 
the age of 8-10 years (Berk, 2006; Kuhn, 1999; Siegler, 1998; Veenman et al., 2006; 
Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004). In a cross-sectional study concerning the 
frequency of metacogntive skills, Veenman et al. (2004) found a linear growth in 
metacognitive skills between the age of 9 and 22 yrs. In another study (Veenman & 
Spaans, 2005) a signifi cant growth of the quality of students’ metacognitive skills (12 
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– 15 years) was found. A growth in both frequency and quality of metacognitive skills 
was found in two studies with participants aged between 13 and 15 yrs. and 12 and 
14 yrs. respectively (Van der Stel, Veenman, Deelen, & Haenen, 2010; Van der Stel & 
Veenman, 2010). In line with these results, metacognitive skills are expected to increase 
in quantity (frequency) as well as in quality (depth) over the years (hypothesis 1). 
4.1.3  Relation between intellectual ability, metacognitive skills, and learning 
performance from a developmental perspective
A related research issue is whether the development of metacognitive skills is intelligence-
related or relatively intelligence-independent. Several researchers (Alexander et al., 
1995; Borkowski & Peck, 1986; Schneider & Pressley, 1997; Van der Stel & Veenman, 
2008; Van der Stel, et al., 2010; Veenman et al., 2004; Veenman & Spaans 2005) 
investigated metacognitive ability in relation to intellectual ability. 
 An interesting question is whether metacognitive skills are part of intelligence, 
that is, ”whether metacognition can be reduced to cognition” (Slife, Weiss, & Bell, 1985). 
Veenman (1993; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman & Verheij, 2003; Veenman et 
al., 1997) described three, mutually exclusive models concerning the relation between 
intellectual ability and metacognitive skills as predictors of learning performance. The 
intelligence model regards metacognitive skills as an integral part of intellectual ability. 
According to this model, metacognitive skills do not have a predictive value for learning 
performance independent of intellectual ability. Sternberg (1990), for instance, advocates 
such an inclusive position of ‘metacomponents’ in his triarchic theory of intelligence. 
The second, contrasting model is the independency model, in which intellectual ability 
and metacognitive skills are regarded as entirely independent predictors of learning 
performance. Finally, in the mixed model intellectual ability and metacognitive skills are 
correlated, but metacognitive skills has a surplus value on top of intellectual ability for 
the prediction of learning performance.
 Over the last decades, support has been found for each of these models (for an 
overview, see Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004). Many studies, however, 
are diffi cult to compare, due to dissimilarities in assessing metacognitive skills (thinking 
aloud, observation, questionnaires), in participants (age, educational background), and 
in tasks and domains. Moreover, the focus of some studies is restricted to the relation 
between intellectual ability and metacognitive skills, thereby excluding the relation of 
both predictors with learning performance. The evidence found so far seems to be in 
favor of the mixed model, albeit many of those studies concerned the metacognitive 
skills of older secondary-school or university students in cross-sectional designs. From 
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the perspective of the development of metacognitive skills, it remains to be ascertained 
more thoroughly in a longitudinal design whether the mixed model can be generalized 
to younger students with initially developing metacognitive skills, performing different 
tasks in different domains (see Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004). More 
specifi cally, the role of intellectual ability in the development of metacognitive skills 
will be addressed in this study. Alexander et al. (1995) formulated three developmental 
hypotheses with regard to the relation between intelligence and the development of 
metacognition. According to the ceiling hypothesis, initial effects of intelligence on the 
development of metacognition diminish over time. The acceleration hypothesis, on the 
other hand, assumes that the impact of intelligence on the development of metacognition 
increases with age. The monotonic development hypothesis, fi nally, assumes that both 
intelligence and metacognition show a monotonic growth over age independent of 
each other. In their literature overview, Alexander et al. (1995) found support for the 
monotonic development of metacognitive knowledge. Gifted children showed a general 
superiority in their declarative metacognitive knowledge, relative to non-gifted children 
at all ages. Giftedness effects were persistent throughout childhood with gifted children 
from early elementary school to junior high school showing a similar superiority in this 
knowledge. With regard to metacognitive skills, however, results were inconclusive. 
Young gifted children were not more spontaneously strategic than non-gifted children. 
However, a giftedness advantage showed up in the middle school and high school years 
for both spontaneous and complex strategy use. In a cross-sectional study, Veenman and 
Spaans (2005) obtained evidence in favor of a monotonic development of metacognitive 
skills. They obtained support for a monotonic maturation effect of both intellectual 
ability and metacognitive skills in students of 13 and 15 years performing a problem-
solving task and an inductive-learning task. 
 In the present study, it is hypothesized that metacognitive skills develop alongside, 
but not fully dependent on intellectual ability, regardless of tasks and domains. A 
monotonic development of both metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability as 
predictors of learning performance is expected, in line with the mixed model and the 
monotonic development hypothesis (hypothesis 2). 
4.1.4  Metacognitive skills across domains
Another objective of this study was to establish whether metacognitive skills are general 
or domain specifi c. From a developmental as well as from an instructional perspective 
it is relevant to know not only whether metacognitive skills develop, but also how they 
develop: Whether they develop from being general into becoming domain specifi c or 
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the other way around? Earlier studies concerning this issue yielded contradictory results. 
Despite differences in assessment, age groups, tasks and domains, some researchers 
found evidence for general metacognitive skills (Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 
1995; Schraw & Nietfeld, 1998; Veenman & Beishuizen 2004; Veenman & Verheij 
2003; Veenman et al., 1997, 2004). On the other hand, De Jong (1992) found that 
the quality and quantity of metacognitive activities of secondary-school students varied 
substantially across tasks. Glaser, Schauble, Raghavan, and Zeitz (1992) showed that 
metacognitive activities of university students varied across different discovery-learning 
tasks, although improvement between subsequent tasks did not rule out the existence 
of general strategies. Kelemen, Frost, and Weaver (2000) concluded that individual 
differences in meta-memory accuracy were not stable across consecutive sessions and 
tasks, which they interpreted as evidence against a general metacognitive ability. 
 Veenman et al. (2004) found support for the generality of metacognitive skills 
among young novices (aged 9 to 22 yrs.) performing discovery-learning tasks in different 
domains. This support for young students’ general metacognitive skills could not be 
corroborated by a study of Veenman and Spaans (2005). In their study 13- and 15-
year olds performed two tasks in different domains (math word-problem solving and 
an inductive-learning task for biology). Metacognitive skills of the younger students 
appeared to be rather domain specifi c, whereas those of the older ones turned out to be 
general by nature.
 Based on earlier studies, the onset of metacognitive skill development for academic 
tasks is not to be expected before the age of 8 – 10 years (Alexander et al., 1995; Berk, 
2006; Kuhn, 1999; Siegler, 1998). The academic metacognitive skills of 12-year olds 
are still premature and developing, which may explain why these skills may diverge on 
notably different tasks. Veenman and Spaans (2005) assumed that metacognitive skills 
might be initially acquired within separate tasks and domains, and then progressively 
become a generalized repertoire across tasks and domains. 
 Participants in the present study are rather young adolescents and inexperienced 
in applying academic metacognitive skills. Spear (2000) characterized adolescence as a 
transitional developmental period. “Adolescence is the gradual period from childhood to 
adulthood……adolescence is a period of transitions rather than a moment of attainment” 
(p.417). Therefore, metacognitive skills of young adolescents are expected to be in a 
transitory phase of development, which implies that both general and domain-specifi c 
metacognitive skills will be used. It is hypothesized that the participants will initially use 
general as well as domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. It is also hypothesized that the 
initially acquired domain-specifi c metacognitive skills tend to generalize during further 
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development. Therefore, older students are expected to resort less to domain-specifi c 
metacognitive skills than younger students do (hypothesis 3). 
4.2  Method
4.2.1  Participants
In the fi rst year of this three-year-longitudinal project, 32 fi rst-year secondary-school 
students participated. They were recruited from 85 students of three different tracks 
(pre-university education, higher general education and pre-vocational education) of an 
urban school in the Netherlands. This school is known because of its large diversity of 
children, thus representing a broad educational level of the students, a broad range of 
social economic status of parents, and various ethnic backgrounds. It was chosen not 
to work with more than one school in order to avoid confounding variables, such as 
differences in teachers, pedagogical/didactic philosophy, schoolbooks, etc. Students with 
learning or conduct disorders (e.g., dyslexia or ADHD) were excluded from the study. 
Participants were distributed equally over the three tracks. Participants were selected on 
their intellectual ability (see section 4.2.3). Consent was requested from and given by 
the participants’ parents. In the second year, four students withdrew as participants due 
to changing residence or school. In the third year, another three students withdrew for 
the same reason. In the third year, 25 students (8 boys, 17 girls; average age 14 years 
and 7 months) participated in the third part of this study7. The data in the present study 
refer to the 25 students that participated in all three years. After completing the tasks, 
participants received a small fi nancial reward. 
4.2.2  Metacognitive skills
All transcribed thinking-aloud protocols were analyzed on metacognitive skills 
according to the procedure of Veenman (Prins, Veenman, & Elshout, 2006; Van der 
Stel & Veenman, 2008, 2010; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman, Kerseboom, & 
Imthorn, 2000). Metacognitive skillfulness was divided into four subscales: Orientation 
(O), Planning and Systematic orderliness (P), Evaluation (Ev), and Elaboration (El). In 
Table 4.1 general metacognitive activities across both tasks and domains as well as 
more specifi c metacognitive activities for text-studying and problem-solving tasks are 
7 Effects of selective loss of participants over the years were checked for and not found. The same applies for 
effect of gender.
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described for each subscale of metacognitive skillfulness (Meijer, Veenman, & Van 
Hout-Wolters, 2006; Pressley, 2000; Pressley & Affl erbach, 1995).
Table 4.1 Examples of domain-specifi c and general metacognitive activities
History-specifi c Math-specifi c General
Orientation
a.  Activating prior 
knowledge
b.  Goal setting
c. Predicting the content of the 
text
Estimating the answer
d. Reading titles of paragraphs 
prior to reading the entire text
Making a sketch of the 
problem in order to 
represent the problem
Planning & Systematic orderliness
a.  Subgoaling
b. Time management
c. Designing a reading plan and 
deciding upon which text 
parts to pay attention to
Designing a step-by-step 
action plan, instead of 
working by trial-and-error
d. Note taking (self-instruction 
for doing so)
Writing down calculations 
step by step
Evaluation  
a.  Expressing non-
understanding
b.  Comment on own 
activities
c. Monitoring text   
comprehension during reading
Monitoring action plan
d. Self-correction after rereading 
(parts of) the text
Checking an answer by 
recalculating
Elaboration  
a. Recapitulating and 
drawing conclusions
b. Relating the answer 
to the question or 
problem
c. Paraphrasing (parts of) the text Paraphrasing the problem
d. Summarizing (self-instruction 
for doing so); Making 
inferences during reading
Drawing conclusions 




The scoring method consisted of two steps for each protocol. First, an utterance was 
coded in the margin if belonging to one of the four subscales (O, P, Ev or El). This resulted 
in a quantitative score obtained by counting the frequency of metacognitive activities 
on each subscale (e.g., if a student evaluated fi ve times, the quantitative Evaluation 
score was fi ve). Secondly, a score for the quality of metacognitive skills was judged from 
the protocols. To obtain a reliable score for the quality of metacognitive skills, scoring 
criteria were formulated for each subscale. This resulted in a method, which allowed for 
assessing general as well as domain-specifi c metacognitive activities. A fi ve-point scale 
(ranging from 0 to 4) was used for each subscale. For example, a participant received a 
higher score for ‘deeper’ Elaboration (e.g., drawing a conclusion in one’s own words) 
than for a superfi cial one (e.g., summarizing a paragraph almost literally). It is important 
to emphasize that the judges intentionally avoided the confounding of metacognition 
scores with the correctness or incorrectness of the content matter. So, an incorrect, but 
highly elaborated conclusion could equally generate a high score for ‘Elaboration’ as 
long as it was in line with the participant’s own reasoning. 
 Each year, 6 protocols of each task were rated by two judges separately. The 
interrater reliability was computed on the summed scores over the four subscales of 
metacognition. Since the interrater reliability was high, the remaining protocols were 
analyzed and rated by one judge. Cronbach’s alpha interrater reliability ranged from .77 
to .93 for the quantitative scores and from .89 to .97 for the qualitative scores.
4.2.3 Intellectual ability
Each year, students’ intellectual ability was assessed by a series of ability tests. 
Three subtests from the Groninger Intelligence test for Secondary Education (GIVO, 
standardized Dutch intelligence test; Van Dijk & Tellegen, 1994) were selected: Number 
Series, Verbal Analogies and Unfolding Figures. With these three subtests a number of 
the primary intelligence factors (Carroll, 1993) is assessed: Both verbal and numerical 
inductive and deductive reasoning abilities and visuospatial ability. The GIVO, however, 
lacks a test for assessing memory abilities, another primary factor in Carroll’s (1993) 
model highly relevant to the prediction of school performance (Crone et al., 2006). 
Therefore, a fourth test (Names & Professions, requiring the memorization of word 
pairs; see Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004) was added. In order to determine the growth in 
intellectual ability, the raw scores of the aforementioned four subtests were compared. 
Furthermore, raw scores were transformed into z-scores and for each participant a 
mean z-score was calculated over the four subtests for each year. This resulted in a total 
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score of the participant’s intellectual ability for each year. These scores were used in the 
correlational analyses. 
To guarantee suffi cient variance in intellectual ability, the median of the intellectual 
ability scores was calculated and participants were denominated as high (1st quartile), 
average (2nd and 3rd quartile) or low (4th quartile) in intelligence. Participants were 
selected at random from each quartile, so as to attain an equal distribution over the 
quartiles. 
4.2.4  Tasks
To ensure the novelty of tasks, each year participants were given new tasks with task 
demands adapted to their age. All tasks were piloted beforehand. In order to answer 
the question whether metacognitive skills are general or domain specifi c, students were 
asked to perform two different tasks representing two different domains. One task was 
a text-studying task in the domain of history and the other one was a problem-solving 
task in the domain of mathematics. In order to allow domain-specifi c metacognitive 
activities, the differences in tasks and domains were maximized. 
4.2.4.1  History task
In an individual session of 50 minutes, participants were asked to study a history text 
in the same way as they usually do when preparing for a test. They were also asked 
to read aloud and to think aloud while reading the text and answering the questions 
or assignments embedded in the text. Participants were allowed to study the text for 
30 minutes and in the remaining 20 minutes a post-test was administered (see section 
4.2.5). 
 The history texts were composed of texts parts from two of the most frequently used 
Dutch schoolbooks for history: “MeMo” (Van Boxtel & Schrover, 1998) and “Sprekend 
verleden” (Buskop, Dalhuisen, & Geest, 1998). To avoid prior knowledge of the topic on 
the one hand, and to appeal to the zone of tolerable diffi culty (Vygotsky, 1978) on the 
other hand, the text was based on a subject of the curriculum that was one year ahead 
(e.g., the fi rst-year text was based on a subject of the second-year curriculum, instead 
of the fi rst-year curriculum). In all texts, three activating questions or assignments were 
embedded. These were not meant for testing the students’ knowledge, but to elicit text-
studying activities (e.g., ‘There are several reasons why the north and the south were at 
war with each other. Describe in your own words at least two of these reasons’). From 
a pilot-study (Meijer, Veenman, & Van Hout-Wolters, 2006) it appeared that if a text did 
not contain such activating questions and assignments, many participants just tended to 
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read linearly. In the fi rst year, a text about slavery and the civil war in the United States 
of America was used. In the second year, a text about the First World War was used. 
Finally, in the third year, a text about politics and economics in the United States of 
America in the Thirties of the last century was presented. 
4.2.4.2  Mathematics task
In another individual session of 50 minutes, participants practiced to solve mathematical 
word problems for 20 minutes. Five problems were presented in the fi rst year, six in the 
second year, and fi ve in the third year. Several categories of problems were presented. In 
the fi rst year, the categories of problems were distance, fraction, percentage, and surface 
area of rectangles. In the next year, the categories of problems were content, surface 
area of a triangle, fraction, percentage, and algebra. In the last year, the categories 
were calculation of probability, quadratic equation, Pythagoras’ theorem, statistics, 
and formula with a square root. The tasks for each year were composed of adaptations 
of math problems from one of the most frequently used Dutch schoolbooks for math 
(“Getal en Ruimte”; Vuijk et al., 2003).
 Together with the assignments, participants received a sheet containing the 
answers and a brief stepwise explanation of problem solutions. Participants were 
free to consult this sheet whenever and as much as they liked. The fi rst 20 minutes 
were considered as a learning-by-doing phase. Next, the participants handed in all 
materials and received another series of parallel problems, which had to be solved in 
the remaining 30 minutes, without the option to consult an answer sheet. This second 
part is considered as a post-test assessment of learning performance (see section 4.2.5). 
All problems had to be solved while thinking aloud. 
4.2.5  Learning performance
After the learning phase of both tasks, learning performance was assessed by a post-
test, as was explained to the participants in advance. Each year the post-test for history 
consisted of fi ve multiple-choice questions and six essay questions. The multiple-choice 
questions assessed reproductive knowledge (facts and dates, e.g., ‘What was the name 
of the Austrian-Hungarian Crown prince?’). The essay questions were meant to assess 
overall text comprehension (e.g., ‘Describe why things went wrong in agriculture and 
explain what Roosevelt did to restore agriculture economically’).
 Participants were not allowed to consult the text or their notes while answering 
the questions. According to a rating system, points were given for the correctness of 
answers to each question. Multiple-choice questions could render one point, while 
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essay questions could render a maximum of four points. A total score was calculated 
and used as a measure of learning performance in history (Cronbach’s alpha was .58, 1st 
year; .51, 2nd year; .80 3rd year). For each test the maximum obtainable score was 20 
points. 
 After the learning-by-doing phase for math, learning performance was assessed 
by the post-test. In each post-test, items were parallel to the items in the learning phase, 
that is, the surface structure of the post-test items differed from the one of the learning-
task items, but the deep structure was the same. Post-tests with fi ve (1st year and 3rd 
year) and six (2nd year) math word problems were administered. In the fi rst year two 
points per item could be earned if both the procedure and the answer was correct; one 
point if either one of them was correct; and zero points if neither of them was correct 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .58). Due to an increase of the complexity of the problems, another 
scoring system was chosen in the second and third year: For the fi rst fi ve math problems 
in the second year, an equal amount of 10 points could be earned. Problem 6 consisted 
of three sub-problems that were independent of each other and, therefore, was valued 
with a maximum of 30 points. So, the maximum obtainable score in the second year was 
80 points. A total score was calculated and used as a measure of learning performance 
in mathematics (Cronbach’s alpha = .69). In the third year, fi ve points per (sub)problem 
could be earned with a maximum obtainable score of 45 points (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.77). Because of the differences in the number of obtainable scores per item over the 
years, the mean proportion of right answers (p-value) was calculated for all questions in 
each year as well as the mean p-value per year8. The p-values were very similar over the 
years.
4.2.6  Procedure
Each year, the intellectual-ability tests were administered during a group session. The 
individual, thinking-aloud sessions took place during school time. The experiment had a 
counterbalanced design with respect to task order, meaning that half of the participants 
started with history and the other half with mathematics. Participants could make use 
of a pen, pencil, text highlighter, ruler, calculator, and blank sheets of paper for making 
notes. In order to compare the results of the three years, only the data of the participants 
that performed all tasks over the years (N = 25) were used in the statistical analyses.
 All participants were instructed to think aloud while working on the individual 
tasks. The experimenter refrained from helping students in any way. Whenever a student 
8 Mean p-values for History over the years were .51, .54 and .56 respectively. Mean p-values for Math over the 
years were .44, .69 and .66 respectively. ANOVA and post-hoc test (Bonferroni) were performed on the math 
data. No signifi cant difference was found. 
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fell silent, the experimenter used standard prompts (e.g., ‘please, keep on thinking 
aloud’) in order to encourage students to think aloud. All utterances of participants were 
audio-taped, transcribed, and analyzed on metacognitive skills. 
4.3  Results
4.3.1  Development of metacognitive skills and intellectual ability 
In order to analyze growth in intellectual ability and metacognitive skills, results of 
the three consecutive years were compared. First, ANOVA was performed on the raw 
subscale scores of intellectual ability with age as within-subjects factor. A signifi cant 
effect of age was found [F(7,18) = 7.40, p <.001, ² = .78]. Pairwise comparisons 
(comparing the fi rst to the second year, and the second to the third year) showed an 
incremental change in intellectual ability over the years (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Means (and standard deviations) of intellectual ability
Intellectual ability N = 25 13 years 14 years 15 years
Number series 18.32 (4.03) 19.20 (4.23) 21.04 (3.61)
Verbal analogies 13.88 (3.27) 16.40 (3.61) 17.64 (3.14)
Unfolding fi gures 10.48 (4.67) 12.72 (4.95) 14.48 (4.62)
Memory 7.76 (2.22) 9.22 (2.59) 9.30 (3.11)
Total 12.61 (2.80) 14.38 (2.83) 15.68 (2.73)
 
Furthermore, separate ANOVAs with repeated measures were performed on the 
quantitative and the qualitative subscale scores of metacognition of both tasks with 
age as within-subjects factor. A signifi cant age effect was found for the frequency of 
metacognitive skills in math [F(8,17) = 4.32, p < .01, ² = .67], whereas for history no 
signifi cant age effect was found [F(8,17) = 2.14, p > .05, ² = .50]. ANOVAs on the 
quality of metacognitive skills revealed a signifi cant age effect for both tasks [F(8,17) = 
2.90, p < .05, ² = .58, math] and [F(8,17) = 3.28, p < .02, ² = .61, history]. Means and 
standard deviations are shown below in Tables 4.3 (quality) and 4.4 (frequency).
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Table 4.3 Means (and standard deviations) of quality of metacognition
Quality of metacognition N = 25 13 years 14 years 15 years
Orientation Math 1.52 (.65) 1.80 (.82) 1.60 (.71)
Planning Math 1.84 (1.54) 2.36 (1.10) 2.48 (.92)
Evaluation Math 1.12 (1.10) 1.40 (.76) 1.36 (.99)
Elaboration Math 1.36 (.99) 1.48 (.92) 1.08 (.81)
Total Math 5.96 (3.33) 7.04 (2.61) 6.52 (2.50)
Orientation History .56 (.58) .92 (.76) 1.04 (.79)
Planning History 2.00 (1.50) 1.64 (.91) 1.96 (1.27)
Evaluation History .80 (1.00) 1.44 (1.35) .72 (.98)
Elaboration History 1.84 (1.55) 1.96 (1.02) 2.00 (1.22)
Total History 5.24 (3.77) 5.88 (3.20) 5.72 (3.30)
Table 4.4 Means (and standard deviations) of quantity (frequency) of metacognition
Quantity of metacognition 13 years 14 years 15 years
Orientation Math 6.84 (1.95) 9.44 (3.13) 6.52 (1.80)
Planning Math 8.40 (4.11) 12.16 (4.30) 10.88 (2.74)
Evaluation Math 2.72 (2.50) 5.04 (4.83) 2.84 (2.35)
Elaboration Math 3.24 (2.63) 5.88 (4.00) 3.68 (2.54)
Total Math 21.20 (8.44) 32.52 (10.90) 23.88 (6.58)
Orientation History .24 (.66) .56 (.87) .80 (1.04)
Planning History 7.36 (6.73) 9.00 (7.70) 8.60 (6.77)
Evaluation History 1.44 (1.98) 3.56 (3.93) 1.60 (2.23)
Elaboration History 9.32 (9.44) 7.40 (4.55) 8.92 (5.89)
Total History 18.36 (13.83) 20.52 (12.83) 19.52 (13.38)
Pairwise comparisons were performed in order to look closer into changes on subscale 
level over the years. These tests revealed different developmental patterns at subscale 


















































Figure 4.2 Quantitative metacognition scores across age (m = math; h = history)
The majority of the metacognitive scores did not increase continuously over the years. 
Two main patterns can be observed: (1) Growth between the fi rst and the second 
year, followed by stabilization in scores between the second and the third year, and 
(2) Growth between the fi rst and the second year followed by regression between the 
second and third year.
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4.3.2  Testing the mixed model 
To determine whether developmental processes affect the relation between intellectual 
ability and metacognition as predictors of learning performance, the correlations 
between these three variables over the three consecutive years were compared (see 
Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Correlations and Semi-partial correlations
IA Meta Semi-PartIA Semi-PartMeta
Quality
LP Math13 .77** .70** .43** .30*
Meta Math13 .61**
LP Math14 .54** .74** .20 .55**
Meta Math14 .49*
LP Math15 .79** .59** .52** .13
Meta Math15 .66**
LP History13 .46* .68** .28* .58**
Meta Hist13 .28
LP History14 .24 .35 .16 .30*
Meta Hist14 .26
LP History15 .25 .60** .00 .55**
Meta Hist15 .41*
Quantity
LP Math 13 .73** .40** .30*
Meta Math13 .64**
LP Math14 .40 .46** .27
Meta Math14 .24
LP Math15 .34 .70** .08
Meta Math15 .42*
LP History13 .61** .32* .51**
Meta Hist13 .26
LP History14 .23 .21 .20
Meta Hist14 .15
LP History15 .43* .15 .38*
Meta Hist15 .23
Note: LP means Learning performance * p < .05, ** p < .01
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As far as the math task was concerned, intellectual ability correlated signifi cantly with 
both quality of metacognitive skills and learning performance in the three consecutive 
years. The same applies for the correlation between quality of metacognitive skills and 
learning performance. The correlation between frequency of metacognitive skills for 
math and learning performance was signifi cant only in the fi rst year. The correlation 
between intellectual ability and frequency of metacognitive skills was signifi cant, except 
for the second year.
 Results on the history task differ partly from results on the math task. Only in the 
fi rst year a signifi cant correlation was found between intellectual ability and learning 
performance. The correlation between intellectual ability and quality of metacognitive 
skills was signifi cant in the third year only. The correlation between quality of 
metacognitive skills and learning performance was signifi cant in the fi rst and the third 
year. The same applies for frequency of metacognitive skills and learning performance. 
No signifi cant correlations were found between intellectual ability and frequency of 
metacognitive skills for history. 
 To test the mixed model, semi-partial correlations for each age group (Nunnally, 
1967) were calculated by partialling metacognitive skill from the correlation between 
intellectual ability and learning performance (i.e., Semi-PartIA) and partialling intellectual 
ability from the correlation between metacognitive skills and learning performance (i.e., 
Semi-PartMeta). These semi-partial correlations (see Table 4.5) are needed to calculate 
the unique, independent contribution of metacognitive skills and intellectual ability 
to learning performance. Using regression-analytic techniques (Pedhazur, 1982; Van 
der Stel & Veenman, 2008, 2010; Veenman & Spaans, 2005) the unique and shared 
proportions of variance in learning performance were distributed to metacognitive skills 
and intellectual ability (see Table 4.6).
 History results in Table 4.6 show that, despite the variance shared with intellectual 
ability, both frequency (QN) and quality (QL) of metacognitive skills, substantially added 
to the prediction of learning performance on top of intellectual ability. Between 13 and 
14 years the unique contribution of metacognition decreased in order to increase again 
between 14 and 15 years. The unique contribution of intellectual ability to learning 
performance in history faded out over the years. Math results show an increasing 
contribution of metacognitive skillfulness to the prediction of learning performance on 
top of intellectual ability between 13 and 14 years. With 15 years, however, this unique 
contribution practically disappeared. The unique contribution of intellectual ability 
to the learning performance on top of the quality of metacognitive skills decreased 
substantially between 13 and 14 years, however, to reappear with 15 years. In order 
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to check whether the contribution of metacognitive skills differed signifi cantly over 
the years, Fisher-z ratios were calculated for pairs of correlations (Guilford, 1965). All 
Fisher-z ratios were smaller than 1.46, meaning that none of the correlations differed 
signifi cantly. 
Table 4.6 Percentage of variance accounted for in Learning performance
Intel unique Meta unique Shared Total
QL QN QL QN QL QN QL QN
History 13  7.9  9.9 33.0 25.9 13.3 11.1 54.2 46.9
History 14  2.5  4.5  9.0  3.8  3.5  1.4 15.0  9.7
History 15  0.0  2.3 30.1 14.3  6.1  3.8 36.2 20.4
Math 13 18.8 15.8  8.8  9.2 40.6 43.7 68.2 68.7
Math 14  4.2 21.0 29.7  7.5 25.0  8.3 59.0 36.8
Math 15 26.6 51.8  1.6  0.0 38.0 12.8 66.2 64.6
Note: Intel unique means the unique contribution of Intellectual ability to Learning performance; Meta 
unique means the unique contribution of Metacognitive skills to Learning performance; Shared means 
the shared contribution of Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skills to Learning performance. Total 
means the total contribution of Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skills to Learning performance. QL 
= qualitative metacognition scores; QN = quantitative metacognition scores.
4.3.3  Metacognitive skills across domains 
The generality vs. domain specifi city of metacognitive skills was investigated by 
performing a principal component analysis (PCA) on the metacognition scores. For 
each year separately, a principal component analysis with a two-factor solution was 
performed on the four subscales of metacognitive skills for both tasks (see Table 4.7).
 The unrotated solutions of the PCAs show that all measures of quality of 
metacognitive skills substantially load on the fi rst component (see Table 4.4). This 
component has eigenvalues of 3.53 (13 yrs.), 3.28 (14 yrs.), and 3.87 (15 yrs.), with 
variance proportions of .44; .41 and .48 respectively. Moreover, in the fi rst two years 
a second component contrasting the two domains was extracted with eigenvalues of 
1.78 (13 yrs.), and 1.40 (14 yrs.), and with variance proportions of .22, .17 respectively. 
Loadings on a second component of the third year with an eigenvalue of 1.11 (15 yrs.), 
and a variance proportion of .14 did not contrast the two domains (see Table 4.7). The 
same analysis was performed on quantitative scores of metacognitive skills. Results were 
in line with those of the qualitative data. 
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Eigenvalue 3.53 1.78 3.28 1.40 3.87 1.11
Variance proportion .44 .22 .41 .17 .48 .14
Metaorientation Hist .50 .49 .51 -.45 .21 .86
Metaplanning Hist .72 .48 .49 -.46 .86 .19
Metaevaluation Hist .48 .52 .77 -.42 .71 -.44
Metaelaboration Hist .72 .37 .89 -.14 .87 .04
Metaorientation Math .61 -.57 .40 .23 .46 -.27
Metaplanning Math .78 -.31 .58 .61 .73 .04
Metaevaluation Math .55 -.67 .69 .13 .68 -.17
Metaelaboration Math .86 -.16 .63 .59 .79 .17
4.3.4  Exploratory analysis
After the individual math sessions of the third year were completed, the experimenter 
had the impression that the frequency of using the step-wise explanation sheet during 
the math task had changed over the years. Together with the assignments, participants 
received this sheet containing the answers and a brief stepwise explanation of problem 
solutions. Participants were free to consult this sheet whenever and as much as they 
liked. The impression was that older participants made more use of the sheet to check 
their own solutions, that is, older participants would consult the sheet more after solving 
a math problem, relative to younger participants. Change in the frequency of using the 
sheets prior to attempts to solve a problem was not suspected. A change in using the 
sheet could have caused the unexpected low unique contribution of metacognition 
to learning performance for math in the 3rd year. In order to test this assumption, the 
sheet use prior and after problem solving was coded in all math protocols. Because the 
number of math assignments was not the same each year, the sheet-use scores were 
recoded in a relative frequency of sheet usage. ANOVA with repeated measures on 
consulting the explanation sheets after problem solving with age as within-subjects 
factor revealed a signifi cant effect of age [F(2,23) = 6.82, p<.005, ² = .37]. Fourteen-
year-olds consulted the sheets more than 13-year-olds, and 15-year-olds more than 
14-year-olds. The mean percentage of assignments for which 13-year-olds consulted 
the sheet after problem solving was 10 (SD = 23.9); 14-year-olds (M = 24, SD = 28.7); 
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15-year-olds (M = 41, SD = 33.2). ANOVA on the scores prior to problem solving did 
not reveal a signifi cant age effect [F(2,23) = .04, p > .05, ² = .00]. Each year, the mean 
percentage of assignments for which the sheet was consulted prior to problem solving 
was about 30.
4.4  Discussion
This longitudinal study investigated the development of both the quantity (frequency) 
and the quality (depth) of metacognitive skills in young adolescents. According to the 
fi rst hypothesis, metacognitive skills were expected to increase in frequency as well as 
in depth over the three consecutive years. Results show an overall growth of quantitative 
and qualitative scores of metacognitive skills over the fi rst two years (between 13 and 
14 yrs.). Between the second year and the third year (between 14 and 15 yrs.), this 
growth did not continue. So, the fi rst hypothesis is partly corroborated: Metacognitive 
skills do grow in frequency and in depth, but growth was not continuous over the three 
consecutive years. In prior research (Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004) 
a continuous growth of metacognitive skillfulness was found. It should be mentioned, 
however, that these studies were concerned with larger intervals between measurements, 
and did not focus on the development between 14 and 15 years in particular. Moreover, 
these studies had a cross-sectional design and the same tasks were used over the years. 
Therefore, it is presumed that growth is arrested only temporarily between 14 and 15 yrs. 
According to dynamic-systems theories (Siegler, DeLoache, & Eisenberg, 2010), a class 
of theories that focus on how change occurs over time in complex systems, individual 
children acquire skills at different ages and in different ways. Their development entails 
regressions as well as progress. Development of metacogitive skills seems to be in line 
with the notion of dynamic-systems theories: During development both progress and 
regression occur, and not all components of metacognitive skillfulness develop at the 
same pace.
 The second hypothesis concerned the relation between metacognitive skills 
and intellectual ability as predictors of learning performance over age groups. Results 
were expected to be in line with the mixed model and the monotonic development 
hypothesis. In the present study, a unique contribution of metacognitive skills to learning 
performance and a shared contribution of metacognitive skills with intellectual ability to 
learning performance was found in all three consecutive years, with the exception of the 
frequency of metacognitive skills in math in the 3rd year. The unique contribution of the 
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quality of metacognitive skills in math in the 3rd year was rather small (1.6%). In a cross-
sectional study with the same tasks and the same age groups, however, a much higher 
unique contribution of metacognitive skills (42.8%) in 15-year-olds was found (Van der 
Stel, et al., 2010). The small unique contribution in the present study could be the result 
of the more frequent use of the explanation sheets in the 3rd year. Consulting the sheet 
after problem solving, that is, comparing the solution given on the sheet with one’s own 
solution, could be acquired behavior promoted by the teachers of this particular group. 
It goes without doubt that this is useful learning behavior, but this acquired behavior 
probably suppressed the unique contribution of spontaneous metacognitive skills during 
problem solving. In conclusion, the mixed model was found over the years for both 
history and math, albeit less convincing than expected for math in the 3rd year.
 Another part of hypothesis 2 was the expected monotonic development of 
metacognitive skills and intellectual ability as predictors of learning performance in line 
with Alexander’s monotonic development hypothesis. Results of the fi rst two years of the 
present study point in the direction of a monotonic development of metacognitive skills: 
A continuous growth of metacognitive skills with age was found, alongside intellectual 
growth. Results of the 3rd year, however, show a continued growth in intellectual ability, 
but no further growth in metacognitive skills. Despite the (temporary) stabilization in 
metacognitive growth, results predominantly agree with the monotonic development 
hypothesis. Here it is hypothesized that intellectual development does not direct 
metacognitive development, as is the case in both the ceiling and the acceleration 
hypotheses (see section 4.1.3). Moreover, the mixed model was found each year, 
confi rming an independent contribution of metacognition to learning performance 
(except for the quantity of metacognition in 3rd year math). Thus, intellectual 
development does not direct metacognitive development. Therefore, the current results 
are considered to agree most with the monotonic development hypothesis, which is 
relevant to the training of metacognitive skills in education. Metacognitive skills can be 
trained successfully at different ages and in various tasks and domains (cf. Campione, 
Brown & Ferrara, 1982; Chinnappan & Lawson, 1996; Kramarski & Mevarech, 2003; 
Masui & De Corte, 1999; Pressley & Gaskins, 2006). 
 The third and last research question concerned the generality vs. domain 
specifi city of metacognitive skills. In the fi rst two years, the solutions of the principal 
component analysis (PCA) on the metacognitive data show a highly similar two-
component solution: A fi rst component with rather high component loadings, which may 
be interpreted as representing general metacognitive skills across domains, and a second, 
weaker component with contrasted component loadings, which may be interpreted as 
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representing domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. In the third year, however, the solution 
of the PCA changed: The fi rst component still can be interpreted as representing general 
metacognitive skills, but the structure of the second component has become much more 
scattered. It no longer can be interpreted as a domain-specifi c component. Results 
support our expectation that metacognitive skills of rather young and inexperienced 
adolescents represent a general as well as a domain-specifi c component. Veenman and 
Spaans (2005) assumed that metacognitive skills initially develop on separate islands 
of tasks and domains. They also assumed that beyond the age of 12 years, these skills 
merge into a more general repertoire that is applicable and transferable across tasks 
and domains. Among young adolescents, a phase of transition could be characterized 
by applying recently acquired general metacognitive skills, along with a remainder of 
domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. In line with hypothesis 3, it was expected that the 
initially acquired domain-specifi c metacognitive skills would tend to generalize during 
development. Although the present results corroborate hypothesis 3, the generalization 
process was less gradual than expected. Next to drawing on a repertoire of general 
metacognitive skills, students continue to apply domain-specifi c metacognitive skills 
between the age of 12 and 14 years. This may indicate that these students are still 
in a transitory phase of metacognitive-skill development. The use of both general and 
domain-specifi c metacognitive skills for a longer period of time could be explained by 
the overlapping-waves model (Siegler, 1998). According to this model, children initially 
use multiple strategies, and with age and experience they will selectively rely on more 
advanced strategies. 
 From an instructional perspective, it would be advisable to extend the training of 
domain-specifi c metacognitive skills in a particular learning context to more general, 
domain-surpassing ones (Veenman et al., 2004). Students will profi t from an explicit 
training in metacognitive skills more effectively if that training surpasses a particular 
learning context. Metacognitive skills, acquired in separate domains, may gradually 
be generalized across domains (Schneider & Pressley, 1997). This process can be 
considered as high road transfer (Salomon & Perkins, 1989). Teachers should initially 
encourage students to develop their domain-specifi c metacognitive skills. As a next step, 
teachers should pay attention to the generalized applicability of the students’ repertoire 
of metacognitive skills across domains. If teachers from various disciplines attune their 
instructions regarding metacognitive skills, transfer of metacognitive skills could be 
facilitated, thus providing students with tools for performing new tasks in new domains.
It should be acknowledged that there are some limitations to the present study. A 
fi rst limitation concerns the generalizability due to the small sample size. The time-
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consuming method of protocol analysis of individual sessions did not allow for larger 
samples. A second limitation could be the dissimilarity in tasks over the years. Repeatedly 
measuring learning performance in a longitudinal design, however, makes it inevitable 
to use new tasks each year. By piloting the tasks and consulting teachers, efforts were 
made to balance the relative diffi culty level of the tasks for each age group. 
 During the last decade, neurocognitive developmental research showed that 
changes in the adolescent brain are non-linear, non-synchronous and with large 
individual differences (Casey, Getz & Galvan, 2008; Steinberg, 2005; Toga, Thompson 
& Sowell, 2006). The prefrontal cortex matures until late adolescence (Toga et al., 2006). 
Veenman et al. (2004) found that a continued growth also applies to metacognitive 
skills, they continue to develop till at least the age of 22 yrs. The current study show that 
different components of metacognitive skillfulness develop neither at the same pace, nor 
continuously. Knowledge about the developmental trajectory of the various components 
of metacognitive skillfulness will enable teachers to teach the right things at the right 
time. For future research it would be a challenge to look for opportunities to combine 
research that describes developmental changes based on behavioral experiments with 
research based on new methods like functional imaging. Such studies would make it 
possible to focus on processes of change rather than focusing on steady states at different 
ages.
4.5  Conclusions
Results show that the age of 15 years is a signifi cant point in time during the developmental 
trajectory of metacognitive skills. It seems that the development of metacognitive skills 
of students between 12 and 14 years is dominated by growth, resulting in an increase in 
both frequency and quality of metacognitive skills. Once this growth of metacognitive 
skills has developed up to a certain level, development of metacognitive skills is not 
longer dominated by growth, but by the generalized application of these skills. Students 
around the age of 15 yrs. will increasingly be able to transfer the metacognitive skills 
that were acquired in certain tasks and domains to new tasks and domains. The present 
study shows that the age of 15 yrs. is a signifi cant landmark in the development of 
metacognitive skillfulness on the way to adulthood. 
Chapter 5 
The increasing role of metacognitive skills in math: 





Both intelligence and metacognitive skillfulness have been regarded as important 
predictors of math performance. The role that metacognitive skills play in math, 
however, seems to be subjected to change over the early years of secondary education. 
Metacognitive skills seem to become more general (i.e., less domain-specifi c) by nature 
(Veenman & Spaans, 2005). Moreover, according to the monotonic development 
hypothesis (Alexander, Carr, & Schwanenfl ugel, 1995), metacognitive skills increase 
with age independent of intellectual development. This hypothesis was tested in a 
study with 29 second-year students (13 – 14 years) and 30 third-year students (14 – 15 
years) in secondary education. A standardized intelligence test was administered to all 
students. Participants solved math word problems with a diffi culty level adapted to their 
age group. Thinking-aloud protocols were collected and analyzed on the frequency 
and quality of metacognitive activities. Another series of math word problems served as 
post-test. Results show that the frequency of metacognitive activity, especially those of 
planning and evaluation, increased with age. Intelligence was a strong predictor of math 
performance in 13- to 14 year-olds, but it was less prominent in 14- to 15 year-olds. 
Although the quality of metacognitive skills appeared to predict math performance in 
both age groups, its predictive power was stronger in 14- to 15 year-olds, even on top of 
intelligence. It bears relevance to math education, as it shows the increasing relevance 
of metacognitive skills to math learning with age.
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5.1  Introduction 
Flavell (1976, 1979) considered metacognition as a very powerful predictor of learning 
performance. Based on a meta-review of studies, Wang, Haertel, and Walberg (1990) 
concluded that metacognition is the most important predictor of learning performance 
in general. At the initial stage of mathematical problem solving, metacognitive skills 
of orientation and planning play an important role in preventing students from a trial-
and-error approach and allow students to use prior knowledge in a strategic way by 
determining what information is given and what is asked for (Desoete & Veenman, 
2006). Metacognitive skills of monitoring and evaluation facilitate students to avoid or 
repair errors during the math problem-solving process, detect progression being made 
and compare the answer given against the problem statement (Veenman, Kok, & Blöte, 
2005). In fact, metacognition is omnipresent in mathematical problem solving.
 This cross-sectional study focuses on the development of metacognitive 
skillfulness during math problem solving. The following issues will be investigated: To 
what extent do metacognitive skills develop between the age of 13 and 15 years? Is there 
a difference in development between various components of metacognitive skillfulness? 
How do metacognitive skills relate to intellectual ability (IA) as predictors of math 
performance and, more importantly, how does this relationship develop? Answers to 
these questions could help us to understand when and how metacognitive skills develop 
and its educational consequences for math.
5.1.1  Metacognitive skillfulness
The distinction between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills has been 
generally accepted. Metacognitive knowledge refers to the declarative knowledge 
one has about the interplay between personal characteristics, task characteristics, and 
available strategies in a learning performance (Flavell, 1979). This knowledge, however, 
is not always applied when necessary, even when people do have it at their disposal. 
Alexander, Carr, and Schwanenfl ugel (1995) found a discrepancy between children’s 
knowledge about monitoring and applying monitoring skills during task performance. 
Winne (1996) stated that knowledge has no effect on behavior until it is actually needed. 
So, it is quite possible that children may have knowledge of a certain strategy at their 
disposal, but still do not spontaneously produce those strategies (Barnett, 2000; Focant, 
Grégoire, & Desoete, 2006; Pressley, Yokoi, Van Meter, Van Etten, & Freebern, 1997). 
 Metacognitive skills, on the other hand, refer to the procedural knowledge that 
is required for the actual regulation of, and control over, one’s learning performance 
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(Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997). Metacognitive skills can 
be inferred from students’ overt behavior or utterances, i.e., from concrete metacognitive 
activities (see Table 5.1). Some of these activities occur at the onset of task performance 
(orientation), during task performance (planning, monitoring, evaluation), and at the end 
of task performance (refl ection and elaboration). 
Table 5.1 Examples of math-specifi c and general metacognitive activities
Math-specifi c General
Orientation
a. Activating prior knowledge
b. Goal setting
c. Estimating the answer
d. Making a sketch of the problem in 




c. Designing a step-by-step action plan, 
instead of working by trial and error
d. Writing down calculations step by step
Evaluation
a. Expressing non-understanding
b. Comment on own activities
c. Monitoring action plan
d. Checking an answer by recalculating
Elaboration
a. Recapitulating and drawing conclusions
b. Relating the answer to the question or 
problem
c. Paraphrasing the problem
d. Drawing conclusions while referring to 
the problem statement
Metacognitive skills appear to be highly interdependent, also for math tasks (Veenman 
& Spaans, 2005). When orienting thoroughly on a task, a student probably will build a 
deeper representation of the problem. Consequently, the student will be able to work 
according to a detailed plan, which enables him/her to monitor and control the learning 
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process. Finally, such a clear trace of problem-solving activities, including repairs of 
errors made, provides an opportunity for learning through refl ection in future occasions.
Over the last few decades, several studies have focused on the use of metacognitive 
skills in general, while performing different tasks, for instance, reading comprehension 
(Markman, 1977, 1979; Pressley & Affl erbach, 1995; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004) 
or problem solving (Carr & Jessup, 1995; Christoph, 2006; Mevarech & Fridkin, 2006; 
Schoenfeld, 1992; Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004). 
Others focused on one or more separate components of metacognitive skills, such as 
planning (Shore & Lazar, 1996; Focant et al., 2006) or monitoring skills (Mengelkamp 
& Bannert, 2008).
 This study, however, focused on all metacognitive skills prior to, during and after 
task performance in math. Hence, orientation, planning, monitoring as well as refl ection 
skills have been included in this study. 
5.1.2  Development of metacognitive skills
The fi rst objective of this study was to investigate the development of metacognitive 
skillfulness during math performance in particular. Flavell (1992) related the concept of 
metacognition to Piaget’s developmental stage of formal-operational thinking (Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1958). At this stage, children are capable of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, 
which requires metacognitive control. Flavell indicated that Piaget did not expect 
metacognition to show up before the stage of formal-operational thinking had been 
reached. More recent studies, however, show that, alongside with the “theory of mind”, 
i.e., understanding of one’s own and other people’s state of mind, (Wellman, 1990), 
young preschoolers already start to develop a metacognitive awareness (Blöte, Van 
Otterloo, Stevenson, & Veenman, 2004; Demitriou & Efklides, 1990; Kuhn, 1999). In later 
childhood, not only metacognitive knowledge, but also metacognitive skills develop. 
Although Whitebread et al. (2009) found some planning and monitoring activities in 
playful situations with youngsters as young as 5 years old, it is generally assumed that 
the development of metacognitive skills in educational contexts commences around the 
age of 8-10 years (Berk, 2006; Kuhn, 1999; Siegler, 1998; Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, 
& Affl erbach, 2006). 
 From a developmental perspective, it is interesting to investigate the development 
of the aforementioned four components of metacognitive skillfulness in relation to each 
other. To be able to offer students an appropriate metacognitive instruction in math, it 
would be useful to understand more about the development of these specifi c skills, in 
particular, about the sequence in which they develop over the years. Focant et al. (2006) 
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found positive and signifi cant relations between planning and control activities, on the 
one hand, and school achievement, on the other. They also found that most children are 
able to correctly specify the goals of an arithmetical problem at the end of elementary 
school. On the other hand, they found that most children, although possessing suffi cient 
content knowledge, did not succeed in detecting their errors. Apparently, monitoring and 
evaluation are more abstract metacognitive skills that arise later in the developmental 
trajectory (Veenman et al., 2006).
 Studying the developmental trajectory of metacognitive skillfulness in math, 
two different measurement perspectives can be taken: The quantity and the quality of 
metacognitive skills. Quantity concerns the frequency of applying those skills, whereas 
quality concerns their level of adequate utilization. Using metacognitive skills more 
frequently does not automatically mean that the metacognitive skills have a higher 
level of quality. More is not always better. In a cross-sectional study concerning the 
quantity of metacognitive skills, Veenman et al., (2004) found a linear growth in the 
quantity of metacognitive skills between the age of 9 and young adults when performing 
a discovery-learning task. In another study (Veenman & Spaans, 2005), a signifi cant 
growth of the quality of students’ metacognitive skills (12 – 15 years) was found for both 
discovery-learning task and a problem-solving task. In a pilot study, Veenman (2006) 
found a similar growth in metacognitive quality for math between 12 and 15 years. 
In line with these results we expect metacognitive skills in mathematics to increase in 
frequency as well as in quality over the years.
 The second objective of this study was to investigate the relation between 
metacognitive skills, intellectual ability, and learning performance in math from a 
developmental perspective. Several researchers (Alexander et al., 1995; Borkowski & 
Peck, 1986; Cheng, 1993; Hannah & Shore, 1995; Schneider & Pressley, 1997; Span & 
Overtoom-Corsmit, 1986; Veenman, 2006; Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 
2004; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1990) investigated metacognitive ability in relation 
to intellectual ability. In the next section, this relation will be discussed.
5.1.3  Relation between metacognitive ability, intellectual ability, and learning 
performance in math from a developmental perspective 
Veenman (Veenman et al., 1997, 2004; Veenman & Spaans, 2005) described three 
mutually exclusive models concerning the relation between intellectual ability and 
metacognitive skillfulness as predictors of learning performance. The intelligence model 
regards metacognitive skillfulness as an integral part of intellectual ability. In this model, 
metacognitive skillfulness does not contribute to learning performance independent 
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of intellectual ability. According to this model, metacognitive skills cannot have a 
predictive value for learning performance independent of intellectual ability. Sternberg 
(1990), for instance, advocates such an inclusive position of ‘metacomponents’ in his 
triarchic theory of intelligence. The second, contrasting model is the independency 
model, in which intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness are regarded as 
entirely independent predictors of learning performance. Finally, in the mixed model, 
intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness are correlated to a certain extent, 
but metacognition has its own, unique contribution to the prediction of learning 
performance, on top of intellectual ability. 
 Over the last decades, support has been found for each of these models by various 
researchers (for an overview, see Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004). 
However, it is diffi cult to compare many studies, due to dissimilarities in the assessment 
method of metacognitive skillfulness (thinking aloud observations vs. questionnaires), 
in participants (age, educational background), and in tasks and domains. Moreover, 
the focus of some studies is restricted to the relation between intellectual ability and 
metacognitive skillfulness, thereby excluding the relation of both predictors with learning 
performance (Alexander et al., 1995; Berger & Reid, 1989; Span & Overtoom-Corsmit, 
1986; Shore & Dover, 1987; Stankov, 2000). The evidence found so far seems to be 
highly in favor of the mixed model. Many studies, however, deal with the metacognitive 
skillfulness of older secondary-school or university students. From the perspective of 
the development of metacognitive skills, it remains to be ascertained more thoroughly 
whether the mixed model can be generalized to younger students at the crucial point of 
developing initial metacognitive skills. Therefore, in the present study, the participants 
are young secondary-school students (aged 13 – 15 years) who are engaged in performing 
math school tasks. 
 From a developmental perspective, a relevant research question is whether the 
development of metacognitive skills is intelligence related or relatively intelligence 
independent according to the mixed model. Alexander et al. (1995) formulated three 
developmental hypotheses with regard to the relation between intellectual ability and 
the development of metacognition, though excluding the relation of both predictors with 
learning performance. The ceiling hypothesis assumes that the effects of intelligence 
on the development of metacognition diminish over time. The acceleration hypothesis, 
on the other hand, predicts that the impact of intelligence on the development of 
metacognition increases with age. The monotonic development hypothesis, fi nally, 
assumes that both intelligence and metacognition show a monotonic growth over age. 
When taking the relations of both predictors with learning performance into account, 
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the last hypothesis would be in line with the mixed model, as both intellectual ability 
and metacognition would have a substantial independent contribution to learning 
outcomes. Support for the intelligence model, on the other hand, would support the 
acceleration hypothesis as the infl uence of intellectual ability on metacognition would 
increase with age. Finally, the ceiling hypothesis predicts that the intelligence model 
will fi t less with age. The independency model fi ts none of Alexander’s hypotheses, since 
it predicts there is no relation between intelligence and metacognition at all. In their 
literature overview, Alexander et al. (1995) found support for the monotonic development 
of metacognitive knowledge. Gifted children showed a general superiority in their 
declarative metacognitive knowledge. Giftedness effects were persistent throughout 
childhood, with gifted early elementary school children showing a similar superiority 
in this knowledge as did junior high school students. With regard to metacognitive 
skills, however, the results were inconclusive. In a cross-sectional study, Veenman 
(2006) and Veenman and Spaans (2005) obtained evidence in favor of a monotonic 
development of metacognitive skills. They obtained support for a monotonic maturation 
effect of both intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness in students of 12 and 
15 years performing various problem-solving tasks. We hypothesize that metacognitive 
skillfulness develops alongside, but is not fully dependent on intellectual ability. 
Therefore, we expect to fi nd a parallel development of metacognitive skillfulness and 
intellectual ability as predictors of math learning performance in line with the mixed 
model and the monotonic development model. 
5.1.4  Research questions and hypotheses
The fi rst research question is whether metacognitive skills in math do develop over 
age. We expect these metacognitive skills to increase in frequency as well as in quality 
over the years. The second research question relates to the development of the relation 
between metacognitive skills, intellectual ability, and math performance. We expect to 
fi nd a parallel development of metacognitive skills and intellectual ability as predictors 
of math performance in line with the monotonic development hypothesis and the mixed 
model.




Twenty-nine second-year students (13 – 14 years; 11 boys and 18 girls) and 30 third-
year students (14 – 15 years; 12 boys and 18 girls) in secondary education participated 
in this study. They were recruited from three different tracks (pre-university education, 
higher general education and pre-vocational education) of two suburban schools 
in the Netherlands. Both schools are well known because of their large diversity of 
children, thus representing a broad educational level of the students, a broad range of 
social economic status of parents, and various ethnic backgrounds. Participants were 
distributed equally over the three tracks. Students with learning or conduct disorders 
(e.g., dyslexia or ADHD) were excluded from the study. Parental consent was requested 
and given for all participants. 
5.2.2  Metacognitive skillfulness
Thinking-aloud protocols were analyzed on spontaneous use of metacognitive skills 
according to the procedure of Veenman (Prins, Veenman, & Elshout, 2006; Van der Stel 
& Veenman, 2008; Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004). Metacognitive 
skillfulness was divided into four subscales: orientation (O), planning and systematical 
orderliness (P), evaluation (Ev), and elaboration (El). In Table 5.1, examples of such 
activities are given for each subscale of metacognitive skillfulness. These activities are 
partly characteristic of metacognitive skillfulness, in general (Brown, 1978; Sternberg, 
1990; Veenman et al., 1997), and partly domain-specifi c for math (de Corte & 
Verschaffel, 1980; Gagné, Yekovich, & Yekovich, 1993; Schoenfeld, 1983). For example, 
goal setting is an activity independent of tasks and domains. Writing down calculations 
step-by-step, on the other hand, is related to a math task, whereas in a text-studying 
task, summarizing the text after each paragraph is considered as a planning activity. 
Note that some of the behavior in Table 5.1 may be considered as cognitive, but the 
purposeful application of such cognitive behavior at the appropriate moment results 
from metacognitive skillfulness. It refl ects the intention to get control over and regulate 
the cognitive task. For example, the recalculation of the answer itself is cognitive by 
nature, but it is the decision to check one’s outcomes at a particular point in time that 
constitutes the metacognitive nature of the activity. 
 The scoring method consisted of two steps for each protocol. First, an utterance 
was coded in the margin if belonging to one of the four subscales (O, P, Ev, or El). This 
resulted in a quantitative score obtained by counting the frequency of metacognitive 
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activities on each subscale (e.g., if a student checked the calculations fi ve times, the 
quantitative score for evaluation was fi ve). Secondly, for each subscale, the criteria that 
should be met to obtain a certain rate for the quality of metacognitive skillfulness were 
described. So, each subscale received a qualitative score according to the formulated 
criteria on a fi ve-point scale (ranging from 0 to 4). For example, a participant received a 
higher score for a ‘deeper’ orientation (e.g., making a sketch of the problem to represent 
the problem) than for a superfi cial one (e.g., only partly reading the problem statement). 
It is important to emphasize that the judges intentionally avoided confounding 
metacognition scores with the correctness or incorrectness of the content matter. A 
properly argued, yet incorrect, conclusion would yield a similar score for elaboration as 
a correct conclusion would.
 Two judges independently rated six protocols of both years. This resulted in an 
interrater reliability of 0.95 (second year) and 0.98 (third year) for the qualitative scores, 
and 0.94 (second year) and 0.86 (third year) for the quantitative scores. These correlations 
were computed on the summed scores over the four subscales of metacognition.
5.2.3  Intellectual ability
In two group sessions, the intellectual ability of 59 students (29 second and 30 third 
year) was assessed by a series of ability tests. Three subtests of the Groninger Intelligence 
test for Secondary Education (GIVO, standardized Dutch intelligence test; Van Dijk & 
Tellegen, 1994) were selected: Number Series, Verbal Analogies and Unfolding Figures. 
With these subtests three primary factors of intelligence (Carroll, 1993) were assessed: 
Inductive and deductive reasoning abilities, both verbal and numerical, and visuospatial 
ability. The GIVO, however, lacks a test for assessing memory abilities, another primary 
factor in Carroll’s (1993) model. Therefore, a fourth test (Names & Professions, requiring 
the memorization of word pairs; see Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004) was administered. 
A total score for intellectual ability was calculated by transforming the individual test 
score into z scores and then calculating an unweighted mean score for each participant.
5.2.4  Tasks
For each year, participants were administered math tasks with task demands suitable for 
their age. The tasks were piloted with appropriate age groups beforehand and teachers 
were consulted about the suitability of the tasks. 
 In an individual session of 50 minutes, the participants learned to solve 
mathematical word problems in 20 minutes. Six problems were presented in the 
second year and fi ve in the third. Several categories of problems were presented. In the 
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second year, the categories of the problems were content, surface area of a triangle, 
fraction, percentage, algebra. For instance, an algebraic problem was ‘In a village are 
two camping sites. At the fi rst one you pay for the rent of a caravan 20 euros cleaning 
costs plus 5 euros a day. At the second one you pay 40 euros cleaning costs and two 
euros a day. Which site would you choose if you wanted to stay eight days? Show 
your calculations’. In the third year, the categories of the problems were calculation 
of probability, quadratic equation, Pythagoras’ theorem, statistics, and formula with a 
square root. For instance, a problem was ‘In the center of a city the air pollution on one 
day is given by the formula V = -0.2t² + 3.1t + 1.7, where V = air pollution in grams 
per m³ and t = point in time in hours. A) Calculate V for 8.15 a.m. B) Calculate the 
percentage of difference in pollution between 7 and 11 a.m.’ Both tasks for second- 
and third-year students were composed of adaptations of math problems from one of 
the most frequently used Dutch schoolbooks for math (“Getal en Ruimte”; Vuijk et al., 
2003).
 Together with the assignments, participants received a sheet containing the 
answers and a brief stepwise explanation of how to solve the problems. Participants 
were free to consult this sheet whenever and as much as they liked. The fi rst 20 min of 
the session was considered as a learning-by-doing phase. Next, the participants handed 
in all materials and received another series of parallel problems, which had to be solved 
without any help in the remaining 30 min. This second part was considered as a post-
test assessment of learning performance (see Sect. 5.2.5). All problems had to be solved 
while thinking aloud.
5.2.5  Learning performance
After the learning-by-doing phase, the learning performance was assessed by the post-
tests, as was explained to the participants in advance. In both years, the post-test items 
were parallel to the items in the learning phase, i.e., the surface structure of the post-test 
items differed from the one in the learning task items, but the deep structure was the 
same. 
 In the second year, the post-test consisted of six math word problems. For each 
problem, an equal amount of ten points could be earned. According to a rating system, 
points were given for the steps that had to be made to come to a correct solution. So, the 
maximum obtainable score was 60 points. A total score was calculated and used as a 
measure of learning performance. Cronbach’s  was 0.66. In the third year, the post-test 
consisted of fi ve math word problems. The items were rated in the same way as in the 




The intellectual ability test was administered during a group session of 100 min. The 
math tasks were presented in an individual thinking-aloud session of 50 min. Participants 
could make use of a pen, pencil, text highlighter, ruler, calculator, and blank sheets of 
paper for making notes and/or calculations. 
 All participants were instructed to think aloud during the individual session. The 
experimenter was not allowed to help the students in any way. To encourage the student 
to keep on thinking aloud, the experimenter used standard prompts (e.g., ‘please, keep 
on thinking aloud’) whenever the student fell silent. All the utterances of the participants 
were audio-taped, transcribed, and analyzed in relation to metacognitive skillfulness.
5.3  Results
5.3.1  Development of metacognitive and intellectual abilities
In order to establish a continuous growth in both metacognitive and intellectual abilities, 
the results of both age groups (second- and third-year students) were compared. First, 
MANOVAs were performed on the metacognition and intellectual ability scores with 
age as between-groups factor. Next, univariate tests were performed. Results of the 
MANOVA on the raw scores of intellectual ability revealed a signifi cant age effect 
[F(4,54) = 3.93, p < 0.01, ² = 0.23]. Third-year students had a higher intellectual ability 
score than second-year students. Results of the MANOVAs on both the quantitative 
[F(4,54) = 13.84, p < 0.001, ² = 0.51] and the qualitative [F(4,54) = 4.90, p < 0.005, 
² = 0.27] scores of metacognitive skills revealed a signifi cant age effect as well. So, 
third-year students had higher metacognition scores than second-year students. Thus, 
both intellectual and metacognitive abilities show an increase between the second and 
third year in secondary education.
 Results of the subsequent univariate tests on the subscales of intellectual ability 
and metacognition scores show a signifi cant growth over the years (see Table 5.2). With 
the exception of the quantity of orientation activities, results of the univariate tests show 
an increase in all the components of intellectual and metacognitive abilities.
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M (SD) F p ²
Quality of meta skills
Orientation 1.69 (.76) 1.93 (.94) 1.19 n.s. 0.02
Planning 1.83 (.80) 2.73 (1.11) 12.77 <0.005 0.18
Evaluation 1.14 (.88) 1.93 (1.14) 8.97 <0.005 0.14
Elaboration 0.83 (.85) 0.90 (1.19) 0.07 n.s. 0.00
Quantity of meta skills
Orientation 7.90 (1.54) 5.13 (3.20) 17.62 <0.001 0.24
Planning 5.31 (2.42) 8.83 (3.98) 16.76 <0.001 0.23
Evaluation 2.62 (2.47) 7.07 (4.30) 23.53 <0.001 0.29
Elaboration 0.83 (.90) 1.80 (2.19) 4.94 <0.05 0.08
Intellectual ability
Number series 17.28(4.42) 21.07(3.71) 12.77 <0.005 0.18
Verbal analogies 13.79(3.92) 16.07(3.45) 6.56 <0.05 0.10
Unfolding fi gures 13.79(3.92) 16.37(3.94) 6.31 <0.05 0.10
Memory 17.24(5.52) 19.17(6.12) 2.45 n.s. 0.04
Note: Because the total scores for Intellectual ability were transformed into z scores, the means and 
standard deviations for Intellectual ability are the scores for the subtests of the intelligence test and the 
memory test.
5.3.2  Development of the relation between intellectual and metacognitive 
abilities as predictors of math performance: Testing the mixed model and the 
monotonic development hypothesis
To be able to answer the question whether developmental processes affect the relation 
between intellectual ability, metacognitive skillfulness, and math performance, 
correlations between these three variables were calculated for both groups separately 
(see Table 5.3). In the correlational analyses, the subtest scores for intellectual ability 
were transformed into one total score. This IA score was obtained by transforming the 
raw scores on all subtests into z scores and then calculating the mean z score for second- 
and third-year students separately (see Sect. 5.2.3). The total score of the quantity of 
metacognitive skillfulness was obtained by adding the quantitative subscale scores 




Table 5.3 Correlations between intellectual ability, metacognition, and math performance for 
both age groups separately
SECOND YEAR THIRD YEAR
Intellectual 
ability
MetaQL MetaQN Intellectual 
ability
MetaQL MetaQN
Math performance 0.79** 0.53** 0.29 0.46* 0.78** 0.40*
MetaQL 0.46** 0.37*
MetaQN 0.39* 0.73** 0.16 0.74**
MetaQL the total score on the quality of metacognition, MetaQN the total score on the quantity of 
metacognition * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
Results show that nearly all correlations between intellectual ability, quantity and 
quality of metacognitive skillfulness, and math performance were signifi cant. The only 
exceptions were the correlation between the quantity of metacognitive skillfulness and 
math performance (second year) and the correlation between intellectual ability and the 
quantity of metacognitive skillfulness (third year).
 To test the mixed model, the semi-partial correlations for both groups (Nunnally, 
1967) were calculated by partialling metacognitive skillfulness from the correlations 
between intellectual ability and math performance (i.e., semi-part Intel) and partialling 
intellectual ability from the correlation between metacognitive skillfulness and math 
performance (i.e., semi-part Meta). These semi-partial correlations (see Table 5.4) are 
needed to calculate the unique contribution of metacognitive and intellectual abilities 
to math performance.









QL QN QL QN QL QN QL QN
Math performance 
second year
0.58** 0.70** 0.21 0.00
Math performance 
third year
0.19 0.41** 0.65** 0.33*
QL qualitative metascores; QN quantitative metascores * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
Using regression-analytic techniques (Pedhazur, 1982; Van der Stel & Veenman, 2008; 
Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004), the unique and shared variances in the 
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math performance were distributed to metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability 
(see Table 5.5). The math data of the second-year students could be taken as an example. 
The squared multiple correlation of intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness 
for predicting the math performance was calculated from the correlations presented in 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 (R² = the squared correlation between intellectual ability and math 
performance + the squared semi-partial correlation between metacognitive skillfulness 
and math performance with intellectual ability partialled out = 0.79² + 0.21² = 0.67). 
The unique contribution of intellectual ability to math performance was determined by 
calculating the squared semi-partial correlation between intellectual ability and math 
performance with metacognition partialled out from intellectual ability (r² = 0.336). 
Consequently, it was estimated that intellectual ability uniquely accounted for 33.6% 
of the variance in math performance, metacognitive skillfulness accounted for 4.3% of 
the variance, while both predictors had another 23.9% of variance in common. This 
procedure was applied for both age groups (see Table 5.5).




Meta unique Shared Total
QL QN QL QN QL QN QL QN
Math performance 
second year
33.6 49.1  4.3 0 23.9 8.4 61.8 57.8
Math performance 
third year
 3.5 16.5 42.8 10.6 17.9 4.9 62.4 32.0
Intel unique the unique contribution of intellectual ability to math performance; Meta unique the unique 
contribution of metacognitive skillfulness to math performance; Shared the shared contribution of 
intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness to math performance. Total the total contribution of 
intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness to math performance. QL qualitative metacognition 
scores, QN quantitative metacognition scores
In both age groups, intellectual ability as well as the quality of metacognitive skillfulness 
have their own, unique contribution to the prediction of math performance. In the 
youngest group, however, there is no unique contribution of the quantity of metacognitive 
skillfulness to the prediction of math performance. Comparison of the unique 
contribution of the quality of metacognitive skillfulness in relation to the contribution of 
intellectual ability over the years shows that the roles have been turned around. In the 
youngest group, intellectual ability is the most important predictor of math performance, 
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whereas in the oldest group the contribution of the quality of metacognition outweighs 
the unique contribution of intellectual ability. 
5.4  Discussion
This study investigated the development of both the quantity and the quality of 
metacognitive skillfulness in math. According to the fi rst hypothesis, we expected a 
growth in metacognitive skills in math, both in frequency and in quality over the years. 
Results show an overall growth of quantitative and qualitative metacognitive skillfulness, 
indeed. Looking closer into the various components of metacognitive skillfulness 
(orientation, planning, evaluation, and elaboration), results show a signifi cant growth 
of both the quantity and the quality of planning and evaluation activities. It seems that 
not only the quantity of these activities increased signifi cantly between 13 and 15 years, 
but that also the quality of these activities developed in a positive way. The quantity of 
orientation activities, on the other hand, decreased signifi cantly, which decrease was 
not refl ected in the quality of orientation activities. Possibly, students become more 
selective in their orientation activities over the years, resulting in fewer, but perhaps 
better, orientation activities. Also, Mevarech and Amrany (2008) report about students 
who did not report to have attempted to comprehend a problem prior to solving it. 
Finally, the elaboration activities show a signifi cant growth in frequency, but not in 
quality. Although students increased the number of their elaboration activities between 
13 and 15 years, they seem to experience a problem in abstracting knowledge as a 
result of these activities. In conclusion, the fi rst hypothesis that the metacognitive skills 
in math would increase in frequency as well as in quality over the years is generally 
corroborated. However, results also show that the various components of metacognitive 
skillfulness differ in their developmental trajectory. “The ages on which strategies are 
acquired seem to depend largely on the strategy itself” (Focant et al., 2006, p. 61). 
 It seems that the metacognitive activities that are required during task performance 
(planning and evaluation) develop in an earlier phase than activities that play a role 
prior to (orientation) and after (elaboration) task performance. It might be that students 
experience the activities during task performance as more concrete and, therefore, 
easier. Maybe teachers pay more attention to overt activities during task performance 
than to less obvious activities prior to or after task performance. 
 From an instructional perspective, it would be interesting to learn more about the 
development of specifi c components of metacognitive skillfulness and, in particular, the 
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sequence and the pace in which they develop over a longer period of time (Veenman, 
Van Hout-Wolters, & Affl erbach, 2006). This would require longitudinal research over 
an extended period of time.
 The second hypothesis concerned the relation between metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability as predictors of math performance over the years. The results for 
both age groups were in line with the mixed model as far as it concerned the qualitative 
scores for metacognition. As we expected, metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
ability were moderately correlated. Moreover, metacognitive skillfulness ability had 
its own, unique contribution to math performance in both age groups, on top of 
intellectual ability. These results are similar to those for older age groups performing 
different tasks (Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman & Verheij, 2003; Veenman et 
al., 2004). Therefore, the mixed model can be generalized to younger students with 
less developed metacognitive skills performing everyday math school tasks. For the 
quantity of metacognitive skills, the mixed model could not be corroborated for the 
youngest group, as no unique contribution of the quantity of metacognition to math 
performance was obtained, contrary to the older group of students. On comparing both 
age groups, an interesting shift in the contribution to math performance occurs. The 
roles of metacognitive skills and intellectual ability as predictors of math performance 
have been turned around between 13 and 15 years. In the youngest group, intellectual 
ability is the most important predictor of math performance, whereas in the oldest group, 
the contribution of the quality of metacognition outweighs the unique contribution 
of intellectual ability. The correlation between both predictors of math performance, 
however, remains practically the same for both age groups. Evidently, it is the growth of 
metacognitive skills that demand a more prominent role in math performance of older 
students.
 A parallel development of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability 
as predictors of math performance was found. This parallel growth is in line with the 
monotonic development hypothesis. Earlier, Alexander et al. (1995) found a different 
developmental pattern in the metacognition of gifted and non-gifted children. However, 
developmental patterns were not consistently found over the different components 
of metacognition. They obtained evidence in favor of a monotonic development of 
metacognitive knowledge, but their results were inconclusive on metacognitive skills. The 
results of our study point in the direction of a monotonic development in metacognitive 
skills as well: A continuous growth of metacognitive skills with age, alongside intellectual 
growth (Veenman et al., 2004), corroborating the second hypothesis. 
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This study focused on students with a normal cognitive development, without learning 
disabilities or conduct disorders. Participants did not receive any explicit training on 
metacognition prior to the experiments. Therefore, the growth in metacognitive skillfulness 
can be considered (partly) as a spontaneous development due to maturation. Testing 
the metacognitive skillfulness of third graders with mathematical learning disabilities, 
Desoete (2006), however, found evidence against the maturational development. She 
found that these children had signifi cantly less accurate evaluation skills on number 
system knowledge and procedural calculation than younger children with comparable 
mathematical performance scores. Based on these fi ndings, Desoete (2006) stated that 
we cannot expect metacognition to develop spontaneously as children grow older 
or as they have more experience with math. Differences in fi ndings can be caused 
by differences in participants (age, mathematical disabilities) and/or by differences in 
assessing metacognition (thinking aloud during task performance vs. interviews prior to 
and after task performance. 
 Despite fi nding signifi cant results, there might be some limitations of the study. 
The small number of participants in each group may be considered as a limitation of the 
generalizability of the results. The same applies for the fact that all participants came 
from only two schools. Although both schools were highly representative of secondary 
schools in the Netherlands, yet some confi rmation of results from a broader population 
of schools is needed. Furthermore, it would be interesting for future research to replicate 
this study with more participants in a longitudinal study over a longer period of time. 
Special attention should be paid to the developmental trajectory of specifi c components 
of metacognitive skillfulness, especially their relation with math performance. At 
present, studies with multi-method designs are scarcely available in the literature on 
metacognition. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to have more studies with a multi-
method design in order to compare off-line and on-line methods of assessment (Van 
Hout-Wolters, 2000; Veenman, 2005).
 Although metacognitive skills in math seem to develop (partly) as a result of 
maturation, there are substantial individual differences in the level of metacognitive 
skillfulness during the developmental trajectory. An important issue in the educational 
context is, therefore, how the development of metacognitive skills in math can be 
enhanced. In the past, various instructional methods to enhance metacognitive 
skillfulness in math have been developed and used with success. Mevarech and Kramarski 
(1997) developed a training program called IMPROVE. With this program, students are 
taught to use a series of metacognitive questions during math tasks. Veenman (1998) 
formulated the WWW&H rule for training metacognition, referring to instructions about 
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What metacognitive activities should be executed When, Why, and How. Van Luit and 
Naglieri (1999) developed a program (MASTER) for teaching math to children in special 
education. Results with these training methods show that children, varying substantially 
in intellectual and metacognitive abilities, can benefi t from training their metacognitive 
competencies in math. Training metacognitive skillfulness in math could be very useful 
as a supplement to the spontaneous development, especially if the right component is 






Although calls for longitudinal designs in developmental studies are frequently made, 
the vast part of developmental studies consists of studies with a cross-sectional design. 
“Although the goal of developmental psychology is to understand change in behavior 
across the life span, most empirical work provides only a short snapshot view of 
behavioral change, because most developmental research infers change by comparing 
different people of different ages (cross-sectional studies) rather than attempting to follow 
change within the same people over time (longitudinal studies studying intra-individual 
changes)” (Bullock & Schneider, 2009, p. 1). One of the most important reasons for this 
lack of longitudinal studies is a pragmatic one. Longitudinal studies not only require an 
investment in time and resources, but the researcher also has to deal with the risk (and 
the possible consequences) of participants dropping out before data collection has been 
fi nished. In this chapter some methodological issues related to the longitudinal design 




At the start of the data collection in 2005, 32 fi rst-year secondary-school students 
were included in the study. They were recruited from 85 students (for further details 
see Chapter 2, sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Unfortunately, the repeated presentation of 
two tasks each year for three consecutive years and the very time-consuming, and 
labor-intensive analysis of thinking-aloud protocols of individual student sessions did 
not allow for a larger sample. All students came from the same school located in one 
of the largest cities in the Netherlands. This particular school is known because of its 
large diversity of children, thus representing a broad educational level of students, a 
broad range of social economic status of parents, and various ethnic backgrounds. The 
choice for just one school was deliberately made to avoid confounding variables, such 
as differences in teachers, pedagogical and/or didactic philosophy, schoolbooks, etc. 
 As stated above, a longitudinal design always risks an early dropout of participants, 
resulting in an unrepresentative sample. Loss of participants also happened in this study. 
After the fi rst year, four participants dropped out due to a change of residence or school. 
From the remaining 28 students in the second year, three students were lost after the 
second year for the same reasons. This resulted in 25 participants in the third year. As 
long as there is no selective drop out, the loss of participants will not necessarily affect 
the results. Therefore, several checks were performed in order to assess any effect that 
might have resulted from the dropout.
 In Table 6.1 descriptives for the fi rst-year participants are shown. Intellectual-
ability scores were transformed into z-scores, resulting in a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation (SD) of 1. Participants, however, were equally distributed over the four 
quartiles. Unfortunately, boys and girls were not equally represented (12 boys, 20 girls), 
but no effect of gender was found. The average age was 12 years and 8 months. By 
calculating the skewness (see Table 6.1) of the independent variables (intellectual ability 
and metacognitive skills), it was investigated whether the scores on intellectual ability 
and metacognition were divided symmetrically. Results of correlational analyses and 
t-tests would be affected by a skewness larger than 1 (De Vocht, 2009). 
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Skewness .44 .36 .80 .85 .43
Note: MetaQLHis means qualitative scores for metacognitive skills in history; MetaQLMath means 
qualitative scores for metacognitive skills in math. MetaQNHis means quantative scores for metacognitive 
skills in history; MetaQNMath means quantitative scores for metacognitive skills in math; LP means 
Learning performance.
Although the skewness of intellectual-ability and metacognition scores was smaller than 
.85, scores of both variables were further checked by transforming them into square 
root scores. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), such a transformation would 
neutralize a skewed distribution. Transformed scores, however, did not alter the results 
of correlational analyses (see Chapter 2, Tables 2.3 and 2.4).
 In order to fi nd cases with exceptional values that would have a strong and 
undesirable impact on the results, Leverage values and Cook’s distance were calculated 
(De Vocht, 2009). All cases had a Leverage value smaller than 0.5 and a Cook’s distance 
smaller than 1, meaning that no cases had an extreme impact on the results. Therefore, 
no participants were to be excluded. 
 The same procedure was applied to the data of the second year and the third year. 
Again the skewness of both intellectual ability and metacognition was smaller than 1, 
and all cases had a Leverage value smaller than 0.5 and a Cook’s distance smaller than 
1. Transformation into square root scores did not lead to other conclusions. 
 Furthermore, the participants that dropped out after the fi rst year and the second 
year have been examined more closely. After the fi rst year, two boys (one out of the 
4th quartile of intellectual-ability scores and one out of the 3rd quartile) and two girls 
(both out of the 4th quartile) were lost. None of these dropouts had the highest or lowest 
scores on intellectual ability, metacognitive skills, or learning performance. It was also 
investigated whether the results of the dropouts differed signifi cantly from those of 
the ‘stayers’. Therefore, ANOVAs were performed on the scores on intellectual ability, 
metacognitive skills, and learning performance, contrasting the dropouts with the rest of 
the participants. No signifi cant differences were found. Because the number of dropouts 
was only four and their scores were not normally distributed, Mann-Whitney tests were 
performed too. This test is a non-parametric test without requirements of the sample 
distribution. No signifi cant differences were found either (see Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2 Results ANOVA and Mann-Whitney comparing results dropouts and ‘stayers’ after 
the fi rst year
N=32 F Sig Asymp. sig
Intellectual ability 3.51 .07 .07
MetaQLHis .23 .63 .71
MetaQNHis .00 .99 .75
LPHis .02 .89 1.00
MetaQLMath .49 .49 .55
MetaQNMath .30 .58 .77
LPMath .33 .57 .66
Note: MetaQLHis means qualitative scores for metacognitive skills in history; MetaQLMath means 
qualitative scores for metacognitive skills in math. MetaQNHis means quantative scores for metacognitive 
skills in history; MetaQNMath means quantitative scores for metacognitive skills in math; LP means 
Learning performance.
In conclusion, there was no indication of selective loss of participants after the fi rst 
year. Both ANOVAs and Mann-Whitney tests did not reveal any signifi cant differences 
between dropouts and ‘stayers’. Moreover, the loss of four participants from the sample 
resulted in a perfect skewness (0.00) for intellectual-ability scores of the second year. In 
the second year no effect of gender was found either. 
 After the second year, another two boys (one out of the 1st quartile of intellectual-
ability scores and one out of the 3rd quartile) and one girl (out of the 1st quartile) were 
lost. Again no effect of gender was found. Tests for signifi cant differences between the 
dropouts and the rest of the participants were repeated on the data of the second year 
(see Table 6.3). 
 Again ANOVA nor Mann-Whitney tests revealed a signifi cant difference between 
dropouts and ‘stayers’. The participants that dropped out after the second year did not 
have any extreme scores either. These tests lead to the conclusion that participants, 
who dropped out of the sample after the fi rst year and the second year, did not cause a 
selective loss and, therefore, did not affect the results of the longitudinal study. 
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Table 6.3 Results ANOVA and Mann-Whitney comparing results dropouts and ‘stayers’ after 
the second year
N=28 F Sig Asymp. sig
Intellectual ability .96 .34 .35
MetaQLHis 1.64 .21 .15
MetaQNHis .69 .41 .33
LPHis 2.11 .16 .12
MetaQLMath .69 .41 .50
MetaQNMath .82 .37 .30
LPMath 1.57 .22 .17
Note: MetaQLHis means qualitative scores for metacognitive skills in history; MetaQLMath means 
qualitative scores for metacognitive skills in math. MetaQNHis means quantative scores for metacognitive 
skills in history; MetaQNMath means quantitative scores for metacognitive skills in math; LP means 
Learning performance.
6.2  Intellectual ability and Metacognitive skills
6.2.1 Intellectual ability
Although intellectual ability generally is considered as a rather stable person-related 
feature at the age of 13, intellectual ability was repeatedly measured each year. In order 
to be able to answer the research question whether intellectual ability and metacognitive 
skills develop in line with the monotonic development hypothesis, a measure for 
growth of intellectual ability was needed. Raw scores on the various subtests were used, 
because norm scores would have ruled out age effects. Although there was a period 
of one year between two consecutive assessments, it could be argued that a repeated 
measure of intellectual ability involves a test-retest effect. However, no substantial intra-
individual changes in test scores were observed: Over the years 85% of the participants 
remained in the same quartile or at the boundary between two quartiles. Therefore, it is 
not likely that the repeated assessments of intellectual ability yielded a test-retest effect 
that would distort the results of the correlational analyses (see Chapter 2, Tables 2.3 and 
2.4, Chapter 3, Table 3.3, Chapter 4, Table 4.2). 
 To establish whether intellectual-ability scores over the three consecutive years 
represented the same construct, correlations of intellectual-ability scores over the three 
years were calculated (see Table 6.4) and a principal component analysis (PCA) was 









Note: IA13 means Intellectual ability at 13 yr. ** p < 0.01
Table 6.5 PCA on subtests of Intellectual-ability tests over the years
N=25 1st component 2nd component
Eigenvalue 5.59 2.01
Variance proportion .47 .17
Number series13yrs .70 -.23
Number series14yrs .83 -.07
Number series15yrs .75 .06
Verbal analogies13yrs .69 -.44
Verbal analogies14yrs .52 -.69
Verbal analogies15yrs .57 -.51
Unfolding fi gures13yrs .82 -.04
Unfolding fi gures14yrs .83 .29
Unfolding fi gures15yrs .78 .09
Memory13yrs .50 .47
Memory14yrs .46 .64
Memory15 yrs .59 .55
Correlations in Table 6.4 are rather high varying from .71 to .82. Furthermore, the principal 
component analysis (PCA) on intellectual-ability subtest scores of all three years resulted 
in a two-factor solution with eigenvalues of 5.59 of the fi rst component and 2.01 of the 
second component, with 47% and 17% of variance accounted for respectively (see 
Table 6.5). The fi rst component could be interpreted as representing general intellectual 
ability and the second component could be interpreted as representing memory 
ability contrasted with verbal-analogical reasoning. These results allow for considering 
intellectual ability as a stable person-related characteristic over the years. The rather 
high correlations of intellectual-ability scores over the years together with the two-factor 
solution allow for the conclusion that intellectual ability can be considered as the same 




The transcribed thinking-aloud protocols for both tasks were analyzed on spontaneous 
use of metacognitive skills according to the procedure of Veenman (1993; Veenman 
& Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman, Kerseboom, & Imthorn, 2000). For a description of 
the scoring method, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.4 and Appendices A and B). Although 
method and rater were the same for the three consecutive years, it can be argued that 
a difference in rating metacognitive skills might have occurred during the study. This 
would mean that a certain activity was rated differently from one year to another, 
resulting in metacognitive skillfulness as an unstable construct. Therefore, after the 
third-year protocols were rated, six protocols of each task and year (36 protocols) were 
rated again on the same day. In order to check the consistency in rating throughout the 
years, a paired-samples t-test on prior scores and most recent scores was performed. No 
signifi cant difference in rating between the two moments of rating was found (t(35) = .33, 
p = .74), meaning that quality of metacognitive skills was not rated differentially. The 
correlation between ratings of the two moments was very high (.99), meaning that 
participants were rated consistently.
6.2.3  Relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skills
So far, intellectual ability and metacognitive skills were discussed separately in this 
chapter. From a developmental perspective, it is relevant to establish whether the 
correlations of these two independent variables with learning performance are stable 
over the years. In the graphs below, the correlation of each independent variable with 





























Figure 6.1 Correlations between Intellectual ability (IA), quality of metacognitive skills in 



























Figure 6.2 Correlations between Intellectual ability (IA), quality of metacognitive skills in 
history, and Learning performance History
Despite correlations seem to differ at face value over the years, Fisher-z ratios (see Table 
6.6) show that there is no signifi cant difference between the correlations over the years. 
All Fisher-z ratios are smaller than 1.96 (Guilford, 1965). 
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Table 6.6 Fisher-z ratios 
Math 13yrs(32) 14yrs(28) Fz 14yrs(28) 15yrs(25) Fz
IA-LP .77 .57 1.37 .57 .79 1.45
MS-LP .72 .74 .16 .74 .59 .93
IA-MS .62 .51 .60 .51 .66 .79
History 13yrs(32) 14yrs(28) Fz 14yrs(28) 15yrs(25) Fz
IA-LP .39 .25 .57 .25 .25 .00
MS-LP .65 .37 1.42 .37 .60 1.04
IA-MS .27 .32 .82 .32 .41 .36
Note: IA means intellectual ability; LP means learning performance; MS means Metacognition 
(qualitative scores). (32) means N=32; (28) means N=28; (25) means N=25; Fz means Fisher-z 
ratio.
In the graphs below (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4), the unique contribution in percentage of 
both intellectual ability and metacognitive skills for both tasks separately are shown. The 






























































Figure 6.4 Distribution of unique and shared variance accounted for in Learning performance 
History
To calculate the unique and shared contribution of intellectual ability and metacognitive 
skills to learning performance, depicted in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, semi-partial correlations 
are needed. If semi-partial correlations would differ signifi cantly, the stability of these 
correlations would be at risk. This would cause instability in the unique variance 
accounted for of either one of the predictors of learning performance. Therefore, Fisher-z 
ratios were calculated for the semi-partial correlations as well (see Table 6.7). 
Table 6.7 Fisher-z ratios for Semi-partial correlations 
Math 13yrs(32) 14yrs(28) Fz 14yrs(28) 15yrs(25) Fz
 SemIA-LP .39 .22 .66 .22 .52 1.15
SemMS-LP .33 .52 .82 .52 .13 1.46
History 13yrs(32) 14yrs(28) Fz 14yrs(28) 15yrs(25) Fz
SemIA-LP .23 .17 .22 .17 .00 .56
SemMS-LP .53 .33 .87 .33 .55 .90
Note: SemIA means semi-partial correlation intellectual ability; LP means learning performance; SemMS 
means semi-partial correlation Metacognition (qualitative scores). (32) means N=32; (28) means N=28; 
(25) means N=25; Fz means Fisher-z ratio.
Again all Fisher-z ratios were smaller than 1.96. This means, for instance, that it cannot 
be concluded that the semi-partial correlation of IA and LP at the age of 15 (.52) is 
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higher than the one at the age of 14 (.22). It can be concluded that the correlations and 
the semi-partial correlations were stable over the years. 
6.3  Learning tasks
In this thesis, intellectual ability and metacognitive skills were investigated as predictors 
of learning performance. In order to investigate the unique contribution of metacognitive 
skills to learning performance from a developmental perspective, new learning tasks and 
post-tests were required each year. In order to exclude confounding variables as much 
as possible, only the content of the learning tasks was adapted each year to age and 
grade, while the format of the learning tasks and post-tests was kept the same for both 
math and history.
6.3.1 Math
For math the content of assignments in the learning-by-doing phase were adapted to age 
and grade each year. However, the tasks were made as comparable as possible as far as 
it concerned the format. Each year, the tasks were ecologically valid, because they were 
composed of adaptations of math problems from a frequently used schoolbook for math 
in the Netherlands. The tasks were piloted in the age group of participants.
 Although, the content of assignments had to be new each year, items with a 
comparable content, that is, an ascending level of diffi culty within the same area of 
math, were included in the tasks over the years. For example, in every year a geometry 
assignment was included. In the fi rst year participants had to calculate the circumference 
of a meadow, in the second year it concerned the surface area of a triangle, and in the 
last year they had to apply Pythagoras’ theorem in order to calculate the horizontal side 
of a triangle. 
6.3.2 History
To make sure that the texts were suitable for text studying and measuring learning 
performance afterwards, the content of the texts had to be new to the participants. 
Participants likely had little or no content knowledge about the topic of the text, because 
topics were taken from the curriculum that was one year ahead. All learning tasks were 
piloted as well. No familiarity with the topics was observed.
In order to minimize a possible confounding effect of differences in learning texts, 
the format of the texts was made as comparable as possible. Van Hout-Wolters (1986) 
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described various text characteristics that affect learning processes and/or learning results 
in text studying: Type of text, structure, diffi culty of language used, length, and didactic 
help. All these variables were taken into account when composing the history learning 
tasks. All texts were informative, and ecologically valid (derived from the two most 
frequently used schoolbooks in the Netherlands). Structure, layout, and length of the 
text were kept almost identical (see Table 6.8). In order to be suitable for text studying, 
texts need to be of a certain length. Texts that are too short will only be memorized 
instead of being studied. In each text, the same didactic help was embedded, that is, 
three activating questions and/or assignments were included in order to elicit (more) 
metacognitive activities. 
Table 6.8 Text characteristics History tasks
Number of 1st year 2nd year 3rd year
Pages 4,5 5 5
Paragraphs 18 19 20
Words 1497 1518 1522
Words per sentence 12 12 12
Concepts 76 95 122
According to Van Hout-Wolters (1986), Veenman and Beishuizen (2004), and Weaver 
and Bryant (1995), the average number of words per sentence is an important indicator 
for the diffi culty and readability of texts. Each year, the average number of words per 
sentence was twelve. The other text variables depicted in Table 6.8 remain almost 
the same as well, except for the number of concepts. It is assumed that the texts are 
equivalent as far as the format was concerned. The content, on the other hand, can be 
considered as more abstract and more ‘condensed’, thus more diffi cult, because of the 
growing number of concepts introduced in the texts. 
6.4  Post-tests
As explained above, new post-tests were needed each year to measure the learning 
performance. The content of the post-tests had to be adapted to the learning tasks and 
had to be suitable for the age group. Like the learning tasks, the post-tests were piloted 
before they were administered to the participants. Again the format was kept the same. 
For math, the items in the learning phase were parallel to the items in the post-test, that 
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is, the surface structure of the post-test items differed from the ones of the learning-
task, but the deep structure was the same. For history, each post-test consisted of fi ve 
multiple-choice questions and six essay questions. 
6.4.1 Math 
Despite the efforts to make the post-tests as comparable as possible in relative level 
of diffi culty, participants could have perceived a difference in level of diffi culty, other 
than just a relative difference. Moreover, the math pilot revealed that for older students 
more assignments were needed in a 50 minute-session relative to younger students. This 
resulted in a difference in the number of items and in obtainable scores over the years 
for math. Therefore, all post-test results were checked on differences in level of diffi culty. 
First, the mean proportion of right answers (p-value) was calculated for each task (see 
Table 6.9). 
Table 6.9 Mean P-values post-tests Math (SD)
N=25 1st year 2nd year 3rd year
Math .44 (.23) .69 (.15) .66 (.15)
ANOVA was performed on the p-values of all math items. A slightly signifi cant 
difference was found (F(2,22) = 3.59, p = .048). Therefore, a post-hoc test (Bonferroni) 
was performed on the math data. This post-hoc test did not reveal a signifi cant difference 
between the learning outcomes for math over the three years. 
Correlations between learning performance measures over the years vary from .63 to 
.66 (see Appendix C).
6.4.2 History
In history, correlations between learning performance measures over the years vary from 
.48 to .74 (see Appendix C). ANOVA was repeated for the p-values of the history post-
tests ( for mean p-values, see Table 6.10).
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Table 6.10 Mean P-values post-tests History (SD)
N=25 1st year 2nd year 3rd year
History .51 (.26) .54 (.29) .56 (.30)
ANOVA on the p-values of all history items did not reveal a signifi cant difference 
(F(2,37) =.11, p = .90). In conclusion, no signifi cant difference in the relative diffi culty 
level of the post-tests for math and history was found.
6.5  Testing generality vs. domain specifi city of metacognitive skills
To establish whether metacognitive skills are general or domain specifi c by nature, 
principal component analysis (PCA) was performed, each year separately. For these 
analyses unrotated PCAs were used. An unrotated solution is a so-called direct solution, 
that is, originating directly from correlational matrices, while derivated solutions result 
from rotation and are obtained from direct solutions. In this thesis, no use was made of 
any rotation, because a rotation would rotate out the general component. Justifi cation 
for this decision was found in the literature on factor analysis. If you are looking for 
separate, contrasting factors and want to avoid a general factor, you need to rotate 
(e.g., for the purpose of test validation). A rotation, however, should not be used if 
the theoretical expectation suggests that a general factor may occur (Gregory, 1996). 
Unrotated solutions are frequently applied in exploratory factor analysis, summarizing 
interrelationships between a number of variables. In this thesis, PCAs were performed 
to fi nd an answer on one of the research questions, that is, to establish whether 
metacognitive skills are general or domain specifi c by nature. Using PCAs as a tool to 
address this issue was in line with prior studies (Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman 
& Verheij, 2003; Veenman, Wilhelm & Beishuizen, 2004). It certainly would have been 
interesting to perform confi rmatory factor analysis as well (see Veenman, Elshout, & 
Meijer, 1997). Then the purpose is to confi rm that variables fi t a certain pattern predicted 
by a theory. Lisrel and SEM are examples of such model-testing programs. Unfortunately, 
the sample was too small to do so. Hayduk (1987) stated that goodness of fi t can be 
estimated for small samples, but only in experimental designs (cf. Veenman et al., 1997). 
The studies in this thesis, however, do not have an experimental design. 
 In this chapter, several checks were performed in order to rule out confounding 
effects due to the longitudinal design. In summary, loss of participants did not cause a 
selective loss of participants, repeated measures of metacognitive skills did not lead a 
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signifi cant difference in rating between the moments of rating, intellectual ability can 
be considered as the same construct over the years, and no signifi cant difference in the 





The studies in this thesis addressed developmental changes in metacognitive skillfulness 
in young adolescents aged 12 to 15 years. The research aimed to gain insight in (a) whether 
metacognitive skills grow in frequency and/or in quality during young adolescence; 
(b) how metacognitive skills relate to intellectual ability as predictors of learning 
performance during this period in life; (c) whether metacognitive skills are general or 
domain specifi c by nature in young adolescence. It was expected that metacognitve 
skills would show a continuous increase both in frequency and in quality (hypothesis 1). 
Furthermore, it was expected that metacognitve skills would have a unique contribution, 
on top of intellectual ability, to the prediction of learning performance. Moreover, it was 
expected that intellectual ability and metacognitive skills would develop in a monotonic 
way as predictors of learning performance (hypothesis 2). Finally, it was predicted that 
metacognitve skills would tend to generalize across development (hypothesis 3). In 
this fi nal chapter, the fi ndings of the longitudinal study (Chapters 2 – 4) and the cross-
sectional study (Chapter 5) will be summarized and discussed.
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7.1 Summary of the fi ndings
7.1.1 Growth of metacognitive skills
Results from the longitudinal study concerning the growth of metacognitive skills were not 
quite as expected. Based on prior cross-sectional studies that investigated metacognitive 
skills from a developmental perspective (Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004; 
Veenman & Spaans, 2005), a continuous increase of metacognitive skills was expected. 
Between the fi rst and the second year (13 to 14 yrs.) a substantial growth was found, 
indeed, in both frequency and quality of metacognitive skills. This growth, however, 
did not continue after the second year (between 14 and 15 yrs.). Only in one of the 
subscales, metacognition scores increased continuously over the three consecutive 
years, whereas most of the subscale scores leveled off or regressed in the third year. 
Results of the cross-sectional study in this thesis, on the other hand, did reveal a growth 
between 14 and 15 yrs. These contradictory results are rather remarkable, because the 
same math tasks were used for the same age groups in both the longitudinal study and 
the cross-sectional study. In conclusion, the fi ndings in the longitudinal study do not 
allow for fully accepting the fi rst hypothesis of this thesis. 
 On the level of subscales of metacognitive skills, two general developmental 
patterns were found: Growth between the fi rst and the second year, followed either by 
stabilization or by regression. Only one subscale met the expectation of continuous 
growth over the three years. The quality of planning and evaluation activities in math 
increased between the fi rst and the second year and then stabilized, whereas these 
activities increased in the cross-sectional study. The quality of elaboration activities 
in math was stable over the fi rst two years and then regressed; in the cross-sectional 
study, no change occurred in elaboration activities. In history, the quality of orientation 
increased between the fi rst and the second year and then stabilized. The quality of 
elaboration activities was stable over the years, while the quality of evaluation increased 
between the fi rst and the second year and then regressed. For the quality of planning in 
history, it was the other way around. Quality of planning activities decreased between 
the fi rst and the second year and then increased.
 The frequency of metacognitive activities showed another pattern than the quality 
did. In math, the frequency of metacognitive skills increased in all subscales between 
the fi rst and the second year in the longitudinal study. Between the second and the 
third year, however, frequency decreased, while there was an increase in frequency of 
metacognitive skills in the cross-sectional study (except for the number of orientation 
activities). In history, the frequency of orientation showed a continuous growth over 
Chapter 7
118
the years. The number of planning activities increased between the fi rst and the second 
year and then stabilized. Evaluation activities increased in frequency between the fi rst 
and the second year and then regressed. For elaboration, it was the other way around; 
frequency of elaboration decreased between the fi rst and the second year and then 
increased. 
 One salient conclusion can be drawn from the results of the longitudinal study: 
Metacognitive growth is not strictly continuous in young adolescents. In the current 
longitudinal study, most of the subscales of metacognition show discontinuity in growth 
between 14 and 15 years. 
 A relevant issue to discuss concerns the question why in the longitudinal study no 
continuous growth of metacognitive skills was found, whereas in prior cross-sectional 
studies (Veenman et al., 2004; Veenman & Spaans, 2005) linear growth was reported. 
Veenman et al. (2004) assessed metacognitive skills at the age of 9 yrs., 14 yrs., 17 yrs., 
and 22 yrs. They found a steep linear developmental growth over these four points in time. 
Veenman and Spaans (2005) found a strong growth in metacognitive skills between 13 
and 15 years (fi rst and third year in secondary education). It has to be noticed, however, 
that the interval between assessments was two years or more. If intervals of assessments 
are rather extended, growth mistakenly may be characterized as continuous, that is, 
uninterrupted, whereas growth may in fact not be continuous. In that case, results of the 
present longitudinal study would not contradict results of prior studies: Metacognitive 
skills show an overall increase between 13 and 15 years. So, it can be argued that over 
a more extended time span metacognitive skills will grow continuously, albeit with one 
or more period(s) of discontinuity within that time span. 
 A related issue concerns the fact that patterns of growth between 14 and 15 
years in the present cross-sectional study (Chapter 5) only partly correspond with the 
longitudinal study of this thesis. Differences in interpretation of fi ndings between the 
present longitudinal study on the one hand, and the studies of Veenman and colleagues, 
and the present cross-sectional study on the other hand, might be due to differences 
in design. Longitudinal studies might be more sensitive than cross-sectional studies to 
detect changes, for example discontinuity, in development. Any differences between 
groups are excluded by a longitudinal design with the same participants, thereby 
reducing the error of variance. 
 Methodological issues, like selective loss of participants or lack of consistency in 
rating throughout the consecutive years that can occur in longitudinal designs, could be 
responsible for the difference in results as well. Therefore, several checks were performed 
in order to ensure that methodological issues did not account for the difference in results 
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(see Chapter 6). Despite methodological risks that are inherent to longitudinal designs, 
in the last decade several researchers in the fi eld of cognitive and neurocognitive 
developmental studies advocated a more frequent use of longitudinal designs (Bullock 
& Schneider, 2009; Casey, Tottenham, Liston, & Durston, 2005; Crone et al., 2006). In 
their opinion, longitudinal designs would be more sensitive to detect and follow changes 
during development, relative to cross-sectional designs. In general, it does not become 
clear from cross-sectional studies whether results on developmental trends based on 
group means are also valid on the individual level. Improvements on the group mean 
level could be due to some children making enormous progress, whereas others remain 
stable or even decline. In a 10-year longitudinal study on verbal-memory development 
(Schneider, Knopf, & Sodian, 2009), it was found that individual children changed their 
relative position in the sample between two measurements. Therefore, the model that fi ts 
the group data does not always adequately describe intra-individual changes. Children 
showed leaps (“jumpers”) and U-shaped curves in memory-strategy development. Thus, 
the pattern of linear growth indicated by the group mean development obtained from 
cross-sectional studies sometimes can be misleading. 
 Looking closer into the data of the present longitudinal study, some intra-
individual changes are found too. Between the fi rst and the second year almost half 
of the participants showed a ‘leap’9 (in problem solving the leap was predominantly 
forward; in text studying some leaped forwardly, others backwardly) in the use of 
metacognitive skills. Between the second and the third year about one third of the 
participants ‘leaped’, either forwards or backwards for both tasks. These intra-individual 
changes would have not been revealed in a cross-sectional study. They do not become 
clear either from group mean data in a longitudinal design that wash out individual 
differences. For example, it seemed that for some participants not much was happening 
regarding changes in applying metacognitive skills in text studying, whereas others 
showed rather big ‘leaps’. From (neuro)cognitive developmental studies it is known that 
there is a large individual variability in brain structure among individuals, especially 
during development (Casey et al., 2005). Furthermore, in dynamic-systems theories 
(Siegler, DeLoache, & Eisenberg, 2010), a class of theories that focus on how change 
occurs over time in complex systems, it is stated that individual children acquire skills 
at different ages and in different ways, and that their development entails regressions 
as well as progress. Results of the longitudinal study are in line with this notion of 
individual variability. Young adolescents not only differ substantially from each other 
in their use of metacognitive skills, they also differ within themselves from moment to 
9 Leap means a change of 50% or more
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moment, or from task to task. During development, both progress and regression occur, 
and not all components of metacognitive skillfulness develop at the same pace. It seems 
that metacognitive skills are still in an unsettled developmental phase during young 
adolescence. 
7.1.2 Metacognitive skills in relation to intellectual ability
As far as known, in this thesis the mixed model was tested for the fi rst time in a 
longitudinal design, including both text-studying and problem-solving tasks. Previous 
studies that found evidence for the mixed model across age groups were studies 
with a cross-sectional design without text studying (Veenman et al., 2004; Veenman 
& Spaans, 2005). Further evidence for the mixed model was found in a number of 
non-developmental studies, including problem-solving or text-studying tasks (Elshout & 
Veenman, 1992; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman & Elshout, 1991, 1995, 1999; 
Veenman, Elshout, & Busato, 1994; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; Veenman, Kok, 
& Blöte, 2005; Veenman & Verheij, 2003). 
 Results of the present longitudinal study show that metacognitive skills had their 
own unique contribution, on top of intellectual ability, to the prediction of learning 
performance in line with the mixed model. In the three consecutive years, metacognitive 
skills had a unique contribution to the prediction of learning performance, regardless 
of tasks and domains. These fi ndings are in line with results of the afore-cited studies 
that investigated the relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skills as 
predictors of learning performance. 
 In the cross-sectional study of this thesis results corroborated the mixed model as 
well, with the exception of the frequency of metacognitive skills in 14-year-olds. The latter 
had no contribution to the learning performance at all. Both in the longitudinal and the 
cross-sectional studies of this thesis, the contributions of intellectual and metacognitive 
skills vary. Sometimes the contribution of intellectual ability outweighs the contribution 
of metacognitive skills; sometimes it is the other way around. Fluctuations in unique 
contributions over the years, however, were not signifi cantly different (see Chapter 
6). Therefore, results of this thesis allow for the conclusion that the mixed model is 
considered to be stable throughout the period of young adolescence.
 Another important issue, addressed in the second research question, was to 
investigate whether the development of metacognitive skills is intelligence-related 
or relatively intelligence-independent. Alexander, Carr, and Schwanenfl ugel (1995) 
compared the metacognition of gifted vs. non-gifted children. They found support for a 
monotonic growth of metacognitive knowledge and intelligence. However, their results 
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were inconclusive regarding metacognitive skills. In this thesis, the relation between 
intellectual ability, metacognitive skills, and learning performance was investigated 
from a developmental perspective. The monotonic development hypothesis is based 
on two presuppositions: A development of metacognition parallel to intellectual 
development, and the appropriateness of the mixed model for describing the relation 
between metacognition and intellectual ability as predictors of learning performance. 
 Two other developmental hypotheses, the acceleration hypothesis and the ceiling 
hypothesis (Alexander et al., 1995), do not relate to the mixed model. Instead, these 
models can be related to the intelligence model (Veenman, 1993) as the infl uence of 
intellectual ability on metacognition either increases or diminishes with age. Finally, 
the independency model (Veenman, 1993) fi ts none of Alexander’s hypotheses, since 
it predicts that there is no relation between intelligence and metacognition at all. In 
the fi rst and the second year of the longitudinal study, support was found for a parallel 
development of intellectual ability and metacognitive skills as predictors of learning 
performance. In this period, intellectual ability and most of the metacognition subscales 
increased signifi cantly. After the second year, metacognitive growth was hardly found, 
apart from a few subscales of metacognition. In the cross-sectional study, however, 
signifi cant growth between 14 and 15 years occurred in both intellectual ability and 
metacognitive skills. Apparently, the relation between metacognition and intellectual 
ability does not develop strictly according to the acceleration hypothesis, nor according 
to the ceiling hypothesis. Moreover, the relation between metacognition and intellectual 
ability does not fi t better or worse with the intelligence model over age. Therefore, both 
the acceleration and the ceiling hypothesis can be rejected as a model for describing 
the relation between metacognition and intellectual ability during development. 
In the previous paragraph the discontinuity in metacognitive growth was discussed. 
If development of metacognitive skills is not strictly continuous, it cannot be strictly 
monotonic either. The monotonic development hypothesis (Alexander et al., 1995), 
however, is based on two presuppositions. The fi rst one, that is, a development of 
metacognition parallel to intellectual development, was not found systematically over 
the years. The second one, that is, the appropriateness of the mixed model for describing 
the relation between metacognition and intellectual ability, was found systematically. 
Metacognitive skills keep on having their unique contribution to learning performance on 
top of intellectual ability, thus supporting the mixed model (Veenman, 1993). Although 
the various components of intellectual ability (numerical and verbal reasoning, visual-
spatial ability, and memory), and metacognitive skills (orientation, planning, evaluation, 
and elaboration) did not develop all at the same pace, the overall relation between 
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intellectual ability and metacognitive skills as predictors of learning performance was 
not affected. As stated above, the mixed model can be considered as stable in young 
adolescence. This means that the present fi ndings corroborate the fi rst part of the second 
hypothesis. In conclusion, results do not corroborate the second part: Metacognive skills 
did not always develop parallel to intellectual ability. Although the second hypothesis 
cannot be fully accepted, it was demonstrated that metacognitve development is not 
directed by intellectual development. The ‘autonomous development hypothesis’ might 
be a more appropriate name for describing the relation between metacognitive and 
intellectual development, because metacognitive skills follow their own developmental 
trajectory in an autonomous way.
7.1.3 Generality vs. domain specifi city of metacognitive skills
Results of the fi rst two years of the longitudinal study showed that 13- and 14-year-olds 
resorted mainly to general metacognitive skills, but also to domain-specifi c metacognitive 
skills to a lesser extent. Metacognitive skills of 15-year-olds, on the other hand, appeared 
to be fully general. Relative to prior studies (Prins, 2002; Schraw et al., 1995; Veenman & 
Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 1997, 2004; Veenman & Verheij, 2003), the opportunity 
for fi nding domain specifi c and general components of metacognitive skillfulness was 
enhanced in this thesis by maximizing the difference between both tasks and domains at 
the same time. Problem solving in the domain of math was contrasted with text studying 
in the domain of history. Moreover, a broad range of metacognitive skills was assessed 
from thinking-aloud protocols in a longitudinal design, with measurement intervals of 
one year. By doing so, the conditions for detecting transitions in the domain specifi city 
or generality of metacognitive skills over age were optimized. 
 Results of prior studies concerning the issue of metacognitive skills being general 
or domain specifi c were contradictory (Glaser, Schauble, Raghavan, & Zeitz, 1992; 
Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; Schraw et al., 1995; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; 
Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman & Verheij, 
2003; Veenman et al., 2004). One of the reasons for contradictory results is dissimilarity 
between the studies (see Chapter 1, section 1.3). The study that is most comparable to 
the present study is the study by Veenman and Spaans (2005). In both studies 13- and 
15-year-olds had to solve math word problems. In both studies it was concluded that 
between the age of 13 and 15 years a generalization of metacognitive skills took place, 
resulting in metacognitive skills being general for 15-year-olds. In Veenman and Spaans, 
however, metacognitive skills of 13-year-olds appeared to be predominantly domain 
specifi c. Apart from drawing a similar conclusion for the 15-year-olds, there were rather 
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important dissimilarities between the two studies. First, tasks and domains differed to a 
lesser extent. In Veenman and Spaans participants had to perform an inductive learning 
task in the domain of biology and to solve math word problems. In the present study 
math word problems were contrasted with text studying in history. Secondly, the number 
of participants per age group was smaller in Veenman and Spaans (two age groups of 16 
participants vs. N=25 in the present study). Furthermore, different methods for assessing 
metacognitive skills were used. Veenman and Spaans used systematic observation 
(math tasks) and log-fi le analysis (inductive-learning tasks). Because not all subscales 
of metacognitive skills could be assessed with log-fi le measures, log-fi le scores were 
validated by the analysis of a limited number of thinking-aloud protocols. Finally, another 
dissimilarity concerned the method of statistical analysis for investigating the generality 
vs. domain specifi city of metacognitive skills: A correlational analysis (Veenman & 
Spaans) vs. a principal component analysis in the present study. So, Veenman and 
Spaans, and the current study show some crucial methodological differences that might 
explain the difference in fi ndings concerning the 13-year-olds. 
 Schraw et al. (1995) suggested a compromise between domain-specifi c and 
domain-general hypotheses. They argued that domain-general monitoring skills emerge 
late in development and that they are preceded by modularized monitoring skills. In 
the same vein, Veenman and Spaans (2005) assumed that metacognitive skills initially 
develop on separate islands of tasks and domains and that beyond the age of 12 yrs. 
these metacognitive skills become increasingly general. Present results support the 
assumption that metacognitive skills tend to generalize across development, even if 
differences in tasks and domains were to be maximized. The generalization process, 
however, was less gradual than expected. Already in the fi rst two years, the general 
component was much stronger than the domain-specifi c component and there was 
hardly any difference between the PCA solutions of the fi rst two years. In the third year, 
however, the domain-specifi c component diminished rather abruptly. Therefore, it could 
be argued that prior to a fi nal generalization, metacognitive skills are predominantly 
general, complemented with domain-specifi c skills. In conclusion, based on the present 
results the third hypothesis can be accepted. A future longitudinal study starting in 
primary school would more fully test the hypothesis that metacognitive skills start to 




Refl ecting on the results of the longitudinal study of this thesis, the overall conclusion is 
that between the age of 12 and 15 years growth in frequency and quality of metacognitive 
skills was not continuous. Various components (orientation, planning, evaluation, 
and elaboration) of metacognitive skillfulness developed in a non-synchronous way, 
that is, not at the same pace. Several scenarios were found in the development of 
these components: No growth at all; growth between the fi rst two years followed by 
stabilization; growth in the fi rst two years followed by regression. While between the 
age of 14 and 15 years further growth was found in a limited number of components of 
metacognition, another interesting change in metacognitive skillfulness occurred at the 
same time: Metacognitive skills of 15-year-olds no longer appeared to be partly domain 
specifi c, but became fully general. 
 From the cross-sectional study of Veenman et al. (2004), it became clear that 
metacognitive skills continue to develop till at least the age of 22 years. Therefore, it 
can be argued that in the long term metacognitive skills will continue to develop till 
late adolescence, but the developmental trajectory will probably know some temporary 
holds and leaps in growth. During these delays growth might give room to other 
developmental changes. In this case, growth could have made room for the transition 
of metacognitive skills from general and partly domain specifi c in the period between 
12 to 14 years to fully general at the age of 15 years. This transition can be considered 
as a qualitative change that does not come without any effort of the learner. Therefore, 
this change may not go hand in hand with a further increase in frequency or quality of 
metacognitive skills, resulting in an intermittent growth at the age of 15 years. Maybe 
due to cognitive overload, growth and transition cannot develop at the same time, but 
occur alternately. Metacognitive skills are considered as procedural knowledge (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.1), that is, a production system of condition-action rules acquired 
in specifi c domains for specifi c tasks (Anderson, 1996; Veenman, 2011; Winne, 2010). 
The condition part of production rules triggers certain activities (actions) of the learner. 
When the reach or scope of these condition parts extends, production rules merge 
and can be applied more generally, initiating the transfer of production rules to other 
tasks and other domains. The intermittent growth of metacognitive skills could mean a 
temporary hold on the action part of production rules. They do not expand for a while 
as alternative actions parts of former individual production rules have to be tuned to 
the new, generalized conditions. This generalization process of conditions could be 
considered as a qualitative change for which the growth of action parts temporarily has 
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to give way. Once students are capable of transferring metacognitive skills that were 
acquired in one context to another, different context, they will continue to increase the 
frequency and quality of their metacognitive activity. 
 Salomon and Perkins (1989) distinguished low-road from high-road transfer. 
Low-road transfer involves spontaneous, automatic transfer of highly practiced skills, 
with little need for refl ective thinking. High-road transfer, on the other hand, involves 
the explicit conscious formulation of abstractions in one situation that allows for 
making a connection to another situation. In the same vein, Adams (1989) distinguished 
direct transfer from mediated transfer. The former involves a direct mapping from one 
problem-solving situation to another on the basis of superfi cial similarities between two 
problem situations, whereas the latter may transcend superfi cial differences between 
problem situations. In mediated transfer, students are capable of applying principles and 
procedures that have been abstracted from previous training problems to new situations. 
According to Salomon and Perkins (1989), low-road transfer comes as a result of extended 
practice in behaviors or cognitions. In contrast, high-road transfer results from mindful, 
controlled processes that decontextualize the elements that are to be transferred. It 
should be noted that Salomon and Perkins explicitly stated that metacognitive guidance 
appear to play a major role in high-road transfer. It can be argued that students could not 
apply high-road transfer -a conscious and metacognitively guided process-, and at the 
same time enhance the frequency and quality of their metacognitive skills. This could 
also explain the stabilization in growth at the time metacognitive skills tend to fully 
generalize. Future research must prove whether this explanation for intermittent growth 
is sustainable.
 In summary, this thesis has shown that (1) Metacognitive skills do increase 
spontaneously in frequency and quality during young adolescence, albeit not 
continuously. The various subscales of metacognitive skillfulness do not develop at the 
same pace; (2) Metacognitive skills have their own contribution to the prediction of 
learning performance, on top of intellectual ability. The relation between intellectual 
ability and metacognitive skills as predictors of learning performance is not affected by 





In this section educational implications of two of the conclusions of this thesis are 
discussed. First, results obtained in this thesis show that metacognitive skills grow 
between the age of 12 to 15 years. It should be noticed, however, that this growth 
is not continuous, and that there are substantial differences in individual growth on 
the overall level, as well as on the various subscales of metacognitive skillfulness. 
Although spontaneous growth in metacognitive skills takes place, that is, growth without 
interventions that explicitly aim at training metacognitive skills, the developmental 
trajectory of metacognitive skills is a lengthy and ‘bumpy’ trajectory with alternating 
periods of progress, stabilization, and regression. Pressley (1986, p. 154): “Developing 
good strategy use is a formidable educational challenge, one that probably requires 
many years. Considered in this light, it is not surprising that few and small general effects 
follow from classroom interventions that span a semester…” A fi rmly-rooted use of 
metacognitive skills will neither develop totally spontaneously, nor can it be attained by 
short-term interventions. At the same time, however, in modern (secondary) education 
a lot is demanded from students in terms of taking responsibility for their own learning 
process by regulating, controlling, and refl ecting (on) it. In other words, students need 
well developed metacognitive skills in order to be successful in secondary education. 
In many studies it was found that metacognitive skills in both problem solving and 
math (Cardelle-Elawar, 1995; Chinnappan & Lawson, 1996; Kramarski & Mevarech, 
2003; Masui & De Corte, 1999; Veenman et al., 1994; Veenman et al., 2005) as well 
as in reading and text studying (Boulware-Gooden, Carreker, Thornhill, & Joshi, 2007; 
Houtveen & Van de Grift, 2007; Pressley & Gaskins, 2006; Souvignier & Mokhlesgerami, 
2006) can be trained successfully. The interventions in the afore-cited studies were 
performed in widely varying age groups, school levels, and levels of intellectual ability. 
So, educators could foster the development of metacognitive skills by teaching them 
explicitly. There are three conditions for training programs of metacognitive skillfulness 
formulated in the literature (Veenman et al., 2006). In order to be successful, (1) training 
must be offered over an extended period of time, (2) students have to be convinced 
of the usefulness of trained skills (informed training), and (3) the skills to be acquired 
have to be trained in the context of a domain. Based on results of the current study, 
a fourth condition could be added, that is, metacognitive-skill components should 
be trained for which the time is right in terms of the developmental trajectory. The 
training of certain skills should be attuned to the spontaneous development of the same 
skills. For example, if young students of a particular age hardly refl ect spontaneously, 
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then, probably training refl ection as metacognitive activity will not be very effective 
at that time. If, on the other hand, spontaneous refl ection starts to develop, training 
will be more effective. Not only teachers, but also authors of methods for teaching 
should consider which component(s) of metacognitive skills has to be offered when. For 
example, in recent methods for teaching text comprehension in primary school much 
more attention is paid to metacognitive skills relative to older methods. Some of the 
recent methods are so-called concentric methods. In these methods, in every grade the 
same metacognitive skills are trained, albeit at different levels. It might be more effective 
to make a selection of skills, resulting in metacognitive-skill training that is more attuned 
to the developmental trajectory of that particular skill. For example, evaluation activities 
in history increased between 13 and 14 years. This could be an appropriate moment to 
foster this development as a teacher. By doing so and by stressing the importance of this 
particular skill in a critical period, the regression that followed the increase might be 
prevented.
 Secondly, results in this thesis not only show a spontaneous growth in metacognitive 
skills, at least between 13 and 14 yrs., but also a spontaneous transformation of 
metacognitive skills to fully general skills. Nickerson, Perkins, and Smith (1985) noted 
that one especially prominent point in the teaching of metacognition is its relationship 
to transfer. According to them, there is the possibility of treating transfer itself as a 
metacognitive skill and attempting to train it directly. By doing so, generalization and 
transfer are no longer considered as “hoped-for-by-products” (p. 301) of teaching. 
Instead, students have to be made aware of the importance of transfer by giving them 
explicit instructions with respect to how to attain transfer. Brown (1978) argued that, 
as part of the training procedure, students should be informed that the skill they are 
acquiring can be useful in a variety of contexts. Next, they should be challenged in 
learning to recognize those situations for which a particular skill is appropriate. In 
other words, transfer itself should be taught as a metacognitive skill. So, educators are 
challenged not only to implement metacognitive-skill training within the scope of their 
own fi eld, but also to generalize this instruction, to teach expectations for transfer, and 
to expect transfer beyond the boundaries of their fi eld. Teachers of different disciplines 
should do so concurrently, while referring to one another during their classes (Veenman 
et al., 2004). Such coordinated teaching requires commitment of both the individual 
teachers and the school organization (Pressley & Gaskins, 2006). 
 Despite the proven usefulness of teaching and training metacognitive skills, 
teachers seem to have problems incorporating such training in their daily practice. 
Knowledge about the concept of metacognition often is lacking. In many cases 
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metacognition is regarded as equivalent for ‘learning to learn’ or ‘independent learning’, 
without knowing how metacognitive-skill training should be implemented (Veenman, 
Kok, & Kuilenburg, 2001).
 Waeytens, Lens, and Vandenberghe (2002) interviewed 53 secondary-school 
teachers about their subjective interpretations and the way they implement ‘learning to 
learn’. The majority of teachers has a narrow sense of ‘learning to learn’. In the opinion 
of these teachers, ‘learning to learn’ is limited to giving tips and general advice, mostly 
to younger and less able students. 
 Zohar (1999) found that teachers’ intuitive (i.e., pre-instructional) knowledge of 
how to teach metacognitive skills is unsatisfactory for the purpose of teaching higher-
order thinking in science classrooms. Moreover, most teachers are inclined to think that 
the teaching of strategy use and higher-order thinking skills is predominantly suited for 
students with high IQs (Zohar, Vaaknin, & Degani, 2001). Dignath and Büttner (2008) 
performed a meta-analysis on self-regulated learning interventions that were integrated 
in normal teaching contexts in primary and secondary schools. It was inferred from 
this meta-analysis that training programs performed by researchers (researcher-directed 
interventions) had better results than training programs performed by teachers (teacher-
directed interventions), which may be the consequence of inadequate or insuffi cient 
teacher training. In order to take up their role as promoter of metacognitive skills in 
students, teachers should be thoroughly educated in the teaching and training of those 
skills. 
7.4 Limitations and directions for further research
Due to the method chosen for assessing metacognitive skills (analyzing thinking-aloud 
protocols), it was not possible within the frame of this thesis to follow a large number of 
participants for more than three consecutive years. As a result, some limitations should 
be considered. One of the limitations is the rather small number of participants. Due 
to the labor intensiveness of analyzing thinking-aloud protocols of individual student 
sessions, it was not feasible to work with a larger sample. Another limitation is the 
fact that all participants came from the same school. Both limitations could have 
affected the generalizability of the results. Furthermore, the period of data collection, 
three consecutive years, was rather short relative to the entire period of adolescence. 
The period between 12 and 15 years offers an interesting, though limited window on 
adolescence. Finally, the current study relied on one particular on-line method for 
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assessing metacognitive skills, that is, the analysis of thinking-aloud protocols. Thinking-
aloud protocols depend on verbalization of executed skills with the risk of missing out 
highly automated skills that are not verbalized. Perhaps, thinking-aloud measures did 
not capture all metacognitive activities.
 Knowing that brain maturation goes on till the early twenties at least, it would be 
very interesting to follow students for an extended period of time across development. 
A longitudinal design, starting in primary school (around the age of 8 years) and ending 
in late adolescence (around the age of 25 years), should be considered for future 
research. A more realistic, that is, pragmatic alternative might be an overlapping roof-
tile construction of cross-sectional and longitudinal research combined in one study. In 
such a design, one group of participants will be followed for a number of consecutive 
years (e.g., at the age of 8, 9, and 10 yrs.), and another group of participants will be 
followed at different, partly overlapping ages (e.g., at the age of 10, 11, and 12 years). 
A third group from 12 – 14 yrs., and so on. This way a lengthy period can be covered 
by a relatively short period of data collection. To monitor development closely, intervals 
between assessments should be no longer than one year. In such a roof-tile design, the 
focus will be on processes of change instead of describing steady states at different ages 
as is the case in cross-sectional studies. 
 Apart from the analysis of thinking-aloud protocols, there are several other 
methods to assess metacognitive skills, either on-line or off-line (see Chapter 1, section 
1.6). Using more than one method in future research will make it possible to cross-
validate and complement a particular method with another one (Veenman, in press). A 
multi-method design will enable the assessment of metacognitive skills in a more fi ne-
grained way. For example in text studying, eye tracking could be added to thinking aloud 
(Kinnunen & Vauras, 1995). This way, navigating through the text can be registered as a 
monitoring activity without verbalizations of the student. 
 In the present study, stabilization in growth took place in the same period that 
metacognitive skills became fully general. These two changes in development were 
considered and interpreted as related developmental processes. This study could not 
establish whether the concurrence of the two changes was coincidental or crucial 
for 14-15 yr. olds. Future research with more participants performing widely varying 
tasks over a longer period of time could give more insight whether the two concurrent 
developments found at the age of 15 yrs. can be replicated as a stable pattern, or whether 
the concurrence was coincidental. Moreover, following students over a period from the 
age of 8 till 25 years could establish whether more periods of intermittent growth concur 
with a transformation process of generalizing metacognitive skills. If metacognitive skills 
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indeed initially set out on separate islands (Veenman & Spaans, 2005) and become fully 
general during development, there should be at least one period prior to the age of 12 
yrs. where intermittent growth and generalization concur. Especially for the educational 
fi eld, it would be relevant if future research would address this issue again. 
7.5 Final remark
In Chapter 2 (section 2.1.2), the question was asked whether metacognition could be 
reduced to cognition (Slife et al., 1985). This thesis has shown that the answer must be 
in the negative. Metacognition has its own contribution to learning performance and its 
own developmental trajectory. Because not all components of metacognitive skillfulness 
develop at the same time or at the same pace, it is important that teachers foster the right 
components at the right time during development. By doing so, educators can have a 
valuable contribution to make the developmental trajectory of students’ metacognitive 
skillfulness a less bumpy one. 
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In de laatste decennia wordt van jonge adolescenten reeds bij aanvang van het voortgezet 
onderwijs in toenemende mate verwacht dat zij zich gedragen als actieve, zelfstandige 
leerders. Zij worden daarmee voor een groot deel verantwoordelijk gesteld voor hun 
eigen leerproces en studieresultaat. Om hierin succesvol te zijn, dienen leerlingen zich 
zorgvuldig te oriënteren op hun leertaak. Vervolgens dienen zij hun leeractiviteiten te 
plannen en uit te voeren op een systematische en ordelijke manier, hun eigen leren te 
monitoren en te evalueren en ten slotte te refl ecteren op de uitvoering en de uitkomst. 
Kortom, zij dienen te beschikken over metacognitieve vaardigheden. Uit verschillende 
overzichtsstudies blijkt dat metacognitieve vaardigheden een sterke voorspeller van 
leerresultaat zijn (Veenman, 2008; Wang e.a., 1990). 
 Het onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrift is gericht op de ontwikkeling van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden bij jonge adolescenten (12 – 15 jaar). Metacognitieve 
vaardigheden zijn vaardigheden die leerlingen aanwenden om hun cognitieve 
processen te sturen, te reguleren en te controleren. Bij metacognitieve vaardigheden 
worden activiteiten onderscheiden die vóór (oriëntatie), tijdens (plannen; evaluatie) of 
na (elaboratie) de taakuitvoering plaatsvinden. De frequentie en de kwaliteit van deze 
activiteiten worden in dit onderzoek gemeten met behulp van de hardop-denkmethode 
(Veenman, 1993). De ontwikkeling van metacognitieve vaardigheden wordt onderzocht 
in relatie tot intelligentie, waarbij de focus ligt op de bijdrage van beide variabelen 
aan de voorspelling van leerresultaat. Het gaat hierbij nadrukkelijk om het spontane 
gebruik van metacognitieve vaardigheden bij ecologisch valide schooltaken, dus niet 
voorafgegaan door enige expliciete training. Tevens is de aard van metacognitieve 
vaardigheden onderwerp van onderzoek. De vraag of metacognitieve vaardigheden 
algemeen of domeinspecifi ek van aard zijn, staat daarbij centaal.
 Piaget veronderstelde dat kinderen jonger dan 11 – 12 jaar niet in staat zijn hun 
eigen denken als object in beschouwing te nemen (Flavell, 1992). Pas met het bereiken 
van het formeel-operationele stadium zouden kinderen, volgens Piaget, zich bewust 
worden van hun eigen denken en denkprocessen. Uit recenter onderzoek blijkt dat 
kinderen reeds in de kleutertijd beschikken over elementaire vormen van metacognitieve 
vaardigheden (Blöte e.a., 2004; Whitebread e.a., 2009). Echter, met betrekking tot 
metacognitieve vaardigheden in een schoolse context wordt algemeen aangenomen dat 
deze zich beginnen te ontwikkelen tussen het achtste en tiende jaar (Berk, 2006; Kuhn, 
1999; Siegler, 1998; Veenman e.a., 2006). 
 Veenman (1993) beschrijft drie modellen voor de relatie tussen metacognitieve 
vaardigheden en intelligentie als voorspellers van leerresultaat. In het intelligentie-
model worden metacognitieve vaardigheden beschouwd als een onderdeel van 
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intelligentie. In dit model hebben metacognitieve vaardigheden geen zelfstandige 
voorspellende waarde voor leerresultaat. In het onafhankelijkheidsmodel, daarentegen, 
zijn metacognitieve vaardigheden en intelligentie onafhankelijke voorspellers van 
leerresultaat. In het gemengde model, ten slotte, zijn metacognitieve vaardigheden en 
intelligentie gecorreleerd, maar hebben metacognitieve vaardigheden ook een eigen, 
unieke bijdrage aan de voorspelling van leerresultaat. In de studies beschreven in de 
hoofdstukken 2, 3, 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift worden deze modellen getoetst bij jonge 
adolescenten. 
 Alexander e.a., (1995) formuleerden drie hypothesen met betrekking tot de relatie 
tussen intelligentie en de ontwikkeling van metacognitie. Hierbij werd de relatie met 
leerresultaat buiten beschouwing gelaten. De ‘ceiling’ en de ‘accelaration’ hypothesen 
veronderstellen een afnemend, respectievelijk toenemend effect van intelligentie op de 
ontwikkeling van metacognitie met de jaren. De ‘monotonic development’ hypothese 
veronderstelt een monotone groei van zowel intelligentie als metacognitie over de jaren. 
Alexander e.a., (1995) vonden een monotone ontwikkeling van zowel intelligentie 
als van metacognitieve kennis. Dit betekent dat de ontwikkeling van metacognitieve 
kennis niet wordt gedirigeerd door intelligentie. Met betrekking tot metacognitieve 
vaardigheden waren de resultaten echter niet duidelijk. In de onderzoeken beschreven 
in de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift worden de hypothesen van Alexander 
e.a. getoetst met betrekking tot metacognitieve vaardigheden.
 De vraag of metacognitieve vaardigheden algemeen of domeinspecifi ek van 
aard zijn, is in de afgelopen decennia regelmatig onderwerp van onderzoek geweest. 
Resultaten leverden geen eensluidende conclusie op. Voor zowel een algemene als een 
domeinspecifi eke aard werd evidentie gevonden. Doordat studies op tal van punten 
verschilden (leeftijd en onderwijsniveau van de participanten, taken, meetmethoden 
van metacognitie) is het moeilijk de uitkomsten van de verschillende studies met elkaar 
te vergelijken. In de huidige studie is getracht het verschil in taken en domeinen te 
maximaliseren ten opzichte van eerdere studies. Hierdoor is de kans op het vinden van 
een domeinspecifi eke component geoptimaliseerd. In de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 is de 
aard van metacognitieve vaardigheden onderzocht vanuit een ontwikkelingsperspectief. 
Hierbij is de focus gericht op de vraag of en hoe de aard van metacognitieve vaardigheden 
verandert tijdens de ontwikkeling van jonge adolescenten. Schraw e.a., (1995) 
veronderstellen dat de algemene aard van metacognitie pas laat in de ontwikkeling 
ontstaat en dat de algemene aard wordt voorafgegaan door domeinspecifi eke 
vaardigheden. In dezelfde lijn, veronderstellen Veenman en Spaans (2005) dat meta-
cognitieve vaardigheden zich aanvankelijk ontwikkelen op aparte ‘eilandjes’ van taken 
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en domeinen. In de loop van de ontwikkeling, vanaf ongeveer twaalfjarige leeftijd, 
zouden de metacognitieve vaardigheden vervolgens steeds algemener van aard worden. 
 De studies beschreven in de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 vormen samen een 
longitudinaal onderzoek. Dezelfde leerlingen zijn gedurende drie opeenvolgende 
jaren gevolgd. Elk jaar voerden zij hardop denkend een tekstbestuderingstaak voor 
het vak geschiedenis en een probleemoplostaak voor het vak wiskunde uit. De taken 
werden jaarlijks aangepast aan het leeftijdsniveau. Aan de hand van de verkregen 
hardop-denk protocollen werd aan iedere participant een score toegekend voor de 
kwantiteit (frequentie) en de kwaliteit van zijn/haar metacognitieve vaardigheden. 
De metacognitieve activiteiten werden gecodeerd als behorend bij één van de vier 
subschalen (oriëntatie, planning, evaluatie of elaboratie). De individuele totaalscore 
voor metacognitieve vaardigheden werd gevormd door de som van de score op de vier 
subschalen. De kwantitatieve score werd vastgesteld aan de hand van het aantal keren 
dat de activiteiten optraden; de kwalitatieve score werd vastgesteld aan de hand van een 
vooraf opgesteld scoringsmodel. Daarnaast werd elk jaar een intelligentietest en een 
natoets voor beide taken afgenomen.
 De studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 is een cross-sectionele studie. Hierin werden 
twee groepen leerlingen van verschillende leeftijden vergeleken. Zij voerden hardop 
denkend een wiskunde taak uit. Ook bij deze leerlingen werd een intelligentietest en 
een natoets afgenomen.
 In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het eerste jaar van de longitudinale studie beschreven. 
Tweeëndertig eerstejaars leerlingen uit het voortgezet onderwijs (VWO, HAVO en 
VMBO-T) namen deel aan het onderzoek. Dit onderzoek richtte zich op de relatie 
tussen intelligentie en metacognitieve vaardigheden als voorspellers van leerresultaat. 
Daarnaast werd de algemene vs. domeinspecifi eke aard van metacognitieve vaardig-
heden onderzocht. 
 In een individuele sessie werd de leerlingen gevraagd hardop denkend een 
tekst te bestuderen over de Amerikaanse Burgeroorlog. De daarop volgende natoets 
bestond uit meerkeuze vragen en open vragen. In een andere individuele sessie kregen 
de leerlingen als probleemoplostaak opgaven voor het vak wiskunde voorgelegd. De 
daarbij behorende natoets bestond uit parallelle opgaven. De scores op de natoetsen 
resulteerden in de leermaten voor beide taken.
 De eerste onderzoeksvraag betrof de bijdrage van enerzijds intelligentie en 
anderzijds metacognitieve vaardigheden aan het leerresultaat. De resultaten van dit 
eerste onderzoek ondersteunen het gemengde model. Volgens dit model correleren 
intelligentie en metacognitieve vaardigheden met elkaar, maar draagt metacognitie 
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ook zelfstandig bij aan de voorspelling van het leerresultaat, bovenop de bijdrage van 
intelligentie. 
 De tweede onderzoeksvraag betrof de algemeenheid versus domeinspecifi citeit 
van metacognitieve vaardigheden. Een principale componenten analyse (PCA) op de 
metacognitie data resulteerde in een twee-componenten oplossing. De eerste, sterke 
component kan worden geïnterpreteerd als representant van algemene metacognitieve 
vaardigheden, terwijl de tweede, zwakkere component domeinspecifi eke meta-
cognitieve vaardigheden representeert. Hieruit kan de conclusie worden getrokken dat 
metacognitieve vaardigheden van brugklassers zowel algemeen als (nog) domeinspecifi ek 
van aard zijn. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 worden de resultaten van het tweede jaar van de longitudinale 
studie beschreven en vergeleken met die van het eerste jaar. Wegens verhuizing of 
verandering van school zijn vier participanten afgevallen, zodat de beschreven resultaten 
betrekking hebben op de overgebleven 28 participanten. 
 De taken bestonden in het tweede jaar uit een tekstbestuderingstaak over de 
Eerste Wereldoorlog en een aantal probleemoplostaken voor wiskunde. De taken en 
natoetsen zijn qua formaat gelijk gehouden aan het eerste jaar, maar de inhoud is qua 
moeilijkheidsgraad aangepast aan de leeftijdsgroep.
 Resultaten laten zien dat tussen het eerste en tweede jaar van het voortgezet 
onderwijs metacognitieve vaardigheden toenemen. Dit geldt zowel voor de kwantiteit 
(frequentie) als voor de kwaliteit van metacognitieve vaardigheden.
 Evenals in het eerste jaar, ondersteunen de resultaten ook in het tweede jaar het 
gemengde model. Dit betekent dat ook in het tweede jaar metacognitieve vaardigheden 
deels onafhankelijk van intelligentie bijdragen aan de voorspelling van leerresultaat. 
Resultaten zijn niet alleen in lijn met het gemengde model (Veenman, 1993), maar 
ook met de monotone ontwikkelingshypothese (Alexander e.a., 1995). Metacognitie en 
intelligentie ontwikkelen beide monotoon.
 Tussen het eerste en tweede jaar is nagenoeg niets veranderd met betrekking tot 
de aard van metacognitieve vaardigheden. In het tweede jaar is vrijwel dezelfde PCA-
oplossing gevonden als in het eerste jaar. Ook de metacognitieve vaardigheden van 
tweedeklassers zijn zowel algemeen als (nog) domeinspecifi ek van aard.
 In hoofdstuk 4 worden de resultaten van het derde en tevens laatste jaar van 
de longitudinale studie beschreven. Het doel van dit onderzoek was de resultaten van 
derdeklassers te vergelijken met die van eerste- en tweedeklassers. Ten opzichte van 
het tweede jaar namen drie leerlingen minder deel aan het onderzoek. Ook deze drie 
leerlingen vielen uit wegens verhuizing of verandering van school. De beschreven 
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resultaten in hoofdstuk vier hebben dan ook alleen betrekking op de overgebleven 25 
participanten. 
 De taken bestonden in het derde jaar uit een tekstbestuderingstaak over de 
economische depressie van de jaren dertig in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika en een 
aantal probleemoplostaken voor wiskunde. De taken en natoetsen zijn qua formaat 
gelijk gehouden aan voorgaande jaren, maar de inhoud is qua moeilijkheidsgraad 
aangepast aan de leeftijdsgroep.
 Resultaten laten zien dat de gevonden groei van metacognitieve vaardigheden 
tussen het eerste en het tweede jaar zich niet voortzet tussen het tweede en het derde 
jaar. Er is dus geen sprake van een continue groei over de gehele periode tussen 12- en 
15-jarige leeftijd. Dit geldt zowel voor de kwantiteit (frequentie) als voor de kwaliteit 
van metacognitieve vaardigheden. 
 Het gemengde model blijft stabiel over de drie jaar. Ook in het derde jaar 
dragen metacognitieve vaardigheden deels onafhankelijk van intelligentie bij aan de 
voorspelling van leerresultaat. In tegenstelling tot metacognitieve vaardigheden, laat 
intelligentie wel een continue groei zien over de gehele periode. Dit betekent dat 
resultaten van het derde jaar de monotone ontwikkelingshypothese niet bevestigen. 
 In het derde jaar verandert de aard van metacognitieve vaardigheden. De 
principale componenten analyse (PCA) laat nog steeds een eerste sterke, algemene 
component zien, terwijl de tweede, zwakkere component niet langer als domeinspecifi ek 
kan worden geïnterpreteerd. Rond de leeftijd van vijftien jaar lijkt zich een belangrijke 
ontwikkeling met betrekking tot metacognitieve vaardigheden te voltrekken: de groei 
stagneert, terwijl de aard verandert naar louter domeinoverstijgende vaardigheden.
 In hoofdstuk 5 worden de resultaten van een cross-sectionele studie beschreven. 
In deze studie is opnieuw onderzocht of kwantiteit (frequentie) en kwaliteit van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden toenemen met leeftijd. Tevens is de relatie van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden met intelligentie als voorspellers van leerresultaat 
onderzocht. Participanten waren 29 tweedeklassers en 30 derdeklassers van het voortgezet 
onderwijs (VWO, HAVO en VMBO-T). Zij voerden dezelfde probleemoplostaken en 
natoetsen voor wiskunde uit (behorend bij hun leeftijdsgroep) als de participanten van de 
longitudinale studie. Intelligentie werd gemeten met behulp van een gestandaardiseerde 
intelligentietest. Maten voor metacognitieve vaardigheden zijn wederom verkregen uit 
de analyse van hardop-denkprotocollen.
 Resultaten tonen een groei in kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve scores voor 
metacognitieve vaardigheden. De kwantitatieve scores op de subschalen ‘planning’ en 
‘evaluatie’ maakten de sterkste groei door. In relatie met intelligentie werd evenals in 
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de longitudinale studie het gemengde model gevonden. Hoewel dit model in beide 
leeftijdsgroepen werd gevonden, was de voorspellende waarde van metacognitieve 
vaardigheden voor het leerresultaat, bovenop die van intelligentie, sterker bij de oudere 
groep. Resultaten ondersteunen de monotone ontwikkelingshypothese (Alexander e.a., 
1995): een monotone groei van metacognitie en intelligentie over de jaren.
 In hoofdstuk 6 worden enkele methodologische kwesties besproken met betrekking 
tot de longitudinale studie. Het betreft hier een aantal controles dat is uitgevoerd met 
behulp van statistische toetsen met als doel mogelijk verstorende effecten als gevolg 
van de longitudinale opzet uit te sluiten. De belangrijkste conclusies van deze controles 
waren dat de uitval van participanten niet heeft geleid tot selectieve uitval, dat er geen 
signifi cant verschil is gevonden wat betreft het relatieve moeilijkheidsniveau van de 
natoetsen over de drie jaren, en dat het herhaald meten van metacognitieve vaardigheden 
met telkens een onderbreking van een jaar niet heeft geleid tot een signifi cant verschil in 
het toekennen van kwalitatieve scores. 
 In hoofdstuk 7 worden de resultaten van de studies samengevat en besproken. 
De eerste conclusie die getrokken kan worden uit de resultaten van het longitudinale 
onderzoek is dat zich discontinuïteit voordoet in de ontwikkeling van metacognitieve 
vaardigheden van jonge adolescenten. Na een aanvankelijke toename van zowel de 
frequentie als de kwaliteit van deze vaardigheden tussen het eerste en tweede jaar van 
het voortgezet onderwijs, trad in het daarop volgende jaar stabilisatie of zelfs regressie 
op. Op basis van eerdere cross-sectionele studies van Veenman e.a. (2004) en Veenman 
en Spaans (2005) werd een continue groei verwacht. In deze studies waren de intervallen 
tussen meetmomenten echter groter, minimaal twee jaar. Het zou kunnen dat over een 
langere periode een continue toename zich voordoet, maar dat binnen die periode 
één of meer periode(n) van discontinuïteit bestaan. Bij grotere intervallen worden 
kortdurende, tijdelijke veranderingen niet gezien. Resultaten van de cross-sectionele 
studie gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 5, komen slechts gedeeltelijk overeen met die van de 
longitudinale studie. In de cross-sectionele studie was wel sprake van een toename van 
metacognitie tussen tweede en derde jaar van het voortgezet onderwijs. Het is mogelijk 
dat het verschil in resultaten tussen enerzijds een longitudinale studie en anderzijds 
cross-sectionele studies mede veroorzaakt wordt door het verschil in onderzoeksopzet. 
Longitudinale studies zijn mogelijk gevoeliger voor het vinden van veranderingen 
tijdens de ontwikkeling. Alle mogelijke, andere verschillen tussen groepen zijn immers 
uitgesloten. In recente ontwikkelingsliteratuur wordt dan ook regelmatig gepleit voor 




De tweede conclusie luidt dat het gemengde model door de data van elk jaar in 
het longitudinale onderzoek en de data van het cross-sectionele onderzoek werd 
ondersteund. De relatie van intelligentie en metacognitie als voorspellers van 
leerresultaat is daarmee stabiel gedurende de jonge adolescentie. Resultaten zijn in 
lijn met eerdere studies waarbij ook oudere adolescenten waren betrokken (Veenman, 
1993; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman e.a., 2004; Veenman & Verheij, 2003). 
 De derde conclusie betreft de aard van metacognitieve vaardigheden. 
Verondersteld werd dat deze vaardigheden zich aanvankelijk ontwikkelen binnen de 
context van taken en domeinen en dat gedurende de ontwikkeling deze vaardigheden 
algemeen van aard worden. De metacognitieve vaardigheden van eerste- en tweede-
klassers bleken inderdaad zowel domeinspecifi ek als algemeen van aard te zijn, terwijl 
die van derdeklassers nog uitsluitend algemeen van aard bleken te zijn.
 Rond het vijftiende jaar deden zich dus tegelijkertijd twee interessante 
veranderingen op het ontwikkelingstraject van metacognitieve vaardigheden voor: de 
groei stagneert, terwijl de aard verandert. Uit onderzoek van Veenman e.a. (2004) is 
bekend dat metacognitieve vaardigheden toenemen tot ten minste de leeftijd van 22 jaar. 
Aangenomen kan daarom worden dat de toenamestop slechts een tijdelijke onderbreking 
is. Tijdens deze stop vindt een verandering in de aard van de vaardigheden plaats. Een 
ingrijpende verandering die waarschijnlijk niet hand in hand kan gaan met een continue 
toename van metacognitie. Het tegelijkertijd voorkomen van toename én verandering 
van aard zou cognitieve overbelasting tot gevolg kunnen hebben. Metacognitieve 
vaardigheden worden beschouwd als procedurele kennis (zie hoofdstuk 1, paragraaf 
1.1), dat wil zeggen, als een productiesysteem van conditie-actieregels verworven binnen 
een specifi ek domein voor specifi eke taken (Anderson, 1996; Veenman, 2011; Winne, 
2010). Het conditiegedeelte van de productieregels zet bepaalde activiteiten (acties) 
van de leerder in gang. Als de reikwijdte van het conditiegedeelte toeneemt, kunnen 
productieregels voor specifi eke taken en domeinen samensmelten en veralgemeniseren. 
Vervolgens kunnen zij worden toegepast op andere taken en domeinen dan waarvoor ze 
oorspronkelijk zijn verworven. Een onderbroken groei in metacognitieve vaardigheden 
zou een tijdelijke stop op de uitbreiding van het actiegedeelte van de productieregels 
kunnen betekenen. Als leerders in staat zijn metacognitieve vaardigheden te transfereren 
naar een andere context dan waarin zij verworven zijn, zou er weer ruimte kunnen 
komen voor toename in frequentie en kwaliteit.
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Implicaties voor de onderwijspraktijk
Ook in de vroege adolescentie blijkt metacognitie, naast intelligentie, een sterke 
voorspeller van leerresultaat. De gepresenteerde resultaten kunnen bijdragen aan 
een zo effectief mogelijke ondersteuning door docenten en methodeontwikkelaars 
bij de verwerving en ontwikkeling van metacognitieve vaardigheden door leerlingen. 
De studies in dit proefschrift hebben aangetoond dat frequentie en kwaliteit van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden weliswaar spontaan, zonder expliciete training, toenemen 
tijdens de vroege adolescentie, maar dat deze ontwikkeling niet in een rechte opwaartse 
lijn verloopt. Tevens is gevonden dat in de ontwikkelingsfase van de vroege adolescentie 
zich grote individuele verschillen voordoen evenals verschillen in groeitempo tussen de 
subschalen van metacognitie. Samengevat, het ontwikkelingspad van metacognitieve 
vaardigheden is hobbelig: groei, stabilisatie en zelfs regressie na groei wisselen elkaar 
af. Een stevig verankerd structureel gebruik van metacognitieve vaardigheden is niet het 
gevolg van uitsluitend spontane ontwikkeling noch kan een dergelijk gebruik bereikt 
worden door kortdurende eenmalige interventies. Bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden is dan ook een langdurige uitdaging voor docenten 
en methodeontwikkelaars. In de laatste decennia hebben vele studies aangetoond 
dat metacognitie met succes trainbaar is. In de literatuur (Veenman e.a., 2006) is 
een drietal condities geformuleerd waaraan effectieve trainingsprogramma’s moeten 
voldoen. Ten eerste dient de training aangeboden te worden over een lange periode, ten 
tweede dienen leerlingen overtuigd te zijn van het nut van de te trainen vaardigheden 
(‘informed training’) en ten derde dient de training plaats te vinden in de context van een 
domein. Op basis van de resultaten van dit proefschrift zou een vierde conditie kunnen 
worden toegevoegd, namelijk dat de verschillende componenten van metacognitieve 
vaardigheden getraind dienen te worden op het daarvoor meest geschikte moment tijdens 
de ontwikkeling. De training van bepaalde vaardigheden zou moeten worden afgestemd 
op de spontane ontwikkeling van die vaardigheden. Bijvoorbeeld, als leerlingen van een 
bepaalde leeftijd spontaan vrijwel geen refl ectie op het eigen leren aan de dag leggen, is 
het waarschijnlijk weinig effectief om refl ectie als een metacognitieve activiteit uitvoerig 
te trainen op dat moment. Anderzijds, door tijdens een kritieke periode de training 
van een bepaalde vaardigheid sterk te benadrukken, kan regressie na groei wellicht 
voorkomen worden. 
 Een andere voor de onderwijspraktijk relevante bevinding uit dit proefschrift is 
dat naast een spontane groei van metacognitieve vaardigheden, er tevens sprake is van 
een spontane transformatie van de aard van metacognitieve vaardigheden. Rond het 15e 
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jaar vindt een volledige generalisatie van deze vaardigheden plaats. Het gevolg hiervan 
is dat leerlingen vaardigheden die zij hebben verworven binnen specifi eke taken en 
domeinen, nu ook meer kunnen transfereren naar en toepassen op nieuwe taken en 
domeinen. Hoewel de aard van metacognitieve vaardigheden (deels) spontaan lijkt te 
veranderen, kunnen docenten ook op het gebied van het bevorderen van transfer een 
belangrijke rol vervullen. Zij kunnen leerlingen wijzen op en trainen in de mogelijkheid 
bepaalde vaardigheden toe te passen op andere taken en domeinen. Een actieve 
benadering van de mogelijkheid voor transfer door docenten verlangt dat docenten over 
de grenzen van hun eigen vak kijken. 
Tot slot
Voor zover bekend is in dit proefschrift voor de eerste maal de ontwikkeling van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden van jonge adolescenten onderzocht in een longitudinale 
opzet. Als gevolg van de arbeidsintensieve meetmethode van metacognitieve 
vaardigheden (analyse van hardop denkprotocollen) is de omvang van het aantal 
proefpersonen, scholen en het aantal jaren dat proefpersonen zijn gevolgd, beperkt 
gehouden. Deze beperking zou van invloed kunnen zijn op de generaliseerbaarheid 
van de resultaten. De uitdaging voor toekomstig onderzoek is om de ontwikkeling van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden van een grotere groep adolescenten over een langere 
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• Not reading the title and/or subtitles of paragraphs  0
• No activity prior to task performance 1
• Some orientations while reading, not (entirely) prior to task performance 2
• Obvious orientation at text level (e.g., looking at the structure of the text; 3 
reading subtitles of paragraphs) prior to task performance
• Aforementioned activities, including deeper (e.g., stating expectations  4
about the content of the text prior to reading; activate prior knowledge)
Planning
• Absent  0
• Superfi cial action (e.g., rereading arbitrary parts without specifi c goal) 1
• Navigating through text with a goal or another planned activity  2
(e.g., selectively marking text parts; take notes)
• Aforementioned activities plus good time management  3
• Aforementioned activities plus executing a plan that was thought of in advance, 4
(e.g., fi rst reading whole text, followed by reading each paragraph and 
paraphrasing each paragraph in one’s own words before reading the next 
paragraph) 
Evaluation
• Absent  0
• Just utterances like “I don’t understand this”, not followed by any action  1
• Self-corrections after having noticed failure or misunderstanding  2
• Variety of deeper evaluation and/or monitoring (e.g., checking comprehension,  3
self-control by selecting text parts looking for information) 





• Absent  0
• Some shallow elaborations elicited by questions/assignments in the text,  1
not spontaneously 
• Some shallow elaborations during text reading (e.g., paraphrasing almost  2
literally) 
• As below, but not during the whole task performance  3
• Deeper elaborations with clear conclusions formulated in whole sentences 4 
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• Absent  0
• Reading the assignments/task demands carefully prior to task performance  1
• Reading the assignments/task demands prior to task performance plus  2
superfi cial orientations (e.g., verifying the number of assignments ) 
• Obvious orientation (visualizing the problem by making a sketch or by  3
schematizing important information) prior to task performance 
• Aforementioned activities, but deeper and more complete (e.g., activating  4
prior knowledge; relating to a previously encountered, similar problem) 
Planning 
• Absent 0
• Action plan consists in consulting explanation sheet, not followed by any action 1
• Action plan is executed only partly,followed by trial-and-error  2
• Action plan is executed partly, followed by a new plan 3
• Problem is solved by action plan that was formulated in advance  4 
Evaluation
• Absent  0
• Just utterances like “I don’t understand this”, not followed by any action 1 
• Self-corrections after having noticed failure or misunderstanding; uncertainty 2
leading to consult the explanation sheet
• Variety of deeper evaluation activities (e.g., checking comprehension,  3
self-control, verifying the outcome systematically, questioning the 
appropriateness of the plan) 




• Absent  0
• Occasionally relating the outcome to the assignment or problem statement  1
• Systematically relating the outcome to the assignment or problem statement 2 
• Concluding which information was important to solve the problem; stating  3
which information was redundant
• After having solved the problem, student refl ects on what was learned and its 4 
usefulness for future situations
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Correlations between intellectual ability, 
metacognitive skills, and learning performance 
over the years
Legend
1. Intellectual ability (IA) Number 
Series 13 yrs
2. IA Verbal Analogies 13 yrs
3. IA Unfolding Figures 13 yrs
4. IA Memory 13 yrs
5. IA Number Series 14 yrs
6. IA Verbal Analogies 14 yrs
7. IA Unfolding Figures 14 yrs
8. IA Memory 14 yrs
9. IA Number Series 15 yrs
10. IA Verbal Analogies 15 yrs
11. IA Unfolding Figures 15 yrs
12. IA Memory 15 yrs
13. Metacognition Math quality 
(MetaMQl) Orientation 13 yrs
14. MetaMQl Planning 13 yrs
15. MetaMQl Evaluation 13 yrs
16. MetaMQl Elaboration 13 yrs
17. Metacognition History quality 
(MetaHQl) Orientation 13 yrs
18. MetaHQl Planning 13 yrs
19. MetaHQl Evaluation 13 yrs
20. MetaHQl Elaboration 13 yrs
21. MetaMQl Orientation 14 yrs
22. MetaMQl Planning 14 yrs
23. MetaMQl Evaluation 14 yrs
24. MetaMQl Elaboration 14 yrs
25. MetaHQl Orientation 14 yrs
26. MetaHQl Planning 14 yrs
27. MetaHQl Evaluation 14 yrs
28. MetaHQl Elaboration 14 yrs
29. MetaMQl Orientation 15 yrs
30. MetaMQl Planning 15 yrs
31. MetaMQl Evaluation 15 yrs
32. MetaMQl Elaboration 15 yrs
33. MetaHQl Orientation 15 yrs
34. MetaHQl Planning 15 yrs
35. MetaHQl Evaluation 15 yrs
36. MetaHQl Elaboration 15 yrs
37. Metacognition Math quantity 
(MetaMQn) Orientation 13 yrs
38. MetaMQn Planning 13 yrs
39. MetaMQn Evaluation 13 yrs
40. MetaMQn Elaboration 13 yrs
41. Metacognition History quantity 
(MetaHQn) Orientation 13 yrs
42. MetaHQn Planning 13 yrs
43. MetaHQn Evaluation 13 yrs
44. MetaHQn Elaboration 13 yrs
45. MetaMQn Orientation 14 yrs
46. MetaMQn Planning 14 yrs
47. MetaMQn Evaluation 14 yrs
48. MetaMQn Elaboration 14 yrs
49. MetaHQn Orientation 14 yrs
50. MetaHQn Planning 14 yrs
51. MetaHQn Evaluation 14 yrs
52. MetaHQn Elaboration 14 yrs
53. MetaMQn Orientation 15 yrs
54. MetaMQn Planning 15 yrs
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55. MetaMQn Evaluation 15 yrs
56. MetaMQn Elaboration 15 yrs
57. MetaHQn Orientation 15 yrs
58. MetaHQn Planning 15 yrs
59. MetaHQn Evaluation 15 yrs
60. MetaHQn Elaboration 15 yrs
61. Learning Performance Math (LPM) 13 yrs
62. Learning Performance History (LPH) 13 yrs
63. LPM 14 yrs
64. LPH 14 yrs
65. LPM 15 yrs
66. LPH 15 yrs
Note: N=25
p < .05 if r ≥ .40; p < .01 if r ≥ .50
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2 .58
3 .70 .56
4 .18 .29 .29
5 .56 .53 .49 .45
6 .34 .59 .37 -.07 .59
7 .49 .39 .82 .33 .55 .20
8 .27 .06 .36 .44 .31 -.10 .53
9 .48 .39 .38 .40 .78 .36 .55 .23
10 .44 .58 .51 .11 .36 .63 .32 .03 .21
11 .35 .43 .61 .36 .60 .29 .77 .21 .75 .32
12 .17 .19 .43 .49 .41 .03 .63 .59 .37 .20 .40
13 .03 .28 .13 .09 .19 .01 .33 -.09 .17 .16 .37 .34
14 .55 .64 .58 .18 .61 .32 .70 .22 .55 .43 .61 .40 .48
15 .27 .32 .29 .14 .52 .25 .38 .04 .25 .06 .34 .22 .61 .45
16 -.04 .23 -.03 .39 .23 .20 -.01 .09 .24 .30 .18 .43 -.04 .06 -.31
17 -.11 .25 -.24 .09 .05 .15 -.36 -.46 .17 .18 -.04 -.14 -.03 .08 -.17 .43
18 .36 .33 .12 .12 .33 .11 .00 -.22 .27 .26 .18 .03 .25 .44 .08 .42
19 .03 .41 .09 .24 .27 .25 -.10 -.09 .15 .21 .08 .02 -.09 .20 .06 .37
20 .19 .36 .02 .08 .12 .02 -.04 -.39 .06 .26 .15 .00 .42 .44 .13 .31
21 -.23 .02 -.21 .06 .06 .17 -.28 -.43 .09 .15 .06 -.38 .05 -.09 .03 .09
22 .39 .44 .30 .28 .67 .40 .35 .26 .68 .31 .39 .21 -.04 .60 .14 .15
23 .23 .45 .13 .24 .52 .50 .23 .04 .40 .41 .42 .07 .23 .39 .34 .35
24 .30 .41 .17 .23 .62 .29 .35 .03 .63 .22 .51 .04 .26 .55 .44 -.01
25 .00 .43 .25 .35 .26 -.05 .43 .27 .23 .23 .52 .44 .42 .39 .16 .37
26 -.07 .17 .09 .07 .08 -.04 .16 -.06 .18 .01 .18 .25 .12 .20 -.04 .15
27 -.15 .41 .00 .12 .20 .29 .06 -.38 .11 .18 .26 .06 .44 .25 .41 .22
28 .02 .46 .20 .45 .42 .20 .29 -.10 .36 .28 .39 .21 .34 .41 .30 .22
29 -.04 .00 -.06 .18 .08 .18 -.08 -.01 .10 .20 .00 .19 .07 -.28 -.22 .38
30 .34 .59 .37 .36 .53 .34 .48 .35 .67 .35 .61 .41 .33 .51 .11 .44
31 -.04 .23 -.03 .39 .23 .20 -.01 .09 .24 .30 .18 .43 -.04 .06 -.31 1.00
32 .36 .55 .29 .29 .43 .23 .32 -.05 .58 .50 .57 .20 .47 .54 .18 .43
33 .02 -.05 -.10 .24 .00 -.21 -.04 -.05 -.07 .04 .04 -.05 .28 .00 .24 .09
34 .05 .24 .00 .23 .33 .10 .10 -.10 .40 .30 .27 .32 .43 .33 .21 .44
35 -.24 .17 -.15 .06 .08 .30 -.15 -.28 .18 .33 .17 .05 .17 .15 -.04 .49
36 .07 .30 .00 .34 .39 .13 .06 -.12 .43 .33 .30 .23 .26 .38 .06 .51
37 -.01 .13 .18 .33 .26 -.08 .36 .31 .11 .07 .42 .23 .56 .21 .65 -.20
38 .51 .43 .53 .24 .66 .23 .65 .21 .63 .18 .62 .32 .28 .86 .54 -.09
39 .10 .25 .32 .24 .30 .30 .32 .07 .08 .12 .36 .23 .55 .17 .76 -.14
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
40 .59 .74 .54 .35 .58 .27 .52 .03 .45 .34 .51 .21 .46 .81 .58 -.02
41 -.18 .17 -.01 .41 .17 .15 -.05 .04 .05 .06 .01 .22 -.11 .11 .02 .31
42 .19 -.07 .04 .33 .24 -.08 .02 .22 .00 -.03 -.12 .30 .17 .18 .17 .33
43 -.16 .20 -.12 .39 .09 -.02 -.21 .01 .03 -.05 -.01 -.04 -.09 .09 .09 .30
44 .27 .35 .02 .05 .26 .11 .01 -.27 .24 .19 .18 .07 .32 .47 .13 .23
45 -.36 -.07 -.25 .16 .06 .04 -.21 -.30 .03 .12 .18 -.26 .29 -.18 .15 .00
46 .27 .15 .19 .10 .53 .42 .25 .11 .54 .16 .30 -.06 .03 .31 .23 -.10
47 -.27 -.11 -.18 -.03 .05 .19 -.20 -.23 -.01 .02 .13 -.17 .12 -.26 .21 .07
48 .44 .55 .25 .25 .63 .44 .21 -.15 .47 .38 .41 -.07 .28 .51 .48 -.01
49 -.08 .24 .12 .37 .25 -.06 .25 .17 .07 .15 .36 .43 .57 .23 .50 .19
50 -.03 .34 .16 .22 .19 -.06 .31 .00 .31 .17 .39 .34 .49 .39 .10 .20
51 -.30 .10 -.03 .09 .01 .17 .05 -.23 .00 .10 .25 .11 .50 .01 .36 .10
52 -.29 .03 -.14 .23 .24 .02 .11 -.13 .35 .02 .28 .14 .29 .22 .04 .17
53 -.05 .07 .00 .07 .07 .18 -.15 -.35 -.07 .25 .05 -.06 .11 -.11 -.16 .35
54 -.10 .04 -.07 -.03 .43 .51 .04 -.21 .43 .13 .28 .11 .20 .21 .31 .18
55 -.23 -.01 -.17 .46 .08 .18 -.24 -.06 .01 .15 -.02 .14 -.08 -.31 -.17 .66
56 .18 .52 .29 .30 .27 .25 .30 -.03 .38 .62 .48 .31 .53 .42 .13 .51
57 -.08 .04 -.08 .37 .04 -.23 .09 .19 -.07 .15 .05 .19 .40 .16 .17 .11
58 -.16 -.04 -.14 .28 .19 .10 -.05 -.09 .24 .32 .23 .00 .09 .00 .01 .35
59 -.12 .04 -.22 .09 .01 .18 -.34 -.24 -.07 .07 -.14 -.14 .00 -.13 -.06 .31
60 -.26 .10 -.19 .33 .11 .07 -.15 -.24 .19 .25 .12 .11 .15 .04 -.13 .52
61 .64 .64 .64 .42 .75 .40 .71 .49 .61 .44 .56 .47 .22 .86 .40 .09
62 .41 .50 .24 .23 .60 .33 .12 -.10 .39 .36 .19 .13 .11 .56 .24 .17
63 .33 .45 .14 .22 .69 .36 .28 .19 .59 .31 .39 .31 .26 .64 .36 .32
64 .29 .46 .14 .28 .45 .26 .09 -.13 .29 .47 .15 .12 .22 .57 .23 .19
65 .32 .42 .41 .36 .67 .40 .49 .29 .75 .41 .64 .51 .19 .62 .17 .37
66 .22 .46 .04 .00 .32 .25 .00 -.19 .32 .23 .12 .04 .21 .48 .00 .35
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
18 .48
19 .56 .42
20 .43 .81 .30
21 .33 .27 .41 .17
22 .26 .36 .38 .16 .13
23 .13 .29 .38 .34 .40 .32
24 .10 .30 .20 .23 .24 .70 .37
25 .10 .15 .36 .27 -.09 .14 .27 .30
26 .24 -.06 .24 .19 -.21 .18 -.08 .07 .44
27 .36 .18 .47 .51 .31 .06 .63 .19 .40 .44
28 .46 .33 .44 .50 .24 .47 .40 .51 .48 .52 .71
29 .02 .08 -.33 -.07 .14 -.12 .03 -.19 -.16 -.35 -.15 -.09
30 .25 .36 .29 .17 .13 .49 .43 .41 .53 .12 .19 .42 .23
31 .43 .42 .37 .31 .09 .15 .35 -.01 .37 .15 .22 .22 .38 .44
32 .52 .58 .43 .51 .28 .39 .55 .39 .55 .27 .46 .56 .07 .73 .43
33 .04 .28 -.04 .41 .08 -.21 .04 .20 .21 .02 .14 .26 -.13 .09 .09 .19
34 .42 .61 .55 .57 .35 .34 .40 .37 .43 .27 .52 .58 .08 .48 .44 .69
35 ..65 .40 .45 .33 .45 .14 .43 -.03 .08 -.07 .44 .28 .26 .29 .49 .50
36 .58 .68 .54 .64 .50 .44 .49 .37 .31 .22 .50 .67 .16 .48 .51 .67
37 -.28 -.13 -.02 .03 .00 .03 .21 .32 .52 .13 .28 .33 -.19 .21 -.20 .22
38 .02 .36 .17 .30 .05 .66 .30 .63 .18 .11 .15 .37 -.35 .38 -.09 .34
39 -.29 -.14 -.02 -.01 .05 -.16 .39 .08 .12 -.06 .43 .18 -.03 .08 -.14 .09
40 .15 .42 .35 .53 .02 .39 .45 .48 .38 .28 .51 .56 -.32 .36 -.02 .55
41 .39 .25 .45 .32 .09 .40 .05 .21 .12 .15 .25 .51 -.13 .14 .31 -.04
42 -.03 .49 .11 .34 .03 .04 .23 -.18 -.11 -.13 .02 -.02 -.09 .04 .33 .13
43 .50 .36 .82 .30 .42 .31 .32 .20 .22 .02 .36 .40 -.36 .18 .30 .24
44 .38. .77 .23 .90 .02 .36 .27 .33 .18 .16 .38 .47 -.01 .23 .23 .40
45 .11 -.03 .10 .08 .75 -.05 .34 .17 .07 -.10 .33 .20 .14 .11 .00 .25
46 .00 .23 .21 -.04 .44 .54 .45 .47 -.22 -.14 .10 .29 .06 .34 -.10 .25
47 .14 -.01 .29 .04 .42 -.17 .53 -.12 -.03 -.15 .49 .11 .03 .01 .07 .19
48 .21 .53 .20 .47 .29 .61 .41 .81 .11 -.12 .26 .53 .04 .29 -.01 .37
49 -.07 .00 .23 .13 .05 -.05 .28 .27 .70 .16 .35 .26 -.13 .17 .19 .29
50 .31 .18 .33 .35 .00 .27 .17 .22 .75 .69 .51 .61 -.14 .49 .20 .65
51 .17 .03 .20 .21 .30 -.09 .48 .03 .20 .06 .67 .44 .10 .13 .10 .29
52 .38 .31 .29 .39 .35 .34 .26 .34 .30 .32 .50 .72 .08 .39 .17 .40
53 .11 .26 -.24 .21 .33 -.19 .02 -.16 -.27 -.26 -.01 -.08 .66 -.03 .35 .06
54 .23 .24 .13 .19 .36 .48 .38 .39 -.18 .12 .38 .38 .16 .21 .18 .17
55 .31 .22 .23 .18 .31 -.07 .36 -.19 -.05 -.09 .30 .26 .52 .11 .66 .16
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
56 .43 .46 .40 .43 .29 .23 .45 .26 .57 .25 .46 .54 .19 .67 .51 .90
57 .05 .00 -.16 .19 -.05 -.27 .05 .02 .29 .00 .09 .19 -.01 .15 .11 .22
58 .42 .30 .33 .24 .51 .11 .51 .09 .15 -.11 .37 .37 .30 .23 .35 .51
59 .34 .30 .41 .29 .27 -.16 .49 -.33 -.12 -.20 .42 .05 .19 -.02 .31 .22
60 .67 .50 .54 .52 .46 .23 .31 .18 .30 .24 .51 .69 .20 .36 .52 .52
61 -.03 .27 .23 .22 -.19 .66 .43 .53 .32 .16 .15 .41 -.24 .48 .09 .39
62 .44 .62 .47 .56 .24 .73 .31 .49 .12 .26 .29 .56 -.09 .24 .17 .41
63 .37 .52 .47 .42 .12 .73 .55 .69 .41 .20 .32 .54 -.23 .58 .32 .56
64 .51 .53 .35 .54 .26 .52 .19 .58 .18 .16 .21 .56 -.15 .26 .19 .40
65 .37 .31 .30 .06 .11 .64 .33 .43 .32 .05 .03 .29 .10 .66 .37 .55
66 .61 .71 .59 .59 .28 .48 .42 .25 .21 .25 .42 .49 -.04 .45 .35 .63
Correlations between intellectual ability, metacognitive skills, and learning performance over the years 
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33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
34 .29
35 -.09 .52
36 .17 .83 .62
37 .44 .16 -.13 .02
38 .03 .23 .03 .33 .24
39 .20 .00 .03 -.08 .67 .19
40 .20 .37 .11 .41 .30 .72 .34
41 .22 .26 .24 .36 .06 .24 .00 .11
42 .29 .26 .14 .25 .03 .17 .18 .19 .13
43 .15 .39 .43 .48 .13 .18 .07 .23 .65 .22
44 .25 .55 .27 .61 -.04 .38 -.11 .48 .42 .24 .22
45 .29 .22 .31 .23 .45 -.07 .36 -.06 .07 -.02 .24 -.09
46 -.14 .28 .23 .43 -.01 .39 .15 .27 .00 .10 .17 .08 .12
47 -.01 .21 .49 .21 .27 -.21 .53 -.12 .04 .01 .37 -.04 .54 .25
48 .17 .32 .12 .46 .25 .56 .21 .56 .29 -.04 .22 .57 .15 .48 .01
49 .21 .25 .00 .16 .69 .14 .54 .28 .05 .03 .24 -.02 .29 -.21 .20 .19
50 .08 .56 .14 .39 .34 .20 -.02 .40 .09 -.05 .10 .29 .15 -.14 -.07 .03
51 -.05 .26 .44 .31 .38 -.06 .63 .08 .14 -.05 .28 11 .44 .19 .79 .18
52 .20 .66 .44 .70 .12 .21 -.09 .22 .44 .00 .28 .48 .26 .41 .17 .28
53 .01 -.03 .37 .17 -.21 -.15 .10 -.09 -.07 .20 -.17 .07 .30 .00 .04 .15
54 -.07 .36 .44 .45 .09 .35 .29 .07 .36 .13 .17 31 .33 .55 .41 .45
55 .14 .26 .54 .43 -.06 -.33 .21 -.16 .34 .37 .36 .08 .30 .15 .50 .05
56 .25 .70 .56 .63 .27 .15 .20 .43 .02 .12 .23 .26 .33 .16 .22 .25
57 .72 .15 .11 .13 .41 .01 .22 .25 .07 .25 .04 .00 .23 -.19 -.12 -.05
58 .17 .59 .75 .66 .13 -.03 .04 .08 .10 .16 .33 .17 .45 .35 .52 .19
59 -.08 .32 .67 .36 -.22 -.27 .14 .07 .07 .36 .38 .24 .14 .20 .62 -.04
60 .29 .76 .65 .84 .00 -.04 -.13 .12 .54 .10 .53 .49 .32 .23 .33 .26
61 -.03 .20 .02 .33 .22 .77 .23 .75 .23 .18 .16 .33 -.29 .45 -.21 .53
62 -.09 .41 .16 .62 -.02 .59 -.08 .56 .40 .23 .34 .63 -.06 .34 -.15 .69
63 .13 .53 .21 .60 .22 .61 .07 .48 .38 .17 .41 .51 -.03 .40 .05 .60
64 .33 .40 .20 .59 .05 .53 -.07 .55 .47 .12 .34 .52 .05 .21 -.29 .65
65 -.22 .31 .41 .46 .08 .61 .07 .34 .24 .03 .21 .17 .00 .34 .00 .37
66 -.18 .57 .49 .74 -.25 .30 -.18 .44 .16 .20 .40 .59 -.13 .43 .11 .38
Appendix C
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49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
50 .38
51 .43 .20
52 -.02 .52 .33
53 -.11 -.29 .13 .10
54 -.04 -.01 .46 .44 .26
55 .05 -.15 .46 .24 .53 .36
56 .37 .60 .38 .36 .23 .17 .31
57 .31 .16 -.02 .17 .06 -.24 .12 .35
58 .07 .16 .36 .55 .20 .29 .56 .53 .25
59 -.09 -.08 .41 .23 .18 .13 .60 .21 .00 .60
60 .07 .41 .40 .80 .12 .36 .58 .58 .20 .71 .44
61 .21 .20 -.02 .17 -.22 .18 -.12 .27 .15 .01 -.07 .02
62 .10 .28 .04 .30 .01 .41 .03 .23 -.22 .11 .02 .35 .55
63 .34 .35 .17 .38 -.32 .45 .01 .39 .04 .18 -.02 .38 .66 .69
64 .20 .20 -.07 .32 .05 .24 .00 .35 .34 .14 -.13 .43 .54 .74 .66
65 .26 .28 .11 .24 -.01 .37 .05 .44 .00 .26 -.04 .25 .63 .48 .66 .47
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